

Genocide vs. Gynocide: Intersectional Identities and Sexual Violence Within Conflict

by Gillen Martin

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I. Introduction

Conflict can be understood as a ritual of human history in the sense that it entails repeated practices and assigns established roles to those involved. International humanitarian law, or the laws of war, have been developed to regulate this ritual. This strand of law proclaims itself to be gender neutral because it holds men and women in equal regard and protects them uniformly. This neutrality is problematic. War affects subjects in different ways depending on the identities they hold and on the roles that conflict, through pre-existing structures, consequently assigns them. International humanitarian law cannot account for the needs of subjects and survivors if it does not understand and account for the many ways that they experience trauma.

The Yugoslav Wars provided a clear example of international law and justice operating within an identity-rich conflict. Specifically, the mass rape of Bosnian Muslim women by Serbian combatants created a complex situation for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The debates that arose during

the prosecution of rapists for crimes against humanity, the first time that sexual violence alone had been charged as such, revealed the need for further theorization and understanding of identity within international humanitarian law and justice; the language that surrounded the tribunal formed a call for a more holistic perspective capable of analyzing how discriminatory structures may affect a survivor's experiences and needs.

The complexity of victims' experiences, because they were tainted by both patriarchy and constructed "ethnic" paradigms, was not discussed within the tribunal. As a consequence, the survivors' mental and physical long-term needs were not adequately attended to—creating larger problems for the Bosnian government. While the prosecution failed to address the gendered and "ethnic" aspects of the conflict, the rhetoric surrounding the tribunal's precedent-setting ruling reinscribed rape as a crime committed against women by men. The language subtly portrays sexual violence and gendered perspectives in international humanitarian law as a whole as *women's* issues. Furthermore, the media, academia, and other sources regarding the rapes often portrayed female survivors as without strength or agency—as "broken." This notion that women in a conflict could only be victims is harmful not only to the survivors it demeans, but also to the development and implementation of gender-neutral international humanitarian law. The ICTY cases that represented symbolic justice for the sexual violence committed against thousands of Bosnian civilians failed to address the intersectional identities of victims and predict their future needs, reinscribed stereotypes regarding sexual violence and gender roles within conflict, and revealed the work that needs to be done within international institutions of justice to move toward remedying these shortcomings. The tribunal, however, also revealed the value and potential of international criminal law to bring justice to victims and to contest established norms. Ultimately, these ICTY cases have initiated new conversations regarding the place of gender

and sexual violence in international humanitarian law—and these conversations must continue.

II. Fifty Years Later

The ICTY marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.¹ Half a century after the Holocaust, the tribunal prosecuted war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by white perpetrators against white victims that took place on European soil. The former Yugoslavia had entered an era of stability with the end of World War II under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito. His regime, and the popular support it amassed during his presidency, proved capable of holding the former Yugoslavia together until his death in 1988. Some, such as Beverly Allen, author of the historical account *Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia*, attribute a portion of his success in unification to his adamant opposition to nationalism and its manifestations.²

The power struggle set off by Tito's death in May 1980 provided an opportunity for nationalist leaders to rise within the individual republics that comprised the former Yugoslavia. The Serbian figure Slobodan Milošević designed a model for inciting nationalist tensions among the ethnic groups not neatly captured within individual territories. He gave a series of inflammatory speeches in an attempt to upset the delicate balance that Tito had created. These speeches focused on the mythos of a “Greater Serbia,” the ideal of a centralized state created along ethnic lines that would theoretically encompass Kosovo and Serb-dominated territories within Bosnia and Croatia. His rhetoric was intended to prime Serbs with a perception of themselves as part of a greater people; he encouraged them to use their superior numbers to force Serbian hegemony upon the regions. To achieve this hegemony, Milošević utilized a rhetoric of “cleansing the land” of non-Serbs.³ These speeches imbued nationalism with religiosity, identifying the

mythical Greater Serbia with Christianity and as an enemy of Islam.

