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FROM THE EDITORS

The journal you hold began with the belief that undergraduates need a new venue for sharing their academic work. The overwhelming response from our peers indicates that we were not alone in this belief; in the course of one month, we received over 80 submissions for publication.

This project is the product of a collaboration in which our undergraduate editors were paired with graduate readers to select outstanding papers from this competitive pool of submissions. As a group, the pieces exemplify the exceptional, original historical scholarship produced by Brown undergraduates; as individual papers they demonstrate a range of approaches to historical analysis.

In soliciting submissions we sought to extend our reach beyond that of Peter Green and Sharpe House to tap into the historical scholarship generated within departments across Brown's campus. Our interdisciplinary orientation is one to which we hope this journal holds strong. We will remain conscious of improving upon the diversity of selections in each of our issues.

Thirty-three years ago, the members of the History Departmental Undergraduate Group (DUG) embarked upon a similar project with similar goals in mind. Between 1974 and 1991, the DUG produced an undergraduate journal entitled *Clio*, after the Greek muse of history. Their publication is still preserved in an acid-free box in the University Archives, a testament to the endurance of undergraduate scholarship.

With hope for its own long run, we present The Brown Journal of History.

Samantha Seeley '07

David Beckoff '08

Editors-in-Chief

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REPRESENTING THE VANGUARD

NATANZEICHNER

Adapted from the senior honors thesis, "Becoming the Vanguard: Student Activism and Grassroots Organizing in the Greater São Paulo Area during the Abertura Period of the Brazilian Military Dictatorship".

On May 12 1978, one hundred tool-workers in the Saab-Scania factory in the industrial suburb of São Bernardo dos Campos stood idle by their machines in protest.¹ In one week's time, the number of auto-laborers refusing to work at the plant had grown to 1,800. Within a matter of weeks, hundreds of thousands of workers in the industrial neighborhoods outside of São Paulo followed suit, causing the first large-scale industrial-work stoppage in Brazil in a decade. In the course of the next three years, the industrial suburbs of Santo André, São Bernardo dos Campos, and São Caetano do Sul, also known as "the ABC," experienced a wave of labor activity that fundamentally changed the balance of power of the military regime. The strike movement that developed in the ABC region in the late 1970s was more than a manifestation of worker discontent over wages. Rather it was an explosion of civil opposition to the generals. As factories shut down throughout the Greater São Paulo area, neighborhoods began to reverberate with agitation. Protesting workers were quickly joined by community members and student activists in demanding an end to exploitative work conditions. Over the course of the following three years, a "new" independent labor movement emerged, capable of effectively challenging the military government's capacity for hegemonic social control over Brazil's working class.

In the late 1970s, new opposition movements developed in urban centers throughout Brazil. In 1977, a year before the workers in the Saab-Scania plant abandoned their machines, student activists made their voices heard. For the first time in a decade under the military regime, thousands of concerned university student activists marched in the streets demanding an end to the military government. The energy felt from this new generation of student activists permeated throughout all social sectors. As students continued to demand social change, their actions were closely followed in the working-class communities of São Paulo. Remembering the atmosphere in the Mercedes Factory in São Bernardo in 1977, autoworker and student activist, Celso Brambrilla, stated that "it appeared as if some sort of sentiment of dissatisfaction had manifested itself publicly Every lunch break we would discuss something. It was incredible, impressive, and imaginary. We believed that these acts of defiance were not limited to students, but could also occur right there in the Mercedes factory."²

When workers throughout the ABC region took action in May 1978, they were not

1 The Saab-Scania factory in São Bernardo produces buses and trucks. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1985), 194.

2 Celso Brambrilla, interview by author, mini-disc recording, July 8, 2006, São Paulo, Brazil.

alone. Both student activists and community leaders joined them in support of better working conditions, mobilizing a mass movement that effectively challenged the state's hold on power. Concentrated in the metropolitan São Paulo area, union leaders such as Luís Inácio "Lula" da Silva, president of the São Bernardo Metalworkers' Union, became popular symbols of a generation of middle and working-class people who yearned for economic, social, and political change.

By 1980, the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers Party, PT) was formed, in large part due to the participation and organization of numerous rank-and-file union activists and labor leaders who were associated with the strike movement led by the Metalworkers' Union in São Bernardo. While the labor movement emerged as the central oppositional civil force to the regime at this time, it is important to recognize the role played by student activists, neighborhood associations and progressive sectors of the Catholic Church in the development of the PT. The PT was emblematic of the construction of a "labor-oriented" political space in which diverse left-wing sectors of civil society, such as student and Catholic activists, would strive for democracy.

In this essay, I examine the social history of left-wing student activists who, in the late 1970s, made the strategic decision to assimilate into blue-collar communities located in the rapidly growing ABC region to bring their revolutionary ideals about popular organizing to fruition. Often finding employment in the burgeoning automotive labor sector, proletarianized students participated in union meetings and assemblies. They worked on official union newspapers and helped raise money for strike funds, thus becoming important union activists within the labor movement. The intention of this action was quite straightforward—the individuals selected were expected to integrate socially into different geographic communities in the ABC region, after which they were urged to become active participants in the union, as well as to secretly recruit rank-and-file workers into their respective left-wing groups. The social practice of proletarianization was, ultimately, part of a larger revolutionary agenda that during the late 1970s privileged the recruitment of industrial workers who were seen by these groups as representing the true Brazilian revolutionary "vanguard".

This essay focuses on events surrounding the student mobilizations of 1977 and the labor mobilizations that occurred in May 1978, the subsequent rise of an independent union and strike movement that emerged in the ABC region during this time, and the role students played in these events.³ In focusing my research on proletarianized student activists, I intend to provide the reader with a social narrative of the lives of these individuals, while weaving in the broader history of social and political change in the Greater São Paulo area during the labor mobilization of the late 1970s.⁴ Using oral testimonies collected in 2005 and 2006 from former proletarianized student activists, State Police (DOEPS) archives, mainstream and left-wing news journals, pamphlets, bulletins, and leaflets, I hope to paint a vivid picture of political activities in the blue-collar communities located in the ABC region during the wave of civil mobilizations in late 1970, which would, in effect, weaken the military's hold on power.⁵

3 The "new union" movement refers to a small group of labor leaders and activists that emerged as the leading proponent of systemic reform and democratization of the traditional labor structure that tied unions to the state.

4 I intend to use the research for this thesis in a larger study on student proletarianization from 1961-1984, which will comprise the individual histories of several student groups that actively proletarianized their members into metallurgic factories in the Greater São Paulo area prior to and during the military regime, to illustrate the social history of student proletarianization during the entire military dictatorship. The groups I am considering including in this future study are the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), *Ação Popular* (Popular Action, AP), *Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária* (Popular Revolutionary Vanguard, VPR), Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), *MR-8*, the *Liga Operária/Convergência Socialista*, and *Liberdade e Luta* (Freedom and Struggle).

5 Academics Thomas E. Skidmore, Marcia Helena Moreira Alves, and Elio Gaspari have made significant contributions to crafting broad political and social histories of the Brazilian military regime. Newer academic works have tended to focus on specific aspects of the dictatorship. There are many examples of scholarly works that explore the histories of the labor and student movements. However, several important studies have been particularly illuminating. Kenneth Erickson's *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working-*

I explore the image and identities of activists in the Liga Operária/Convergência Socialista. This essay analyzes the manner in which they were represented in Brazilian society from 1974 to 1980. I examine the development of the group's constructed self-identity as depicted in its own news journals, *Independência Operária*, *Faisca* and *Convergência Socialista*, and in other pertinent student publications. Using a textual analysis of these journals, I argue that the proletarianization of a small number of activists in the Liga Operária/Convergência Socialista transformed the identity of the group, thus allowing non-proletarian members to see themselves as active participants in a vanguard working-class organization.

*This year (1980) we are experiencing a wave of strikes in the ABC region. Additionally, however, we are experiencing significant student mobilizations, especially in São Paulo. There are no differences in these respective struggles. They are two different fights against the same enemy—those responsible for the situation in which we live: the government. Students throughout the country and the leaders of National Student Union have to show their support for the metalworkers striking in the ABC region by maintaining communication, doing actions in solidarity with the struggle, or contributing to the Strike Fund. As it is, students in São Paulo are in a position to be the most helpful.*⁶

Early in the morning on April 28, 1977, eight activists were arrested by Military Police officers in the Mauá train station. The detainees were officially charged by the São Paulo State Department of Political and Social Order (DEOPS) with “distributing pamphlets in the ABC region.”⁷ In preparation for May 1, the small student activist group *Liga Operária* (Workers League) strategically placed a four-page pamphlet titled *Faisca* (Spark) in train stations and bus terminals throughout the working class neighborhoods in the Greater São Paulo area. When it became apparent that the police were not going to discharge several of the accused, the news spread throughout the state. Several days later, leaders of student organizations called for a rally in the center of São Paulo. Despite strong police presence, more than 10,000 students showed up to demand the release of the imprisoned student activists and an end to the repressive military regime. News of the events in São Paulo quickly spread nationally, causing a wide-reaching surge in student-led mobilizations. According to Michael Lowy, in 1977, the student movement became “the most active and organized social sector in the struggle against the regime.”⁸

Class Politics (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977) and John Humphrey's *Capitalist Control and Workers' Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry* (Princeton, New Jersey: University of Princeton Press, 1982) have played an important role in explaining the history of organized labor in São Paulo during the dictatorship. Margret Keck's book, *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1992) and Rachel Meneguello's book, *PT: a formação de um partido, 1979-1982* (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1989) offer in-depth analyses of the formation and early growth of the Workers Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Victoria Ann Langland's doctoral dissertation, “Speaking of Flowers: Student Movements and Collective Memory in Authoritarian Brazil” (New Haven, Connecticut: Ph.D. dissertation, May 2004) is a superb study on the memory of student activism in the first half of the military regime. Finally, João Roberto Martins Filho's book *Movimento estudantil e ditadura militar, 1964-1968* (Campinas, São Paulo: Papirus Livraria Editora, 1987) offers an excellent theoretical analysis of the identity of student activists prior to the passage of AI-5. This book has played a significant role in shaping my own understanding of the identity of student activists in Brazil. Martins Filho argues that the student movement cannot be separate from the social class of its participants. While conducting research in Brazil in 2005 and 2006, I routinely questioned whether or not this statement applied to “my” proletarianized students.

6 *Convergência Socialista*. Editorial. April, 1, 1980, 10. PSTU National Archive, São Paulo. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are by the author.

7 “Inquério Policial number 25177; Lei da Segurança Nacional; Indiciados: Celso Brambrilla e outros.” Secretaria da Segurança Pública, December 2, 1977. 40Z/11/251-40Z/11/239. DEOPS Papers—Arquivo Estadual de São Paulo (AESP).

8 Michael Lowy, “Students and Class Struggle in Brazil,” *Latin American Perspectives* 6, no. 4 (1979): 101. Also see, Elio Gaspari, *A ditadura encurralada: O sacerdote e o feitiçeiro* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2004), 409-410.

From the onset of the military regime in 1964 and until its demise in the mid-1980s, university students in Brazil went through numerous phases of left-wing political and social radicalization. The new generation of student activists that emerged in the mid-1970s followed earlier strategic Marxist-Leninist organizational models, many of which embraced the dictum that the true “vanguard” of a revolution could only be found among the industrial workforce. From 1977 to 1980, the leadership of several student organizations sent small groups of student activists into metallurgic factories in the ABC region. At the same time, the explosion of social protests in São Paulo and in other urban centers during the late 1970s played an important role in shifting popular perceptions of the student movement. Student activists were increasingly viewed in mainstream media sources as being representative of a rapidly growing national vanguard against the military regime. However, unlike the class identity of rank-and-file metalworkers in the ABC region, the identity of student activists was not necessarily predicated on their overwhelmingly middle-class social status.

I examine the public self-image created by student activists in one of several left-wing organizations whose members became involved in the labor movement. It is important to note that the student left was not a single unified social movement, but rather a loose network of various activist organizations. While many of the groups shared common Marxist beliefs and orientations, each group had a distinct social and political identity. Because it is not possible to reconstruct a single identity for student activists as a whole, I focus my analysis on one specific radical student organization that sent students into factories in the ABC region during the late 1970s: the Liga Operária (Workers’ League), which would later become the Convergência Socialista (Socialist Convergence). I evaluate the image of student activism among the working class as it was represented in student newspapers, political pamphlets, leaflets and popular media, thus providing a picture of how these activists wanted to be seen in the public sphere.

FROM THE LIGA OPERÁRIA TO THE CONVERGÊNCIA SOCIALISTA

As the Brazilian military government increased levels of social control in the early 1970s, a climate of fear arose, spreading pervasive anxiety among left-wing activists throughout the country.⁹ Responding to the repressive atmosphere, many activists sought refuge beyond Brazil’s borders. Concurrently, the rise of the democratic socialist government in Chile, led by Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity coalition, captured the hopes and dreams of many young Brazilian radicals. Over time, a sizeable community of exiled left-wing Brazilians formed in Chile’s capital city of Santiago.

In 1972, four young Brazilian activists who were living in Santiago formed a small discussion group with the purpose of remaining current about the daily political situation in Brazil. Despite coming from different political currents before arriving in Chile, the members of the discussion group shared the idea that the working class was the only true vanguard of a revolutionary movement in Brazil. They also opposed armed struggle and advocated the use of Marxist-Leninist structural models in the formation of a political movement. Eventually, after much deliberation, the group adopted a Trotskyist identity, and in doing so formed the Liga Operária. After a violent military coup was staged in Santiago on September 11, 1973, members of the Liga Operária were forced to flee from Chile. Regrouping briefly in Argentina, the group began to publish a monthly newspaper titled *Independência Operária* (*Workers’ Independence*). By 1974, members of the Liga Operária were eager to return to Brazil. Their goal was to relocate to São Paulo to create a socialist political movement, initially among students,

and subsequently among industrial workers.¹⁰

That year, student activism began to reemerge on university campuses. Despite continued repression and strong resistance by conservative faculty members, university students began to form politically-oriented discussion groups to disseminate literature and even to stage small gatherings on campus. In this semi-clandestine atmosphere, the founding members of the Liga Operária were successful in recruiting interested students, eventually developing a strong presence in many of the São Paulo universities.¹¹ While the Liga Operária remained predominantly a student organization, its leaders were primarily concerned with issues affecting the working class.

As the new independent union movement led by Lula's Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo continued to gain support in the ABC region during the mid-1970s, the leaders of the Liga Operária strategically decided to become more involved the labor movement. From 1977 to 1980, the organization supported and encouraged the proletarianization of significant numbers of its membership body. While the actual number of students that took jobs in industrial factories during this time period never exceeded the number of regular student activists in the organization, these "trailblazers" served as an important catalyst in facilitating links between the Liga Operária and factory workers.

During the labor mobilizations of 1978 to 1980, both proletarianized and non-proletarianized student activists in the Liga Operária assisted in forming picket-lines, blocking factory doors, providing entertainment for rallies, speaking at events and organizing assemblies. Students distributed newspapers, pamphlets and flyers to workers at rallies in the hope of spurring their political interest. Like many student organizations, the Liga Operária published several monthly and/or weekly pamphlets that afforded them uncensored expression of their political positions.

After establishing itself in São Paulo, the Liga Operária began to semi-legally publish and distribute the newspaper *Independência Operária*. From 1974 to 1978, this publication served as the group's main venue of public propaganda. In 1978, members of the Liga Operária gained control of *Versus*, one of several new "alternative" newspapers that offered political and cultural criticisms of the military regime. This afforded the underground organization a legal and public voice as well.

That same year, the Liga Operária organized a large conference among several other student currents that shared similar ideological identities. Following this event, a new political organization, the Convergência Socialista, was created. The formation of the Convergência Socialista was seen by the group's leadership as a necessary next step toward the creation of a socialist political party. Thus, the Liga Operária moved to dissolve itself into the Convergência Socialista. It also began to publish the *Convergência Socialista* as a special supplement to *Versus*. The *Convergência Socialista*, an insert in the monthly publication, focused on working-class issues and could be sold legally on the picket lines and among union activists.

Concurrently, in October of that year, as part of President Ernesto Geisel's strategy of controlled liberalization, the Brazilian Congress passed a constitutional amendment reinstating habeas corpus, removing censorship from radio and television, and abating death sentences and life terms for political prisoners. Later in 1978, almost as a conciliatory gesture, Geisel sanctioned the return home of more than 120 exiled Brazilian activists.¹²

10 Maria José Lourenço (Zezé), interview by author, mini-disc recording, São Paulo, Brazil, August 2006.

11 The Liga Operária developed a presence in the student movements of the University of São Paulo (USP), the University of Campinas (UNICAMP), the University of São Carlos, and the São Paulo Pontifical Catholic University (PUC-SP).

12 Most of the activists permitted to return to Brazil had been exiled during the height of the armed resistance between 1969 and 1970. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985*, 203.

CLANDESTINE CONSTRUCTIONS: REPRESENTING STUDENT ACTIVISM BEFORE MAY 1977

While the Liga Operária and later the Convergência Socialista were able to establish a significant presence within the student movement in São Paulo, the primary purpose for establishing the group was to create a political apparatus that would ultimately contribute to the formation of a vanguard socialist political party under the leadership of radicalized industrial workers. Like many Marxist student groups formed in the mid-1970s, the Liga Operária assumed an interesting conception of its own identity, which permitted it to align its struggle with the new independent labor movement. The following discussion focuses on how representational imagery, found in the publications of *Faisca*, *Independência Operária* and *Convergência Socialista*, illustrates a clear shift in the identity of the group itself from 1974 to 1980.

From its founding until 1978, the Liga Operária operated as an underground political group. Activists in the Liga Operária recruited potential members by organizing political discussion groups among the general student body. This forum was seen as a safe space in which Liga members would be able to observe the level of receptivity of politicized students to Marxist ideas, while at the same time hiding their own clandestine social status. Students were invited to join the Liga Operária by proving themselves through sustained involvement in political activism in the student movement. The reemergence of left-wing activist groups on university campuses remained a risky business. The discovery of a participant in clandestine student groups could lead to arrest and, possibly, torture. In this context, the mere act of joining a clandestine organization resulted in the redefinition of one's own social identity. Because it was dangerous for students to participate openly in activist groups, members of the Liga Operária took great pride in distributing the *Independência Operária*, which served not only as a means to publicize the identity of the group, but also to define their own covert identity as young revolutionaries.

To comprehend how the identities of student activists in the Liga Operária were linked to the public image represented through the *Independência Operária*, it is important to understand how the group was structured. The corporate structure of the Liga Operária, like many other Marxist groups in Brazil during this period, was based on a strict top-down distribution of power that bestowed virtual hegemonic control to a central committee. Rank-and-file activists in the Liga were compartmentalized into small independent "cells" that met regularly.¹³ Recalling the importance of order and discipline in the structure of cell meetings, former group member Maria da Cunha recounted that,

Every week we had this little bulletin for everyone to discuss. We would write up our ideas and questions and give them to the cell representative to pass on the directorate. The next week our cell representative would return with new topics to discuss. Discussions always had an agenda . . . Meeting generally lasted two hours, however at times they would last longer, depending on the situation. Compared with other [student] groups we had the best methods—the best methods of analysis, proposals, action, and it was this that attracted me and other people most of all.¹⁴

Because the Liga Operária was seen by the military government as a "subversive" organization, it was necessary to limit the flow of information within the group. This was a standard

13 Cells groups met at least once a week.

14 Maria da Cunha (pseudonym), interview by author, mini-disc recording, April, 3, 2006. Boston, United States of America.

precaution to prevent low-ranking student activists from disclosing vital information under torture that might lead to the government's dismantling the organization through subsequent arrests. Students who joined the Liga Operária were ultimately "full-time" activists. They rarely went to their classes and often dedicated most of their time to assigned tasks. By influencing daily activities of the rank-and-file membership base, the leaders of the Liga Operária were highly successful in molding the identities of group members. It is likely that as these students embraced a "clandestine" life style, they also developed a separate social self-identity with respect to other students who were mostly members of the middle or upper classes, and who unlike them, lived carefree lives. Because student activists were unable to operate openly in the public domain, their own identities were intertwined with the corporate image of their respective groups.