Galvanized by his election to the Serbian presidency, Milošević served the republics of the former Yugoslavia with a choice: sink passively into a state run solely by Serbs, or declare independence from the state and face what may come. Bosnia declared independence. By January 2nd, 1992, thousands of Serbian troops were en route with tanks toward a state utterly unprepared for war. These forces would execute a centrally planned campaign in Bosnia to expel or exterminate Bosnian Muslims. Before the invasion, Serb army officers devised the Ram Plan, which was “the first official document establishing ‘ethnic cleansing’ as military policy” in Bosnia.⁴ Allen revealed some of the text from the minutes of the initial planning meeting among the officers:

Our analysis of the behavior of the Muslim communities demonstrates that the morale, will, and bellicose nature of their groups can be undermined only if we aim our action at the point where the religious and social structure is most fragile. We refer to the women, especially adolescents, and to the children.⁵

Serbian troops developed strategies that they repeatedly employed to enact the Ram Plan throughout the Bosnian countryside. A unit would form a perimeter around a town, set up roadblocks, send in messages for Serbs to leave, and open fire on the town.⁶ After a couple of days, once the residents had forsaken resistance, the bombardment would stop and the unit would invade. The Serbian forces—especially the paramilitary units—were brutal and inventive in their methods of terror, but rape was the most widespread method of torture for females. The documented ages of female Bosnian Muslim rape victims ranged from 5 to 81.⁷

After the initial invasion, the Serbian forces often separated the women from the men. The groups were segregated in camps. Men were usually subjected to “beatings, cannibalism, castrations, and other extreme forms of torture,” while women were repeatedly

Genocide vs. Gynocide

raped, often until impregnated.⁸

Besides the camps in which Bosnian Muslims were tortured or starved to death (and in which rape also occurred), there were those that served exclusively as “rape camps.” In the death camps, 90% of victims were killed after their rapes. In the “rape camps,” women were held and raped continuously until impregnation or death.⁹ There were at least forty-two of these locations recorded.¹⁰ The policy of rape was implemented not only to terrorize, defeat, and conquer Muslim populations, but also to destroy their ethnic identities. They attempted to do this by forcing women to bear “Serbian” children. As Irma Oosterman, a member of the prosecution investigation team, testified against Serbian leaders in July 1996, “the soldiers often told us that they were forced to do it...They wanted to make Serb or Chetnik babies.”¹¹

The estimated numbers of female Bosnian Muslim rape victims range from twenty thousand to fifty thousand.¹² The strategy was undoubtedly present from the beginning—the first wave of refugees reported such “rape camps” as early as June of 1992, not even six months after the invasion in January.¹³ As Allen states, never before had a genocide in progress been so visible, with so much information available, and yet still “consistently ignored”: “It can never again be said that the Western powers will surely intervene to stop genocide anywhere in the world.”¹⁴ Catherine A. MacKinnon, feminist, lawyer, and representative for female Bosnian and Croatian rape victims, stated that, “every country in the world had a legal obligation to stop the Serbs.”¹⁵

The idyllic region of Foca in the south eastern Bosnian countryside on the Drina river came under control of a Serbian paramilitary group in 1992. The atrocities that occurred there led to the first three cases within the ICTY and in international history where rape alone was charged as a crime against humanity.¹⁶ As

Susan Brownmiller noted in her 1975 study of rape, prosecutors had “mountains of evidence of systematic rape” at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and yet none of the charges included an indictment for rape.¹⁷ As some members of the ICTY prosecution team working on the rape cases discussed in the documentary *I Came to Testify*, women—who suffered in the same numbers as men—were absent entirely from the trials after World War II. Besides contesting for the first time the notion that wartime rape will always be an unfortunate side effect of conflict, the Bosnian trials were also some of the first international justice cases to be documented and prosecuted by women.¹⁸ The ways that the prosecution mounted and conducted their cases against Serbian rapists set a precedent in the development of international law on rape and other forms of sexual violence. The complex identities at play in the crimes also provided a unique case in which to examine how international humanitarian law can bring justice to victims whose gender, religion, or ethnicity were crucial to their being targeted. Finally, the ways in which victims, the ICTY, the media, and scholars of this subject debated and defined these cases of sexual-based violence show both the value of international justice and how it must be improved.

III. Intersectional Identities Under International Humanitarian Law

Conflict has a revelatory nature. The ways in which a war is waged and its various effects necessitate analysis of the structures and systems that preceded it. As Patricia A. Weitsman stated in her article “The Politics of Identity and Sexual Violence: A Review of Bosnia and Rwanda”: “War is the ultimate cauldron of identity politics.”¹⁹ In the Yugoslav Wars, the Serbian forces utilized identities and their associated cultural meanings in the formation of military policies so that they would have the maximum destructive force. International humanitarian law was itself created by male lawyers and military

Genocide vs. Gynocide

participants within a patriarchal culture, which assumed stable identities and assigned them significance. Gender norms have heavily influenced the development of law, especially surrounding conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions did not stand outside of history; as a Harvard Humanitarian Initiative podcast explains, the language they employ regarding sexual violence is distinctly gendered.²⁰ When men drafted international humanitarian law, they were not considering women in the sphere of combat. And if they were, it was solely as victims.