From 1974 to 1977, *Independência Operária* went through a series of aesthetic and thematic developments. The first issue of *Independência Operária*, published on February 4, 1974, was a small six-page pamphlet. The front cover of the pamphlet included the sub-heading, "For the Unification of Revolutionary Brazilians." Next to the only image on the cover, a caricature of a white male industrial worker, was written: "Down with the dictatorship. *Companheiros* fight for a government of workers." Finally, in a separate box located to the left of the image was an official explanation giving the rationale for the creation of the *Independência Operária*. The statement read that, "*Independência Operária* was created as an attempt to unite all workers and revolutionaries to build socialism in Brazil. Our first goal will be to inform our *companheiros* about the labor movement, while at the same time working to participate in the movement ourselves. Our struggle is the struggle of all workers against the dictatorship and for a workers' democracy."¹⁵ It was very important for the leaders of the Liga Operária to construct a self-image that would allow their members to identify personally with the workers. By linking the identity of student activists with that of factory workers through the concept of a common struggle, it enabled middle-class students active in the Liga Operária to associate the sacrifice they opted to make as "clandestine social subversives" with an abstract idea of class struggle.

The publication of the first issue of the *Independência Operária* was one of the most important steps taken by the newly formed Liga Operária in codifying a public political identity. The short three articles included in the first issue touched on several important and recurring themes used by the Liga Operária during the formative years of the organization. The first article briefly recapitulates the history of resistance and repression experienced by labor activists during the dictatorship. Citing a limited victory achieved in the Volkswagen factory, the anonymous author urges workers to increase levels of resistance and to unite all "unsatisfied sectors" into one "united front" to be led by the labor movement. Noteworthy in this article is that the author refers to workers and to the labor movement as having a position distinct from that of the author. In fact, in the concluding paragraph, the author states that the only viable solution to the problems would be found if "our worker *companheiros* were in power."¹⁶ Here, the author specifically dissociates her/his own identity from that of the only "true" vanguard—the proletariat.

In the March 1975 issue of *Independência Operária*, the social position of the Liga Operária with respect to workers is made abundantly clear in an article about the arrest of several union leaders. The article's author writes: "We should defend the working class and their leadership. It is our job to utilize all of our power to mobilize among the masses (DAs [department-based student organizations], schools, unions, factories, etc.) in defense of imprisoned

15 *Independência Operária* 1 (1974)— PSTU National Archive, São Paulo, Brazil.

16 "Perspectivo do governo Geisel," *Independência Operária*, São Paulo (February, 4, 1974): n.p.— National Archive of the PSTU, São Paulo, Brazil.

workers. Only through mobilizations can we invert the present power structure and continue to strengthen the labor movement—for better wages, working conditions, and the complete return of democratic liberties.”¹⁷ In this passage, the author strongly urges like-minded students to become involved in university politics *and* popular mass movements, such as those within factories. Nevertheless, at no time does the author identify herself or himself as a member of the working class. Rather, the identity of the author is presented as one of the noble vanguard—the student activist.

In the mid-1970s, student activists in Brazil strongly believed that they were in a position to challenge the military regime. Unlike factory workers, they were not burdened by the responsibilities of earning a salary or providing for a family. Rather, student activists, who were, for the most part, middle- and upper-class youths, had many more options concerning their own future occupations. As highly educated individuals who had only recently entered adulthood, they were motivated to participate in the social life of “their” country. During this period, it is important to note that the predominant means for criticizing the status quo among intellectuals and university students was through Marxist analysis. Consequently, the identity of the student activist soon became publicly linked with issues that affected popular and working-class sectors. Nevertheless, the self-identity of most of these concerned students was not seen as being members of the working class, but instead, as “activists,” or in some cases as underground revolutionaries.

In 1975, left-wing journalist and news editor at São Paulo’s educational television station TV Cultura, Vladimir Herzog, was tortured and killed by Brazilian army officers. His death provoked protests among religious leader, intellectuals and left-wing groups against the government’s ongoing use of violence. The next year metalworker and labor activist Manoel Fiel Filho met a similar fate.¹⁸ While these two events served as a harsh reminder to students of the dangers in joining left-wing student groups, the heroic images of Herzog and Filho also inspired a large number of students to become active in the student left. From 1975 to 1977, the membership in “clandestine” student groups skyrocketed. As civil unrest grew, university campuses bustled with public displays of discontent against the military regime. In celebration of the clandestine reorganization of the National Students Union (UNE) in 1977, students staged a demonstration in the streets of downtown São Paulo. As sympathetic students gathered peacefully in the city center, the military police suppressed the mobilization violently in a gross display of institutional power.¹⁹

By 1977, apart from having its headquarters in São Paulo, the Liga Operária could boast membership bases in Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre and Brasília. As more and more youths became active members in the Liga Operária, the group continued to support and promote the labor movement as its primary focus, while at the same time expanding the breadth of its members’ own identity. Consequently, as the student left was beginning to re-organize in Brazil, the leaders of the Liga Operária believed that it was necessary to define itself in respect to the broader student movement. In an article published in the April 1977 edition of *Independência Operária*, the author states that “the most organized sector continues to be the middle class, principally the student movement. . . . The workers’ movement continues to lack leadership. The clarity of the vanguard is being held back so that it can’t recuperate quickly.”²⁰ In this article, the author writes that due to state-led repression against factory workers, or the

17 “Solidariedade proletária!,” *Independência Operária* March ,1975. n.p.— National Archive of the PSTU, São Paulo, Brazil.

18 Paulo Markun, *Meu querido Vlado: A história de Vladimir Herzog e do sonho de uma geração* (Rio de Janeiro: Objective, 2005). Also see Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-2985*, 176-178. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 155-160.

19 Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil*, 158-159.

20 “O Movimento de Massas,” *Independência Operária*, São Paulo (April, 1977): 8.

“vanguard,” blue-collar communities were not able to mobilize on a large scale. In contrast, however, student activists are represented by the author as being the most dynamic social force in the country. However, later in the article, the author describes the middle class as unconcerned with issues pertaining directly to the working class. The author abstains from linking his or her own identity with either the labor movement or the student movement, which is described as “middle-class.” During this time, many activists in the Liga Operária did not self-identify as participants in the student movement. Rather, they saw themselves as full-time revolutionaries, which in their minds freed them from having an identity that was limited to the middle class.

FROM SCHOOL TO SHOP FLOOR: CLANDESTINE TRANSITIONS

In 1977, the Liga began to send select members into metallurgic factories in the ABC region. While student activists were increasingly taking to the streets to criticize the government despite continued military repression, workers were not yet ready to strike. Unlike the atmosphere prevalent on university campuses, public displays of “subversion,” such as distributing alternative news media or staging small rallies, were strictly repressed by government authorities in blue-collar neighborhoods. The handful of activists in the Liga Operária who moved to the ABC region and secured employment in industrial factories believed that by literally assuming the identity of the workers and participating in mass actions they were getting closer to their goal of ending the military regime and establishing a vanguard socialist political party.

When Celso Brambrilla and Márcia Basseto Paes, two of the militants who had moved to the working-class neighborhoods in the ABC region, distributed leaflets at the Mauá train station in preparation for May 1, they did not expect that they would be arrested. Nor did they anticipate that the treatment that they received in prison would spark widespread student mobilizations on their behalf.²¹ Celso and Márcia were held in prison for five months, during which time they were tortured. Their injuries remain physically evident to this day. Another individual who was arrested in the Mauá train station was metalworker José Maria Almeida, or Zé Maria. At the time of his arrest, Zé Maria was not an active member of the Liga Operária. Rather, he was what was known as a *simpatizante* (sympathizer). Remembering the first time he met the proletarianized Liga Operária activists, Zé stated:

The truth was I had met these guys at a debate. They were speaking about the situation of the workers. I remember that I joked with them telling them that over there, where I worked, none of this existed ... everyone was scared. After establishing this point of fact, they told me, without words, that they were part of a clandestine activist group. They asked me if I wanted to participate in a group of workers that met at that church in the Eastern Zone of São Paulo. It just so happened that several members of this group of workers were militant members of the group Liga Operária, and other were activists in the Catholic Church ... Others in this group, like me, were not affiliated with any organization. The month after meeting the members of the Liga Operária, in April, we decided to make a pamphlet and distribute it throughout the region in preparation for May 1.²²

As a suspected member of the Liga Operária, Zé Maria was held in the DEOPS prison

21 Celso Brambrilla, interview by author, mini-disc recording, São Paulo, Brazil, July 8, 2006; Also see Márcia Basseto Paes, interview by author, tape recording, São Paulo, Brazil, June 28, 2005.

22 José Maria de Almeida, interview by author, tape recording, São Paulo, Brazil, July 14, 2005.

for one month. During this time, he too was subjected to torture by military officials as they attempted to extract information from him concerning the Liga Operária. While in prison, Zé Maria shared a cell with Celso Brambrilla, who spoke at great lengths about the importance of organizing against the military regime. After his release from prison, Zé Maria gradually became active in the Liga Operária. By 1978, he had become a leading member, and eventually, assumed the role of the group's most prominent public figure.

Massive student protests that followed the arrest of the proletarianized members of Liga Operária resulted in extensive media coverage of the events. Several days after the arrests, the pro-military and popular São Paulo newspaper, *Jornal da Tarde*, reported that "eight students from the Catholic University of São Paulo, the University of São Paulo, and the University of São Carlos, had been incarcerated on account of spreading Marxist-Leninist propaganda in the ABC region."²³ Quoting heavily from information supplied by DEOPS officials, the anonymous author continues to write that, "Officer Sergio Paranhos Fleury informed reporters that among those arrested were several professionalized students." Focusing on the role played by proletarianized Liga members, the author writes that, "the police informed us that the Liga Operária's primary goal was to eventually assume the leadership role among automobile unions in the region. The authorities said that there was evidence that in addition to infiltrating metalworkers unions, the Liga Operária intends to organize 'armed resistance.'"²⁴

It is not surprising that the newspaper *Jornal da Tarde* would slander the image of the Liga Operária with allegations that the organization advocated armed resistance. As Beatriz Kushner has noted in her book, *Cães de guarda : jornalistas e censores, do AI-5 à constituição de 1988* (*Watch Dogs: Journalists and Censorship, from AI-5 to the 1988 Constitution*), by the late 1970s *Jornal da Tarde* had become the voice of the military police. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, many left-wing student groups that, in the aftermath of AI-5, would eventually shift their efforts exclusively toward the armed struggle, also proletarianized sizeable sectors of their membership base. Thus, the supposition that the Liga Operária supported armed violence can be seen as an attempt by the newspaper and the police to co-identify the Liga Operária with other past student organizations who had, indeed, been involved both in armed struggle and in labor organizing.²⁵ While the argument presented in this article identifies all members of the Liga Operária as students, it also conceptualizes the notion of student proletarianization as a political action. The student mobilizations of 1977 engendered popular sentiments in support of the working class. The police's linkage of the Liga Operária to a guerrilla movement seems to have been an attempt to both discredit the arrested activists and the Liga Operária. By recycling the image of the guerilla as a threat to society, the press influenced the popularization of the notion that alien and dangerous forces were present within working-class communities and the union movement. This article, along with others of similar content, was probably intended to instill fear in a large sector of the middle and upper classes. By promoting the idea that large numbers of student activists were infiltrating the labor movement in the ABC region, mainstream news contributed to shaping the image of student activists.

In an editorial published in June 1977 in the *Independência Operária*, the editor very care-

23 DEOPS papers, 50Z/435/2020—AESP.

24 This article was included as a clipping in the DEOPS file discussing the arrested activists. "Oito estudantes presos. Distribuíram panfletos," *Jornal da Tarde* (May 4, 1977), 30Z/160/15681, DEOPS Papers—AESP.

25 Upon examination of the DEOPS concerning the origins of the Liga Operária, it became abundantly clear that officials were not completely sure how the Liga Operária was conceived. In one document produced in 1977 that referenced the collaboration of Marcia Basetto Paes, the Liga Operária was created from a dissident faction of the student group, *Vanguardia Popular Revolucionária* (VPR), which was not the case at all. 40Z/11/239-251. DEOPS Papers—AESP. It is interesting to note that despite emerging as one of the main armed resistance movements in the early 1970s, the VPR also actively proletarianized students in metallurgic factories in the Greater São Paulo area and are credited with playing a very important role in the Osasco strike of 1968. Alves, *State and Opposition in Military Brazil*, 90.

fully describes Celso Brambilla, Márcia and Zé Maria as metalworkers and not as students.²⁶ This image is reinforced in a publication of a human rights group based in Paris, France, offering support for the arrested activists. In the articles, the authors refer to Celso Brambilla and Marcia Basseto Paes as rank-and-file workers, giving no indication that they had joined the Liga Operária originally as students and that, in fact, they had only recently become workers in the ABC region.²⁷ As student demonstrations persisted, however, the identity of the Liga Operária militants began to shift. A good example of this can be seen in the main slogan used following the arrests, “*Libertem Nossos Presos*” (Free Our Prisoners). By referring to Celso and Márcia as prisoners, they maintained an ambiguous public image concerning whether or not they were university students or metalworkers. Using the *Independência Operária* to emphasize the working-class status of Celso and Márcia and downplay their student identity by referring to them only as “prisoners,” the leaders of the Liga Operária seemed also to have attempted to convince their student public that they had successfully become a working-class organization.

In the direct aftermath of the arrests, the Liga organized a large assembly at the University of São Paulo to which they brought two metalworkers. When the workers were asked to address the crowd, the elder of the two gentlemen, Pacheco, rose to his feet and spoke. Remembering Pacheco’s words, Valfrido, a former leader in the Liga Operária who was present at the rally, recounted,

He started his speech by saying, “You see this floor on which you are standing. We are the people who built this structure that you use here. This building, we built it. At this moment, I am here asking for your help, for the help of the student movement, because we are poorly organized. *Companheiros*, we were imprisoned while preparing for May 1. My fellow workers are presently being threatened with the possibility of death while they sit in the DEOPS building. And we need your help.”²⁸

While it was not unusual for different left-wing student groups to send their members to working class neighborhoods for one reason or another, it was not customary for blue-collar Paulistanos to frequent university campuses, and the significance of Pacheco’s presence did not go unnoticed.²⁹ By using Pacheco as a “showcase worker” and representative of the Liga Operária, the leaders were successful in linking the public image of Celso and Márcia with the working class.

In addition to inspiring students to rally in support of the arrested activists, the presence of two metalworkers who spoke out in defense of the Liga Operária greatly influenced the group’s public image among students. The public representation of Celso Brambilla and Márcia Basseto Paes as metalworkers, both in the *Independência Operária*, and by Pacheco himself, inspired the hope that it was possible for student activists to make a successful transition from student to worker.

The arrest of the proletarianized student activists did not occur in a political vacuum. While the Liga Operária saw their proletarianized activists as legitimate factory workers, this was not the view of other union leaders. In the December 1977 issue of *Tribuna Metalúrgica*, a popular local newspaper in the ABC region published by the Metalworkers’ Union in São Bernardo and Diadema, an article appeared, “Workers under the Hammer.” In this article, the paper

26 “Soltem nossos presos!” *Independência Operária* (June, 1977).—PSTU Nacional Arquivo, São Paulo, Brazil.

27 Comité Bresil Pour L’Amnistie, “Bresil Manifestation a São Paulo Le 5 mai 77”—Centro de Documentação e Memória da UNESP, São Paulo, Brazil.

28 Valfrido Lima, interview by the author, mini-disc recording, São Paulo, Brazil, July 26, 2006.

29 Elizabeth Maria de Lima, interview by the author, mini-disc recording, São Paulo, Brazil, July 26, 2006.

addresses the issue of student proletarianization stating that “there are people in the factories with the sole purpose of forming a political party of workers.”³⁰ The paper argues that such a party can only be created by workers themselves. While the identity of both proletarianized and non-proletarianized members of the Liga Operária and Convergência Socialista was based on feelings of affiliation with the working class, their understanding of what it meant to be a member of the proletariat was much different from that of rank-and-file metalworkers. In response to the article published in the *Tribuna Metalúrgica*, the Liga Operária dismissed the *Tribuna’s* attack on their legitimacy as workers and proceeded to develop an argument in support of the need for a new political party, as if their identity as workers was not being questioned.³¹ In the minds of the Liga Operária members, the arrests of proletarianized activists Celso Brambrilla and Márcia Basseto Paes and the public spectacle provided by Pacheco were enough for them to justify a *real* connection with the working class. From 1977 to 1980, the Liga Operária and, later, Convergência Socialista went through a process of representational proletarianization. In the following sub-section, I analyze the public image of the Liga Operária and Convergência Socialista from May 1977 to 1980 with the purpose of illustrating how student proletarianization specifically altered the identity of the Liga Operária, and later, Convergência Socialista during this time period.

REOCCUPYING THE STREETS, 1977–1980

The years of 1977 and 1978 were a crucial time for the independent labor movement. While DIEESE and other independent economic analysis organizations had denounced the military government for unjust wage manipulation practices undertaken since the early 1970s, it was not until 1977 that growing international attention triggered an investigation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF study reaffirmed data collected by DIEESE. In August 1977, the Brazilian military government admitted to having manipulated official figures concerning wage increases for industrial workers during 1973 and 1974. Immediately following the announcement, unions from all over metropolitan São Paulo area publicly pledged to “fight the government in court, using the laws passed after 1964 by the military regime.”³² According to political scientist José Moisés, the labor mobilizations of 1977 signified a return “of the Brazilian working class to the political scene for the first time since the major strikes of Contagem and Osasco.”³³ The Metalworkers’ Unions of São Bernardo and Santo André established an official campaign called the “Movement to Reclaim Lost Wages”. Demanding wage increases of 34.1 percent, equivalent to the amount of lost wages calculated by DIEESE, the movement’s popularity quickly spread throughout the Greater São Paulo area.

In addition to campaigning for “wage-recovery,” workers in the ABC region forwarded a series of demands aimed at deconstructing the corporatist labor system. Workers insisted on differential wage increases according to each sector’s production rate. In this action, workers in São Bernardo publicly demanded better working conditions, job security, direct negotiations with their employers, legal recognition of union representatives and more freedom for unions to organize on the premises of the factories. It is important to note that the “right-to-strike” was not included among workers’ formal demands in 1977. Prior to May 12, 1978, the Metalworkers Union in São Bernardo and other sympathetic unions in the ABC region did not officially support using the strike as a weapon of labor, but instead advocated the use of legal

30 “Operários em Leilão,” *Tribuna Metalúrgica* (December 1977): n.p.

31 “Tentando Convencer o Companheiro Lula,” *Independência Operária* (January 1978), 8.

32 José Alvaro Moisés, “Current Issues in the Labor Movement in Brazil.” *Latin American Perspectives* 6, no. 4 (1979): 51.

33 *Ibid.*, 52.

channels to challenge state power dynamics.³⁴

From the beginning of the campaign, the Metalworkers Union of São Bernardo took the reins of the Movement to Reclaim Lost Wages. At this time, Lula emerged as a national political figure.³⁵ Labor leaders allied with the new independent union movement used novel strategies of mobilization that favored rank-and-file organizing. Their goal was to build an institutional base among industrial laborers and their respective unions. Stressing grassroots tactics, these leaders worked hand-in-hand with many non-labor sectors of civil society such as neighborhood associations, Catholic groups and left-wing student activists. Willem Assies writes that “neighborhood (rather than shop-floor) references came to play a key role in the formation of a ‘popular’ (rather than working-class) consciousness.”³⁶ Although it is important to examine the roles played by other social sectors in the social construction of community identity among workers in the ABC region preceding the strike wave, it is likewise important not to ignore the constructed identity of the “metalworker”. One cannot discount the importance of the shop floor in creating a separate space for resistance. Importantly, however, similar to ABC communities, transforming the shop floor into a space of resistance was not accomplished by workers alone. Rather, the resistance process became an all-inclusive community project. Catholic and student activists, on many occasions, participated in union assemblies or organized separate strategizing workshops.

In February 1978, Lula was reelected to the presidency of the São Bernardo Metalworkers’ Union with 97 percent of the vote.³⁷ Lula’s victory was seen as a strong sign of viability for the new independent labor current. The same year, Lula and the Metalworkers’ Union of São Bernardo withdrew from all contract negotiations with the state to illustrate the futility of the bargaining process. According to Humphrey, this action was highly influential in convincing workers that they could not solve their problems from within the system. For a multiplicity of reasons, workers felt that the union’s refusal to negotiate signified that it was time for more direct action.³⁸

In March of that year, the weekly news magazine, *Pasquim*, published an interview with Lula in which the union leader hinted that as he had exhausted all his options through discourse, the only logical next step would invariably be a strike. In the interview, he stated, “We’ve already talked. No one cares about the worker ... So let’s just wait a little bit. I feel that the time is coming.”³⁹ Later that month, workers in three sectors of the Mercedes plant initiated select work stoppages effectively paralyzing output—albeit only for a limited time. In April, the Ministry of Labor announced a wage adjustment of 39 percent. Discontent with the announcement, metalworkers in São Bernardo decided to take matters into their own hands. On May 3, one hundred workers in the Ford factory systematically stopped their machines for several hours demanding immediate salary increases of 15 percent.⁴⁰ By May 10, tension was palpable as 400 workers in the Ford plant shut down all production and demanded immediate wage increases. As the month progressed, emotions ran high among metalworkers throughout the ABC region; all were waiting to see what would occur next.⁴¹

On Wednesday, May 10, 1978, metalworkers in São Bernardo received their first pay checks that reflected wage adjustments that had been announced by the Ministry of Labor

34 Ibid., 59.

35 Keck, *The Workers; Party and Democracy in Brazil*, 75.

36 Willem Assies, “Urban Social Movements in Brazil: A Debate and Its Dynamics.” *Latin American Perspectives* 21, no. (1994): 83.