Armed conflict affects women, girls, boys, and men in different ways. The exclusionary silence regarding women means that the particular kinds of experiences that they endure have been largely ignored by international humanitarian law. For example, studies have shown that women and children are more affected by the long-term ramifications of conflict.²¹ In general, the laws that regulate warfare are fairly effective at being “gender neutral” in the sense that women and men are usually regarded equally as legal subjects.²² But a legal regime striving for neutrality will not have the intended neutral effect if it is operating within discriminatory structural settings. International humanitarian law cannot override patriarchies, and thus it must understand their effects. If individual subjects are affected differently because of the identities they hold, then there must be practices and systems in place that account for these variations. A gendered perspective in any work that deals with conflict is crucial; if the goal is to alleviate human suffering, then the mechanisms of achieving that must factor in how individuals usually experience life within a given society and the changes brought upon that experience by conflict.²³

Allen refers to the Serbian policy of sexual violence that targeted women as a “system of femicide,” stating that “in combination with ‘ethnic’ or religious identities, sexual and gender identities often determine whether one is raped or not, whether one lives or dies.”²⁴ Aside from the trauma of the violence itself, a victim’s identity also dictated how they experienced and dealt with the aftermath. The

Balkans, especially its rural areas, had a very conservative culture in the early 1990s that operated along strict, gendered lines.²⁵ Rape was perceived to be shameful for the female victims, whom society then deemed no longer “marriageable or socially viable.”²⁶ As Weitsman discusses, the Serbian policy was designed with this patriarchal devalorization of the victims, their families, and their communities in mind: “Rape becomes a particularly potent form of torture in patriarchal societies in which a woman’s standing derives from her relationship to the men in her family: her brothers, father, husband, and sons.”²⁷

The social and symbolic connection between a woman’s sexual experiences, consent aside, and her community’s respectability implies that a woman’s body belongs not entirely to herself, but also to her people—specifically, the men of her people. As Mary Ann Tétreault discusses in her article “Justice for All: Wartime Rape and Women’s Human Rights,” just as conceptions of individual rights have historically applied to men but not to women, the concept of individual ownership of the body has also been gendered: “the rights of women to control their bodies have almost always been inferior to similar rights of men.”²⁸ The international tribunals’ insensitivity to these patriarchal histories when handling sexual violence against women is matched by the attitudes of domestic legislative processes. In fact, “despite the inclusion of state-mediated rape as a category of human rights violation in international conventions, an unambiguous statement on a woman’s absolute right to sexual integrity was not made prior to the 1995 UN conference on women held in Beijing.”²⁹ A woman’s identity, no matter her country, no matter her culture, will always be tied to patriarchal legacies; her respectability will always be juxtaposed by her sexual relationships, “whether coercive or consensual.”³⁰

The Serbian policy of targeting Muslim women and girls utilized these patriarchal cultural structures to ensure that the terror inflicted on their victims would have significant ramifications throughout their

Genocide vs. Gynocide

communities. They made women into personal property; girls into sexual slaves. Witness 99 for the prosecution of the ICTY stated that the victims were often “treated more like cattle than human beings.”³¹ The Serb forces acted with the knowledge that the ownership they took over Bosnian women’s bodies was also—under patriarchal logic—stripping Bosnian Muslim men, who no longer had the ability to protect their women and children, of their masculinity. In this way, the ownership of women’s sexuality became a pawn of war—a sign of power. This uniquely gendered trauma that female victims endured had persistent effects after the war. Physician Toni Carr, who reported that she cared for rape victims over 75 years of age, stated that nearly all of the women she saw begged her not to tell anyone, not even their families: “The women’s feeling of shame is even deeper than their hurt or anger.”³² To complicate the processes through which many of the female victims have handled their trauma, the Serbian policy extended beyond sexual violence to forced impregnation—what many have called “genocide by rape,” or “genocidal rape.”³³