37 Laís Abramo, “Metalworkers’ Strike in São Bernardo: Dignity at the Workplace,” 167.

38 Humphrey, *Capitalist Control and Worker’s Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry*, 158-159.

39 (Interview, *Pasquim*, 24/3/1978). Ibid., 159.

40 Abramo, “Metalworkers’ Strike in São Bernardo: Dignity at the Workplace,” 168.

41 Paranhos, *Era uma vez em São Bernardo*, 108-109.

earlier that week. Two days later, at 7:00 in the morning, 100 tool workers in the Saab-Scania factory in São Bernardo do Campos walked into the plant, stood by their machines, and refused to turn them on. Within two weeks, more than 45,000 workers from Mercedes, Ford, Volkswagen and Chrysler plants in the ABC region had followed suit causing massive work stoppages throughout the metropolitan São Paulo area. In the first four months of the strike, it is estimated that as many as 280,000 workers in over 250 factories refused to work, effectively halting production in the region for the first time in a decade.⁴²

The eruption in strike activity in the ABC region following the May 1978 strike wave had a drastic effect on the role played by the *Convergência Socialista* in the labor movement. In the months surrounding the general strikes, the *Convergência* actively proletarianized a second generation of student activists. However, unlike Celso and Márcia's generation, students who proletarianized in this period found that they had much more freedom with respect to their own political identities. By 1978, the leaders of the Liga Operária decided that it was time for the group to transition gradually into becoming a legal organization. Seeing the potential behind the growing labor movement, the leaders of the *Convergência Socialista* decided that they would focus their efforts on increasing rank-and-file participation in key unions.⁴³

Unlike in the student publication *Independência Operária*, the editors of the *Convergência Socialista* did not project a unified image of the group's identity. This can be seen in the textual content of the news journal itself. While the 1977 student mobilizations played an important role in establishing the means for many non-proletarianized student activists to personally self-identity with the labor struggles as their own, this did not mean that all rank-and-file activists in the *Convergência Socialista* "symbolically proletarianized," per se. In fact, on several occasions between 1978 and 1980, authors who published in the *Convergência Socialista* referred to workers as "them." For example, in an article in the May 1980 issue titled "ABC: We are With You," the author assumes a distinct and separate identity when referring to workers.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, most of the articles in *Convergência Socialista* on questions concerning workers refer to the labor issues as "our" struggle, thus projecting a strong blue-collar identity. For example, in the February 1980 issue of the *Convergência Socialista* there are several noteworthy instances in which the authors explicitly project a working-class identity. One particular article titled, "We Want a 15 Percent Raise" discusses the current labor campaigns in São Bernardo, São Caetano, Santo André, Campinas and Santa Barara as if the authors themselves were metalworkers.⁴⁵ Ironically, this image is again used in the main heading of the same May 1980 issue, which reads, "We Want Lula, We Control of Our Unions, and We Want Dignified Wages!"⁴⁶

While publishing in the *Independência Operária*, it was not safe for student journalists to sign their names to the articles they wrote. However, as members of the Liga Operária began to assume control of *Versus*, this precautionary measure ceased being as important. From 1978 to 1980, a sizeable number of articles published in *Versus* include the author's name. However, this was not the case for the *Convergência Socialista* supplement. The *Convergência Socialista* was officially an insert of *Versus*, however, it also served a much more profound purpose in linking the public image of the *Convergência* directly with the new independent labor movement. Because the *Convergência Socialista* was predominantly intended for a blue-collar audience, it

42 Humphrey, *Capitalist Control and Worker' Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 161-166.

43 "Balanço do Sindical," Internal Bulletin used for discussion and indoctrination during cell meetings (1987)— PSTU National Archive, São Paulo, Brazil.

44 "ABC: estamos com vocês!" *Convergência Socialista* (May, 1980): cover page.

45 It is important to note that members of the *Convergência Socialista* were actively proletarianized in all of these respective locations. "We Want a 15 Percent Raise," *Convergência Socialista* (February, 1980): 8-9.

46 *Convergência Socialista* (May 1980): cover page.

was subjected to a higher level of public scrutiny from government officials. Thus, during this period the majority of articles included in the *Convergência Socialista* were published anonymously. As such, the small number of articles in the *Convergência Socialista* that did include the name of the author can be seen as a premeditated action taken by the group's leaders to promote a specific group personality.

From 1978 to 1980, the only members of the *Convergência* that openly published articles in the *Convergência Socialista* were either members of the Central Committee or proletarianized students.⁴⁷ The publication of articles by proletarianized students demonstrated an overt effort on behalf of the leadership of the *Convergência* to represent publicly a strong working-class presence among the group's membership. An example of this can be seen in the November 1979 issue of the *Convergência Socialista*, when proletarianized activist, Célia Regina Barbosa, published an article titled, "What happened in Guarulhos." In the article, Célia offers a first-hand account of a strike involving 2,000 workers that occurred in the metallurgic factory where she worked. The final sentence reads, "No one will be able to cut off the head of the hundreds of united workers that are presently mobilizing in force, consequently we are organizing within the factories and the unions."⁴⁸ In this article, Célia publicly refers to student proletarianization in the final line. By assuming the public identity of a proletarianized student activist, Célia played an important role in legitimizing her identity as a member of the *Convergência Socialista* and as a factory worker through her demonstration of first-hand knowledge of the day-to-day activities on the shop floor. Célia and other proletarianized activists that published articles in the *Convergência Socialista* during this period were essential in reinforcing public linkages between students and workers, as well as contributing to the public association of the *Convergência Socialista* with student proletarianization.

In addition to publishing articles by proletarianized students, the *Convergência Socialista* was successful in installing Zé Maria as the group's principal public representative who, like Pacheco, would be publicly represented as the *Convergência's* "showcase worker." Like many blue-collar families residing in the ABC region, Zé Maria and his mother had moved to Santo André in the 1970s when Zé was 12 years old with the hope that Zé would be able to find a job in the bustling metallurgic industry. As luck would have it, Zé Maria quickly found employment in a metallurgic factory making material for clothes. Eight months after arriving in São Paulo, he was admitted to the highly prestigious SENAI technical school. After graduating, Zé worked in several metallurgic factories in Santo André, and in 1977 he was admitted to the Faculdade de Matemática in the FEI University where he studied in the evening while working a ten-hour day in the factory. After being politicized in prison in 1977 by members of the Liga Operária, Zé decided to abandon his studies and pursue a more active role in the union. From 1978 to 1980, Zé Maria rose rapidly through the ranks of the Santo André Metalworkers' Union.⁴⁹ He eventually earned the nickname, "Little Lula from Santo André."⁵⁰ During this time, Zé Maria played two public roles: the young labor leader and the public face of the *Convergência Socialista*.

As Zé Maria continued to gain public recognition as a rising star in the new independent labor movement, the *Convergência* advantageously used the image of "their" young labor leader to gain legitimacy among rank-and-file metalworkers. From 1978 to 1980, no other member of the *Convergência Socialista* was featured as prominently and in as many articles as

47 In several issues of the *Convergência Socialista* founding member of the Liga Operária, Jorge Pinheiro, published several editorial commentaries.

48 Célia Regina Barbosa. "What's happening in Guarulhos." *Convergência Socialista* (November 1979): 7.

49 José Maria de Almeida, Interview by author, July 14, 2005, tape recorder.

50 Almeida de José Maria e Dona Sebastia, "Dois combatentes do ABC," *Convergência Socialista* (May 1980): n.p.

Zé Maria. Ultimately, his image was used to link publicly the *Convergência Socialista* with the growing labor opposition in São Paulo. This was largely achieved by representing Zé Maria in conjunction with other reputable labor leaders, especially Lula.⁵¹

In January of 1979, the IX São Paulo State Metalworkers' Congress was held in Lins, São Paulo. At the conference, Zé Maria proposed the formation of an independent national Workers Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT) to leaders of the Metalworkers' Unions representing over a million workers in Brazil.⁵² After passing the proposal with overwhelming support, a group of labor leaders drew up a Statement of Principles, an estimated 200,000 copies were distributed in numerous May Day rallies throughout the country. After a long and grueling campaign within varied sectors of the Left, it was decided that the PT would be officially launched. On October 14 in São Bernardo, a mass assembly of approximately 100,000 workers, intellectuals, community members and Catholic and student activists, approved the formation of the party.⁵³

On April 19, 1980, three weeks into the forty-one-day strike, the government arrested sixty-four leaders of Metalworkers' unions, including both Lula and Zé Maria. Zé Maria's arrest together with Lula's and those of other union leaders generated a new public awareness concerning the role played by the *Convergência Socialista* in the new independent union movement. Responding to the massive arrests of the labor leaders in an article published in the popular news journal, *Isto É*, Luiz Roberto Serrano wrote that "it's a shame that one of the prisoners from Santo André was not freed, José Maria de Almeida, who confessed to participating in the *Convergência Socialista* is out of place among the metalworker leadership. Nor can José Maria even be considered a metalworker."⁵⁴ In arguing that it is not possible for a member of the *Convergência Socialista* to be a "legitimate" metalworker, Serrano demonstrates his own deep-seated anxiety that radical student groups, like the *Convergência Socialista*, were successfully infiltrating and influencing the strike movement. Thus, in an attempt to publicly smear the student Left, Serrano infers that Zé Maria was, in fact, a proletarianized student activist.