Although the Serb aggression in Bosnia has rightly been characterized as “ethnic cleansing,”³⁴ it has proven difficult for non-Balkans observers to grasp the complexity of the situation beyond the trope of ancient ethnic divisions and reinvigorated nationalism. As Allen states, U.S. observers in particular often considered the war to be “the most recent in an endless series of violent conflicts that somehow characterize *those people*.”³⁵ In reality, however, a tolerant, multicultural attitude had characterized much of the former Yugoslavia, “Bosnian cities in particular.”³⁶ As the witnesses and victims in the documentary *I Came to Testify* explained, there was a rapid transition within rural regions. Ethnicity had not previously mattered among neighbors and lifelong friends in towns such as Foca. In what seemed like a sudden change, however, most of the non-Muslims had been evacuated or had joined the armed forces.³⁷ Many have attributed this evolution from harmony to “ethnic” violence to the stirring speeches made by Milošević and other nationalist leaders,

but John Mueller provides an alternate explanation in his article “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War.’” He asserts that the Yugoslav army, “despite years of supposedly influential nationalist propaganda and centuries of supposedly pent-up ethnic hatreds,” largely refused to fight and disintegrated early in the war.³⁸ To remedy this lack of forces, he claims that the Serbian leadership recruited paramilitary forces from gangs or “bands of soccer hooligans”—even releasing criminals from prison specifically for their purposes.³⁹ This little-known reality sheds new light on the violence; rather than reenacting historic hatred, it could be the result of “a situation in which common, opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly nonideological marauders were recruited and permitted free rein by political authorities.”⁴⁰ Zagreb intellectual Nenad Popovic’s characterization of the Serbian aggression supports this narrative: “It is, he says, a military aggression performed in the name of an extremist nationalist mythos but without the foundation even of a nation-state.”⁴¹

Clarifying the fictitious role of ethnicity and nationalism within the conflict is crucial. But, however constructed or recent the divisions may have been, the trauma that victims endured was undoubtedly ethnically charged. As MacKinnon makes clear regarding the experiences of the women she represented, these were not “ethnically neutral” wartime rapes.⁴² Female victims that were raped with the goal of forced impregnation were “repeatedly told that they were being raped in order to ‘plant the seed of Serbs in Bosnia,’ to give birth to little ‘Chetniks,’ to deliver a Serbian baby, and so forth.”⁴³ Whether visions of a “Greater Serbia” or pure sadistic violence were on the minds of the perpetrators, the experience was genocidal for the victims. They were targeted by their “ethnic” or religious identity and tortured as supposed Muslim “filth.”⁴⁴

Michael Sells, Islamic History and Literature professor and author of *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia*, calls the rape of Bosnian Muslim women “gynocidal—a deliberate attack on women as childbearers.”⁴⁵ The perpetrators of the forced impregnations

Genocide vs. Gynocide

ensured that their actions would lead to forced maternity, holding the victims for months and only releasing them if it was far too late to terminate the pregnancy. This policy was not only an assault on these women's reproductive self-determination, but it also constituted a patriarchal attack on their ethnic identities. The Serbian ideology behind the forced impregnations was to communicate that female victims' "ethnic" and religious identities no longer allowed them to reproduce with the men of the same "ethnic" group—constituting a genocide by birth dynamic. As Allen states, this equation is a "glaring example of faulty logic": "to its perpetrators, such an equation was possible on the condition that they cancel every aspect of the mother's identity—her national, 'ethnic,' religious, and even genetic identities—other than that as a sexual container."⁴⁶ Weitsman succinctly communicates agreement with Allen's logic: "The women, in other words, serve as vessels that impart paternal identity."⁴⁷

To accept these forced impregnations as a form of genocide is to accept the perpetrators' patriarchal logic—to erase the connection between mother and child.⁴⁸ But the logic behind the Serbian policy, often violently communicated to victims during their rapes, undoubtedly contributed to the trauma of victims. Their experiences were stained with patriarchal erasures of their "ethnic" or religious identities, while it was understood that this very identity was why the Serbs targeted them in the first place. In the late summer of 1992, the survivors started to appear. As an 83-year-old Bosnian gynaecologist Sreko Simic recalled: "Most of them came alone, at night, so no one would see them. They were silent and full of shame and hatred. Often we would treat them but they would not speak. Some asked for abortions. Others gave birth and then rejected the child."⁴⁹ Female Bosnian Muslim victims experienced and dealt with ramifications of their traumas through structures of patriarchy and (constructed) constitutions of ethnicity. The complexity of these attacks on gender and "ethnic" identities was not addressed within mechanisms of international justice and the victims' needs were not provided for. This

intricate network of identity and harm provides a painful example of why international humanitarian law must evolve to encompass experiences involving plural, layered identities—identities that made one more vulnerable to trauma and its lasting impacts. If international mechanisms of justice fail to utilize this more holistic approach, then they fail to appreciate the ways that victims see themselves as situated within conflict; they fundamentally fail to understand the notion of harm itself.⁵⁰ International humanitarian law should be able to capture the complexity of identities because only then will it be able to adequately address victims.