Responding to public criticisms concerned with whether or not Zé Maria was a "true" metalworker, the *Convergência Socialista* published a series of articles demanding that the government free Lula and Zé Maria. Interestingly, in each of these articles, the author details Zé Maria's personal trajectory as a factory worker in Santo André. It was very important to the leaders of the *Convergência* to be able to project an image of "authentic" participation in the new independent union movement, and they could not do this without the public image of Zé Maria as a model blue-collar labor activist. In fact, Serrano's attacks went much further than simply challenging the credibility of Zé Maria. He also was raising a question concerning the ability of proletarianized student activists to actually become proletarians.⁵⁵

Two weeks after the publication of Luiz Serrano's article maligning Zé Maria and the *Convergência Socialista*, *Isto É* again published an article criticizing students' participation in the labor movement. However, this time it did not come from a journalist, but rather, from Lula himself. In the article, Lula was quoted stating that he was "opposed to the participation of university students in the labor movement." While this statement may have been unintentional

51 It is important to note that the leaders of the *Convergência Socialista* were very critical of the new independent labor leaders, whom they saw as far too moderate. This is largely due to their own ideological identity as Trotskyist radicals. The members of the Liga Operária and *Convergência Socialista* adopted the identity of being the "enlightened vanguard," which consequently allowed them to criticize openly the new independent labor bureaucracy and create animosity of the union leadership toward the militants of this Marxist-Leninist organization.

52 *Tese de Santo André*, IX Congress of Metalworkers, Mechanics and Electricians in the State of São Paulo, January 24, 1979.

53 Margaret Keck, *The Workers Party and Democracy in Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 67-72.

54 Luiz Roberto Serrano, "E a hora de pensar em Lula," *Isto É* número 177, (May 14, 1980), n.p.

55 This question is thoroughly explored in Chapter Five by examining the individual histories of former members of the Liga Operária and *Convergência Socialista* who proletarianized in the ABC region from 1977 to 1980.

tional, or perhaps taken out of context, the article itself highlights how student activists were perceived by the Brazilian popular news media. Responding to Lula's aspersion of student participation in the labor movement, the *Convergência Socialista* writes:

The student's only ally can be the worker. Who does not remember 1977, when the union had not yet began forming assemblies, it was the students who took the lead in the struggle for the liberation of workers imprisoned by the dictatorship, like metalworker Celso Brambrilla who was brutally tortured. The history of student participation in the struggle for the independence of the working class from the Bourgeoisie is replete with blood, valor, and many advances.⁵⁶

In this response, members of the *Convergência Socialista* used the image of Celso Brambrilla to authenticate their own participation in the labor movement. However, according to both Serrano and Lula, it was not conceivable for student activists to be considered metalworkers. In this view, calling someone a student within the factory was not just a way of discrediting one's class identity; rather, it was a direct attack on one's ideological identity.

56 "Os estudantes devem entrar nos partidos burgueses?" *Convergência Socialista* (July 1980): n.p.

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Correio da Manhã

Convergência Socialista

Folha de São Paulo

Em Tempo

Estado de São Paulo

Independência Operária

Movimento

Opinião

Ultima Hora

Vêja

Tribuna Metalúrgica

Pasquim

Versus

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'TIS A PITY SHE'S A WHORE?: LANAH SAWYER AND THE NEW YORK BAWDYHOUSE RIOTS

GRAINNE BELLUOMO

"Oh brave new world that has such people in it. Let's start at once."

—Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World*

-

"It's wonderful to be back in a nation where even a riot may be tolerated."

—William Orville Douglas

-

I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing ..."

—Thomas Jefferson

On a warm Wednesday evening in early September of 1793, a young girl by the name of Lanah Sawyer went on a date with a young man named Henry Bedlow. Sawyer, the seventeen-year old daughter of a dockworker, and Bedlow, the twenty-four-year old son of a fairly wealthy real-estate manager, "took some ice cream"¹ together before taking a lengthy walk around the Battery. They then made their way through the streets of lower Manhattan, setting in motion a series of events that would captivate the city for weeks.² Their encounter in the early hours of September 5 at the notorious establishment of Mother Carey led to a sensational trial, a series of editorial disputes and a show of mob force that spoke to issues that lay at the very heart of the social fabric of the early Republic. An evening that began as a date ended in violence and caused a week of rioting emblematic of the swiftly changing realities of late eighteenth-century America. Henry Bedlow's trial for rape was a public sensation. What followed was a public panic. The courtroom accounts of the Bedlow trial, the riots that followed and the ensuing media coverage provide insight into the gender relations, popular morality and, perhaps most importantly, the burgeoning class conflict underpinning America's early Republic. The Bedlow case and the ensuing bawdyhouse riots were watershed events that, for a few days in mid-October 1793, gave form to the ideological issues that would be contested in America well into the next century.

Before delving into the ideological undercurrents at play in the Sawyer rape case, it is important to establish a brief chronology of the crime, trial and public reaction. According to her own testimony, Lanah Sawyer first met Henry Bedlow in late August of 1793 when he rescued her from "several insults from some Frenchmen whose language she could not under-

1 William Wyche, *Report of the Trial of Henry Bedlow for Committing a Rape on Lanah Sawyer* (New York: Printed According to Act of Congress, 1793), 4.

2 *Ibid.*, 2-8.

stand.”³ He fallaciously introduced himself to her as a lawyer named Smith and convinced her to accompany him on a date later in the week. That Wednesday, September 4, the couple met and spent several hours traversing the Battery. According to Lanah, they left the promenade around one in the morning. On their walk home, Ms. Sawyer claimed that Bedlow physically forced her to accompany him to Mother Carey’s house—a well-known local brothel—where, after dragging her upstairs, he “ravished her.”⁴ Ms. Sawyer left Mother Carey’s around ten the next morning and, after a day of awkward encounters with neighborhood acquaintances, was finally coerced by her mother into revealing the events of the previous night.⁵

Henry Bedlow was brought to trial for rape on October 8. Attorney General Hoffman led the prosecution, while several attorneys—identified in the account of the trial as “Messrs. Thompson, Hughes, B. Livingston, Troup, Cozine and Harrison”—served as Bedlow’s defense team.⁶ The trial began with Lanah Sawyer’s testimony, which was followed by a series of witnesses providing their accounts of the events of September 4, as well as many acquaintances of the Sawyer family attesting to Lanah’s character. Bedlow’s defense attorneys then gave a series of arguments seeking to prove that the Sawyer-Bedlow encounter was an act of seduction and not, in fact, a rape as the prosecution claimed. In order to make their case, the lawyers framed Lanah as morally debased and conniving, and dismissed both her and her character witnesses as biased members of a class of people whose word was not to be taken over that of someone of Henry Bedlow’s standing. Upon the conclusion of the fifteen-hour trial, “the jury retired and, in the space of 15 minutes, returned, finding a verdict of—NOT GUILTY.”⁷

When news of the verdict reached the public, many members of Sawyer’s class and other marginalized factions of New York society were outraged. They felt failed by the legal system and insulted by the defense’s claim that Sawyer was an emblem of a larger group that could not be trusted. On October 14, a mob of almost six hundred converged upon Mother Carey’s brothel and leveled the house of ill-repute. One New York paper remarked with a level of disgust that the crowd was made up primarily of “Boys, Apprentices and Negroes as well as Sailors.”⁸ The rioting continued for several days, and by the end of the melee, several bawdyhouses had been attacked.

The riots, of course, attracted a stream of press attention in the largely Federalist press, mostly in the form of letters submitted by presumably upper-class readers. Many of these lamented the actions of the mob. Few felt the need to consider the fact that the rioters were targeting brothels that they felt were demoralizing their community, and those that did uniformly agreed that the matter of regulating prostitution was best left to the city magistrates. On October 18, a letter appeared in *New York Diary*. Under the pseudonym Justitia, the female author wrote a scathing indictment not only of Bedlow—“whom infamy would blush to own as her offspring”—but of the government officials and the “*male* citizens” of society at large who allowed the Manhattan bawdyhouses to thrive.⁹ In the following days, a debate raged in the pages of the *Diary* between Justitia and several male opponents who defended the morals of their city officials. This editorial spat continued well after the rioting had finished. The focus of the public scandal had shifted from the streets to the broadsheets.

Finally, after weeks of turmoil, Lanah Sawyer, Justitia and even the disturbance the riots

3 Ibid, 2.

4 Ibid, 6.

5 Ibid, 2-7.

6 Ibid, 2.

7 Ibid, 62; This capitalization, and the other italics and capitalization that appear in this paper, are taken from the original source in an attempt to preserve the intended emphasis of the primary document.

8 “Assault and Battery!” *The Columbian Gazetteer*, 17 October 1793.

9 Justitia. *New York Diary*, 18 October 1793.

had caused faded into the bustling backdrop of the rapidly growing city; on October 25, the final letter regarding the bawdyhouse riots (written by a male supporter of Justitia) ran in the *Diary*. Though the famous trial and the riots may have largely exited from the public consciousness, they marked one of the first alarms announcing the tumultuousness of early Republican society. The events themselves may have faded into relative obscurity, but their precipitating factors would remain part of the greater social fabric of America for decades to come.

The media coverage of the Sawyer case points to an interesting turning point in the development of the American newspaper. Up until the 1790s, the press had concerned itself mostly with issues of national and international import, with a heavy focus on intellectual, partisan analyses of the debates regarding the formation of the new government. Alfred M. Lee writes that “early ‘conductors’ of dailies paid little attention to local happenings.”¹⁰ But, as the circulation of daily newspapers grew, the monotony of long form essays became increasingly apparent. Though still primarily engines of partisan political debate, daily papers slowly began to focus on issues of more immediate local interest.¹¹ Though the penny papers, with their sensationalistic tales of scandal and urban disaster, would not become prominent until the 1800s, papers were beginning to straddle the line between acting as forums for high-minded political debate, and avenues for a more personalized, localized brand of ‘news.’ With their elements of sex, class antagonism, violence, and corruption, the bawdyhouse riots provided the perfect opportunity to cover scandal on a city-wide level.