IV. De-gendering Sexual Violence and Victimization

Sexual violence is not only committed against females. Rape can be used against men and children of both genders as well.⁵¹ Male victims are often unacknowledged—especially in times of conflict, when the male identity is assumed to be combatant—and such as the case within the international justice proceedings of the ICTY. There were many reported incidents of sexual violence committed against Bosnian Muslim men during the Serbian occupation.⁵² One particularly common tactic that Serb forces used to humiliate, shame, and degrade their victims was forcing them to perform sexual acts on each other. Branislav Vlaco, a Serb commander who ran a rape camp throughout 1992, also ran a bunker behind this camp where troops could go to watch male prisoners, “kept in subhuman conditions,” do just this.⁵³ Especially because all Yugoslav societies were “forcefully heterosexual,”⁵⁴ these experiences created absolutely different traumas and ramifications within the lives of males than those experienced by female survivors of rape or forced impregnation. Yet the prosecution’s strategy brought all of the sexual violence “under one rubric.”⁵⁵ Furthermore, the February 1993 UN report on “The Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia” defined rape in subtly gendered terms as well, stating it to be “an abuse

Genocide vs. Gynocide

of power and control in which the rapist seeks to humiliate, shame, embarrass, degrade, and terrify the victim. The primary objective is to exercise power and control over another person.”⁵⁶ As Allen pointed out, in a patriarchal context the phrase “abuse of power and control” automatically implies men controlling women, reinscribing “the image of the male over the female.”⁵⁷ As well-intentioned as the ICTY was in prosecuting rape, the rhetoric utilized implied that women were the sole targets of sexual violence while their strategy discounted the distinct experiences of male victims—erasing any possibility of post-trauma mental or physical aid for male survivors.

Institutions and individuals that were attempting to help victims often fell into traps of gendered assumptions regarding female victims as well. Forces on all sides of the tribunal and media debate treated women solely as victims, often characterizing them as “broken” and their rapes as “taking away whatever power of resistance they might have had.”⁵⁸ Allen reveals that even caregiver activists often harbored this conception of the women they helped; one stated that “These women’s lives are all past and no future.”⁵⁹ Karen Engle asserts in her article “Feminism and Its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina” that the UN and the ICTY at times treated women as part of the “concept of ‘women and children’”⁶⁰ that inadvertently reinforced their second class as a “special” category of humans in need of “special” protection.⁶¹ This deep-rooted tendency to reduce women’s roles in conflict to “broken” victims in need of protection along with children, has tangible consequences. Aside from demeaning the strength and agency of female survivors, studies have shown that female combatants in the Rwandan genocide who committed crimes were often served harsher punishments than their male counterparts—highlighting a deep social unease with women killing, or transgressing the assumed norms of conflict.⁶² Mechanisms of international justice have the potential to disrupt power dynamics and structures of inequality in place by revealing, discussing, and accounting for them. But this must begin by analyzing the gendered

ideologies in institutions such as the UN, or at play in tribunals such as the ICTY. Those handling sensitive cases must be conscious of the assumptions that they themselves harbor, noting the reality that everyone carries baggage and blind spots.⁶³

V. Conclusion

The atrocities committed during the Yugoslav Wars occurred over twenty years ago. After the war ended, the survivors attempted to cope. On a long-term basis, many female victims suffered social ostracism, severe psychological trauma, possible pregnancy, death by abortion, or suicide.⁶⁴ The rapes have also produced a generation of children who carried the pain of their conception. While the U.S. played a crucial diplomatic role in creating peace in the Balkans, the Dayton Accords did not account for these traumas.⁶⁵ Female and male victims alike have received little help, mentally or physically, since their rapes. As Saliha Djuderija, Assistant Minister for Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, admitted, “nobody has made this a priority. Now the problem is three times bigger than it was because nothing has been done for so long.”⁶⁶ The patriarchal dishonor that wrongly accompanies the identity of female rape victims has never been addressed, and this misplaced shame has encouraged survivors to suffer in silence. As psychiatrist Dubravka Salcic stated, “I would not talk about rape myself in the official healthcare system. People feel too stigmatised. They do not want to expose themselves as victims.”⁶⁷ In the documentary *I Came to Testify*, victims expressed the heartbreaking sentiment that they today feel as though their state is waiting for them to die so they are not anyone’s “problem” anymore.⁶⁸ By ignoring these survivors’ experiences and neglecting their specific gendered and “ethnic” charge, the state and the international community have failed to forecast and attend to their needs. This failure represents compliance with the discriminatory structures that shaped their trauma in the first place.

Genocide vs. Gynocide

Despite the flaws within the tribunal's approach to sexual violence and attacks on the identities of individuals, the prosecution of individual rapists revealed the value of international justice. These cases furthered the development of international criminal law that tries individual experiences, rejecting collective responsibility and allowing for analysis of the forces of identity—be it gender, religion, or “ethnicity”—that tainted the victim's specific trauma. The tribunal's prosecution of rape as a crime against humanity also spoke to the value of symbolic justice for victims. *I Came to Testify* revealed the differences that the prosecutions have made in the lives of survivors; as one victim stated, “we [could] still function as human beings” if these men could be convicted and jailed for their crimes. Furthermore, the documentary shows that there is still a culture of denial around the atrocities that occurred. When female survivors of a rape camp in Foca tried to return to the site of their torture and place a plaque, they were booed away by a mob largely comprised of Serbian women. If nothing else, the international conviction of their rapists serves as an official acknowledgement of what happened to them.⁶⁹ Every single witness for the prosecution of the Foca case had second thoughts, fears of retaliation, and fears of reliving their trauma. In the end, they all testified. As one woman explained, their dread was overcome by their desire for justice. She wanted the still operational Serb forces to know that, “If you rape, there is the possibility of prosecution.”⁷⁰ Perhaps the most important precedent that the tribunal established was to differentiate wartime rape, patriarchally understood as a “property crime,” from its place in the phrase “raping and pillaging,” in which one is the destruction of belongings and the other has a substantially higher human cost.⁷¹ The charge of rape alone as a crime against humanity asserts that sexual violence committed against human bodies is not just a side effect of war to be expected from soldiers and dismissed afterward. This consensus, that rape is a crime against the sexual determination of individuals in wartime as well as in peacetime, was groundbreaking. However, as Allen notes, the tribunal should have explicitly stated the

dynamics that “genocidal” rape added in combination with the effects of patriarchy in order to understand and account for the particular suffering it caused female victims.⁷² Furthermore, the prosecution should have differentiated between the sexual violence committed against male and female victims in their strategy and taken greater efforts to remove the gendered implications of their language in defining and discussing rape. The heart of international humanitarian law is ensuring humanitarian protection, and the only way to ensure that this protection does not discriminate or empower discrimination is to account for existing structures of inequality.

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ENDNOTES

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⁷ *Ibid.*

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Genocide vs. Gynocide

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¹⁵ Carol Anne Douglas, “Review: Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia—Herzegovina,” *Off Our Backs* 18 (March 1995): 18.

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¹⁸ Douglas, 18.

¹⁹ Weitsman, 562.

²⁰ Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, “Gender Perspectives on IHL,” *The Humanitarian Assistance Podcast*, podcast audio, February 17, 2016, accessed December 9, 2016, <http://atha.se/webcast/gender-perspectives-ihl>.

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²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

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²⁵ Colvin, lecture.

²⁶ Weitsman, 564.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Tétreault, 203; 199.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 199.

³⁰ Weitsman, 564.

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³⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

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⁴⁰ Ibid, 43.

⁴¹ Allen, 41.

⁴² Amy Hamilton, "Catharine A. MacKinnon to represent Croatian, Muslim war-time rape survivors," *Off Our Backs* 23.2 (February 1993): 3.

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⁴⁴ I Came to Testify.

⁴⁵ Engle, 792.

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⁴⁷ Weitsman, 565.

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⁴⁹ Sophie Arie, "Rape: a long lasting weapon," *BMJ: British Medical Journal* 341.7785 (December 11, 2010).

⁵⁰ Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, "Gender Perspectives."

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⁵⁴ Ibid, 23.

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⁵⁶ Allen, 119.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 119; 120.

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⁶⁵ Arie, "Rape: a long lasting weapon."

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⁶⁷ Ibid.

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Genocide vs. Gynocide

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⁷² Allen, 39.

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Gillen Martin

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