Daily newspapers also began sprinkling in shorter essays and columns which provided livelier social commentary. *The Columbian Gazetteer*, for instance, frequently ran a section called “Moralist,” which offered tips for virtuous living. It is no coincidence that the first “Moralist” after the bawdyhouse riots laments:

“Oh! How my heart had often bled to see so many lovely women, who were intended by nature to be the pleasing bond of society and the source of virtuous pleasures reduced to the sad alternative of perishing for want, or living on the wages of prostitution! But oh woman, when thou canst so far forget what is due to thy own sex as to be accessory to the ruin of the innocent, my heart swells with indignation.”¹²

As Isaiah Thomas noted in *Printing in America*, newspapers had gradually become “immense moral and political engines,”¹³ and the primary means of disseminating not only facts, but values to the American public. In addition, as the Justitia debate makes clear, the daily newspaper became the ultimate public form for examining society and venting concerns.¹⁴

The appearance of such socially pious columns in daily newspapers was not the only manifestation of the new conception of Republican virtue and morality. In *Rising Glory*, Gordon Wood writes that “all American intellectuals were aware that republics were the states most susceptible to disease, requiring an extraordinary moral quality in their citizens if they were to survive.”¹⁵ By the end of the eighteenth century, Americans were particularly attentive to the preservation of morality. Revivalist religions sprang up professing the need for spiritual purity at the same time that secular moral-societies advocating temperance, abolition and other causes gained popularity. The bawdyhouse riots of 1793 show that this zeal for morality was

10 Alfred M. Lee, *The Daily Newspaper in America* (New York: MacMillan, 1937), 603.

11 Ibid., 604.

12 “Moralist,” *Columbian Gazetteer*, 28 October, 1793.

13 Isaiah Thomas, “Printing in America,” in *The Rising Glory of America; 1760-1820* ed. Gordon S. Wood (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), 273.

14 Carol Sue Humphrey, *The Press of the Young Republic* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1996), 158.

15 Gordon Wood, ed. *The Rising Glory of America; 1760-1820* (Boston: Northeastern University Press 1990), 57.

not limited to backyard revivals and temperance meetings. The entire Bedlow trial had, after all, centered on whether or not Lanah Sawyer could be considered “modest, discreet and prudent,” and, by extension, credible. By assaulting the girl’s moral fiber, Bedlow’s attorneys were able to entirely undermine her status as a victim.

It is telling that the mob that gathered in response to the verdict did not focus its energies on Bedlow himself, or even a general attack on the homes of the upper class. Instead, rioters targeted the “chicken houses”¹⁶ of Mother Carey and other local matrons. The riots were more than misplaced aggression towards an unfair verdict as “many New Yorkers sought to destroy the scene of possible future corruption of their own sisters and daughters.”¹⁷ The brothels, and not just the Bedlows, posed a threat to the chastity of the young women of New York.

Perhaps a more concrete basis for this moral panic was the very real threat of venereal disease. Sexually transmitted diseases ran rampant through the urban areas of the early Republic. Newspapers were full of advertisements for doctors proclaiming their ability to treat such ailments. One such man, a Doctor Cowan, ran ads in *The Columbian Gazetteer* throughout most of October. Though he could provide care for all sorts of disorders, Cowan’s expertise lay “particularly in venereal complaints . . . whose skill in that disorder none can excel.”¹⁸ October’s daily papers also featured many admonishments to citizens of New York that they should take heed of a particularly rampant venereal outbreak in Philadelphia, and exercise extreme caution when dealing with people and goods from that city.¹⁹

As the debate about the riots raged on in the papers, commentators on both sides bemoaned the moral implications of the recent troubles. By enacting vigilante justice, the mob had transgressed the notion of virtuous citizenry. *The New York Journal* labeled the riots “INDECENT outrages.”²⁰ Such rowdiness and chaotic violence certainly did not represent the moral fabric on which the country had been built. Worst of all, this impudent behavior was not limited to the urban rabble. The “Notice by the Magistrates” which ran in three major papers noted that, “it is with pain the magistrates mention that, at the riots above alluded to, they saw a number of respectable Fellow-Citizens.”²¹

Letters from the public also voiced this moral distress. In the October 15 issue of *New York Diary*, A. Citizen wrote that “we are sorry the citizens have taken the law into their own hands . . . have we not law to punish licentious houses . . . ’tis a pity that such infamous nests were not all rooted out, which are the bane and disgrace of our city, and the ruin of many of our youth.”²² Justitia also lamented the lack of morality in her city. The trial itself provided an example of the corruption she so detested—“the protection of a *wretch* . . . whose character is too vile to be portrayed, and the blasting of a spotless reputation are serious things.” The actions of the rioters may have been illegal, but Justitia laid the blame at the feet of the magistrates who had failed their moral obligation to shut down “these nunneries” and prevent the corruption of young girls like Lanah Sawyer.²³

It is impossible to analyze the import of the Lanah Sawyer case without considering gender at least to some extent. Certainly, the assault mounted on her character at trial and the

16 “An Airing!” *New York Journal*, 16 October 1793.

17 Paul A. Gilje, *The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 1987), 88.

18 “Venereal Complaints to the Public,” *Columbian Gazetteer*, 21 October 1793.

19 *The Columbian Gazetteer*, *New York Daily Advertiser*, *New York Diary* and the *New York Journal* all printed several articles warning New Yorkers about the outbreaks of “infectious disease” in Philadelphia, and the possibility of its transfer to New York.

20 “An Airing!” *New York Journal*, 16 October 1793.

21 “Notice by the Magistrates,” *New York Daily Advertiser*, 17 October 1793. An abbreviated version of this notice also ran in the October 17 issue of the *Columbian Gazetteer* and in full again in the October 19th issue of *New York Journal*.

22 A. Citizen, *New York Diary*, 15 October 1793.

23 Justitia, *New York Diary*, 18 October 1793.

burden of proof set upon her as an accuser points to a society that viewed women as objects of desire, fulfillment and temptation. In *City of Women*, Christine Stansell points out that “the republican beliefs of the Revolution ... strengthened assumptions of female subservience and male authority ... Republican ideas of government, authority and power supported already familiar justifications of sexual hierarchies.”²⁴ Indeed, it is telling that the most profitable occupation available to women in New York (and, presumably many other cities as well) at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century was prostitution.²⁵ Class further complicated conceptions of gender in late eighteenth-century America, and lower class women were viewed as sexually wanton, “accustomed to levity, to allowing male friends liberties.”²⁶

For many women in the early Republic, pursuing a rape charge may have in fact amounted to another assault. Livingston conceded that “the woman who complains of rape...if she does not succeed, her reputation and character are immediately lost, she is shunned by her former dearest connections and life itself must become a burden.” Because of this potential ruin “she leaves not a single effort unturned to ensure the prisoner’s conviction.”²⁷ Perhaps Lanah had good reason to do so. According to his deposition, her own father testified that “if his daughter was wrong, he would turn her out of doors, if right, he would say nothing to her.”²⁸ The sanctity of female chastity was tantamount. Faced with the choice between being a victim and being a whore, Lanah Sawyer had opted to protect her own reputation by targeting an innocent man. She had, in fact, been as active a participant in the seduction as Bedlow had. “Was it prudent,” Mr. Troup asked, “to pick up a man in the streets and become instantly acquainted with him?”²⁹ Sawyer’s failure to alert anyone to her plight pointed to her complacency in the attack. She claimed to have screamed to no avail, but surely there were “other means which a virtuous woman would have employed in defense of her chastity” to fend off her attacker, or bring *someone* to her aid.³⁰

The conflicted status of women in the early Republic—at once pillars of virtue and objects of sexual temptation—rings through in almost every line of the Bedlow defense. Sawyer, they claimed, had accused Bedlow of rape because he showed no interest in pursuing a further relationship with her. Attorney Livingston offered the jury a slightly more eloquent version of the old adage about the fury of a woman scorned saying, “you all know how strong the passion of revenge exists in the female breast.”³¹ Sawyer had had many opportunities to break free from Bedlow, but she had been guided not by virtue and good sense, but by lust.

The entrance of *Justitia* into the fray further indicates the position of women in New York in the early Republic. From the very beginning of her first letter, *Justitia* frames the riots in terms of gendered morality, claiming that, “the reduction of *Mrs. Carey & co.*’s houses, it seems, is a matter of great grief to many of our *male citizens*” who frequent such brothels, “far from the complaints of a neglected wife, or the very vexatious cries of hungry children.” She went on to accuse the city magistrates not only of turning a blind eye to the brothels, but of supporting them as well. The editors of *The Diary* chose to accompany this potentially inflammatory letter with this somewhat condescending disclaimer: “As the following address came from the *hand of a female author*, we could not refuse in indulging her, though she is rather severe. This, we

24 Christine Stansell, *City of Women; Sex and Class in New York 1789-1860* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1986) 20, 23.

25 Timothy Gilfoyle, *City of Eros: New York City, Prostitution and the Commercialization of Sex 1820-1920* (New York: Norton 1992), 17.

26 Wyche, 44.

27 Ibid, 31- 32.

28 Ibid, 16.

29 Ibid, 37.

30 Ibid, 26.

31 Ibid, 32.

hope, will be a sufficient apology for its appearance.”³²

Immediately, letters flowed in attacking Justitia's feminine virtue and mocking “the indecency of her pen.” One particularly scathing response, signed with the pseudonym Justitius, states that no respectable woman could have such intimate knowledge of the sexual proclivities of members of local government. He goes on to say that “as long as our ladies take for their model the lilies of Solomon, so long will prudence countenance the crime of bachelorship.” Like Lanah Sawyer, Justitia too had transgressed the boundaries of acceptable behavior for a woman in the early Republic. Justitius suggested that “there are subjects more fit for a lady to handle.” Challenges were issued for Justitia to “name him ... if a vile wretch has crept into office.”³³ If she would not substantiate her claims then she was “guilty of vile falsehoods.” Accusations also abounded that she had put forth “a gross libel on the magistrates of this city.”³⁴ Clearly Justitia, wearied by public attacks on her character (anonymous though she may have been), felt the need to qualify her accusations saying “I published nothing from my own knowledge. I said that *Fame* said so ... instead of including all the Magistrates, simply to have noted ‘some’ of them.” Justitia was not without her supporters. On October 25, a letter ran blasting Justitius for “descending to personal remark.” Ultimately, Justitia “was reduced to calling on a gentleman.” This ally wrote to the *Diary* on October 25 (although it is possible that the anonymous letter came from Justitia's pen) asking that the writer who had “awakened all of [Justitia's] resentments ... leave his name at Mr. Loudon's, where a GENTLEMAN will condescend to call upon him.”³⁵

The events surrounding the Lanah Sawyer rape case and the bawdyhouse riots of 1793 do provide an insight into the relationship between American men and women at the end of the eighteenth century. Henry Bedlow's defense in particular is replete with misogynistic rhetoric. It is all too tempting to assign primacy to a gendered analysis of these events. But to do so is to undermine the most salient undercurrent of the bawdyhouse riots. It is true that the defense attorneys prosecuted Lanah Sawyer's virtue, but ultimately it was her class and not her gender that paved the way for this attack.

The Bedlow trial and the riots highlight the growing sense of class resentment in America's early Republic, the power of the mob and the encroaching reality of a democratic society. The prosecution in the Bedlow trial called forth a series of character witnesses who could attest to Lanah Sawyer's virtue. Her neighbors, friends and relatives all described her as a chaste and innocent girl, lacking the guile to be a party to her own seduction, let alone fabricate a rape case. In response to these witnesses, Mr. Troup, one of the defense attorneys, appealed to the “reasonability” of the jury. “Who are these witnesses,” he asked. “An obscure set of people, perhaps of no character themselves. We know none of them, and the very girls who have testified on behalf of the Prosecutrix, require testimony in behalf of their own reputation.”³⁶ Ironically, the defense attorneys later asserted that Mother Carey and the other inhabitants of her house, who corroborated Bedlow's version of events, should be believed because, since she had a level of familiarity with Mr. Bedlow before he arrived at her door with Lanah Sawyer, “though she is a woman who keeps a bad house, still it is one of a decent kind.”³⁷ Ms. Sawyer and her character witnesses were not to be believed because of their humble, and presumably morally-bankrupt, social status.

32 Justitia. *New York Diary*, 18 October 1793.

33 Justitius. *New York Diary*, 24 October 1793.

34 Candidus. *New York Diary*, 21 October 1793; Civis. *New York Diary*, 21 October 1793.

35 R. “Letter to the Editor.” *New York Diary*, 25 October 1793; Stansell 26; “Unsigned Letter to the Editor.” *New York Diary*, 25 October 1793.

36 Wyche, 36-37.

37 Ibid, 27.

Another defense attorney, Mr. Cozine, took the class argument one step further. “Remember the character she tells you he first affirmed—lawyer Smith and remember her condition in life...could she imagine that a man of his situation would pay her any attention...unless with a view of promoting illicit commerce?”³⁸ By this logic, even if what had occurred on September 4 could have been construed as a rape and not a seduction, it could not be defined as such because Ms. Sawyer should have known that there was only one reason that someone like Henry Bedlow would request her company. The defense presented the jury with a clear choice, delineated by class. They could believe the gentleman—standard bearer of republican ideals, or they could put their faith in the common girl, daughter of a dockworker, a seamstress and a member of the vast urban folk. It is perhaps remarkable that the jury needed to deliberate as long as they did. Surely fifteen minutes was an excessive amount of time for such a simple decision.

Small wonder then that, once the verdict was handed down, the resentment of the urban masses reached a fever pitch. Wood writes that by the end of the eighteenth century, “gentlemanly distinctiveness, and particularly the age old tradition of aristocratic leisure was brought under increasing attack by all those who had to work for a living.”³⁹ The aristocratic disinterestedness that was once the mark of intellect and prudence now stood for the brand of debauched luxury that threatened liberty and equality. The crowds attacking the bawdyhouses “tended to come from the middle to lower segments of society.”⁴⁰ Indeed, the “600 enraged citizens” who converged upon Mother Carey’s brothel on October 14 were more than just moral crusaders, or vigilante avengers, they were members of a larger, national group of workers growing increasingly suspicious of those in power. In his treatise, “The Key of Liberty,” William Manning wrote about the discrepancies between the Few and the Many. The former “cannot bear to be on a level with their fellow creatures... [They] seek to deceive the people and promote their own schemes.”⁴¹ The rioters were not simply striking out at sin and inequity in their own neighborhood; they were sending the clear message that the brand of classist oppression that had been used to ensure the privilege of one group within the republic over another would no longer stand. The mob may not have ruled, but it certainly did roar.

On the other side of the social divide, the unrest of the lower classes translated into the panic, or at the very least, the disgust of the upper classes. In his diary, Philip Hone recalled watching the bawdyhouse riots as a young boy, observing them from a tree as if they were some sort of burlesque entertainment (perhaps, with the “turning into the street of Mother Carey’s chickens,” they actually were). Hone sneered that on that fateful day, “the popular indignation was excited to the highest pitch.” He went on to refer to the actions of the rioters as “excesses.”⁴² Hone was clearly not impressed with the plight of the urban poor, nor was he gratified to see the beginnings of a new structure for an American society governed by the masses.

The 1790s stand as a transitional period in American history, a time when the egalitarian values of the Revolution collided with the growing awareness of class division arising throughout the young nation, particularly in urban centers like New York City. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, “New York was characterized by a significant degree of social and economic divergence.”⁴³ New York was a fast growing city—between 1790 and 1800 its

38 Ibid., 40.

39 Wood, 370.

40 Gilje, *Mobocracy*, 89.

41 William Manning, “The Key of Liberty,” in *The Key of Liberty; The Life and Writings of William Manning, “A Laborer,” 1747-1814* ed. Michael Merrill and Sean Wilentz (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1993), 138-139.

42 Philip Hone, *The Diary of Philip Hone 1828-1851* Vol. 1, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company 1927), 399.

43 Howard B. Rock, *Artisans of the New Republic; The Tradesmen of New York City in the Age of Jefferson* (New York: New York University Press 1979), 2.

population increased by eighty percent. Wilentz writes that “this rapid development deepened existing contrasts between the rich and the poor.”⁴⁴ As the divide widened, the resentment and fear deepened. These class divides made New York a very complicated socio-political environment, a city whose “social code helped foster a fractious political system of patrician control and popular participation.”⁴⁵ It is easy to think about class division as an ideological construct, something that descends upon a society over time. The Lanah Sawyer affair provides an example of the smaller, but very real-life disputes that not only displayed, but created this rising sense of class-based antagonism. For many members of New York’s upper class, the riots represented the terrifying notion that Fisher Ames would later label, “a mobocracy...[which is] usurped by the worst men in the most corrupt times.”⁴⁶ It is not a stretch to suppose that the only reason for the success of the “what would he be doing with her” defense lay in a deep-seated fear of the power of the lower class, and the potential threat of social upheaval. The outpouring of anti-riot editorials in the largely Federalist New York newspapers, with their talk of “Boys, Apprentices and Negroes, as well as Sailors” and their “shameful affair,”⁴⁷ reflects a very-thinly veiled panic beneath their law-abiding condemnation of the rioters. One article in the *New York Journal* described the first night of rioting as follows: “Mother Carey’s nest of chickens, in the fields, was sadly interrupted by about 600 enraged citizens. In this onset, the house was turned out of the windows ... the downy couches, or feather beds of the innocents, where strewed to the winds.”⁴⁸ The *Journal’s* crowd bordered on the demonic—a group of possessed citizens converging violently on the innocent damsels of a brothel.

The editorials, of course, only present one side of the story. Newspapers may have been a crucial public forum in the early Republic, but they represented a forum in which participation was largely limited to members of society who could not only read and write, but write well. We learn nothing of the feelings of the “Apprentices” and “Sailors” from these newspaper articles. The depositions of those called to testify on behalf of Lanah’s character do offer a glimpse of the socio-political views of the lower classes in New York. But beyond affirmations that “the general character of the Prosecutrix was good, and she [was] esteemed to be modest and prudent,”⁴⁹ there is no first hand written evidence about how members of the lower orders felt about the Sawyer verdict. Their actions, the “out-of-doors political activity of ordinary Americans,”⁵⁰ constitute the only evidence that remains of their personal beliefs.

By the 1790s, class conflict in American political and social life had reached new heights. The “eternal scuffle” between the Few and the Many that Manning had described had “unfolded as a more comprehensive struggle over labor, property, and free government itself.”⁵¹ Mass public displays constituted the best form of political speech available to members of New York’s lower classes. “Mobbing and ritualized street demonstrations ... were quite familiar to late-eighteenth-century New Yorkers, accepted as normal ... manifestations of lower-class displeasures and high spirits.”⁵² Public displays of political sentiment became the primary means of mass participation in American civic culture, and one of the premier forums for displaying sentiments both positive (the patriotic celebrations surrounding Washington’s birthday) and

44 Sean Wilentz, *Chants Democratic; New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class 1788-1850* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1984), 25.

45 Ibid, 63.

46 J.T. Kirkland, ed. *The Works of Fisher Ames* (Boston: TB Wait 1809), 96.

47 “Notice by the Magistrates,” *New York Daily Advertiser*, 17 October 1793.

48 “An Airing!” *New York Journal*, 16 October 1793.

49 Wyche, 18.

50 Simon P. Newman, *Parades and Politics of the Street; Festive Culture in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1997), 7.

51 Merrill and Wilentz, 59.

52 Wilentz, 64.

negative (the string of riots that plagued America throughout the end of the eighteenth century).⁵³ Lanah Sawyer and her peers did not write lengthy essays reacting to the verdict in the case. Presumably, few members of her community became individually influential in city politics as the new century dawned. They did make their dissatisfaction known, however, through the best means of political speech available to them.

In effect, the bawdyhouse riots sounded a death knell, at least locally, for the standing social structure of the early Republic. Democracy was rising, and with it, the ability of the lower classes to have an equal say in government and equal sway in the courts of law. The rioters simply proved that if they did not receive equality as a gift, they would claim it as a spoil. Though at first the bawdyhouse riots may have simply been a way of avenging the mistreatment of one of their own, they became emblematic of a shifting nation. In one week of violence (enacted, for the most part, against property and not people), the frustrations of the lower class and the fears of the upper class came into brush, open contact with one another. The fall of several “houses of ill repute” provided a showcase for the beginning of the rise of New York’s urban democracy.

Rioting had long been viewed in America as a popular (if not always desirable) means of “regulating the community.” Colonial uprisings, particularly in the years leading up to the Revolution, were an important part of American socio-political mobilization. As tension rose between the classes, however, tolerance for the urban mob fell. In the three major riots that occurred in New York City in the 1790s—the Duer riots of 1792, and the bawdyhouse riots of 1793 and 1799—“magistrates did not hesitate to take action to quell disturbances.”⁵⁴ Rioting had become a public threat because of what it represented: mob action constituted a terrifying reminder that “power was not inherent in a single individual or a small group, but was instead exercised in the negotiations between rulers and ruled.”⁵⁵ The bawdyhouse riots forced city government to take notice of the feelings of the lower classes, if only for a week. More importantly, as the Henry Bedlow verdict was “discussed” in the newspapers and in the streets, they marked a convergence of two major forums of public opinion.⁵⁶

A new movement had hijacked the course of the Revolution. What had originally been conceived of as a government of the people, for the people, run by the best of the people, eventually became a mass democracy, in which the ordinary man had as much political power as the intellectual elites of the Revolutionary era. Mobs allowed the Lanah Sawyers, those who had been failed by the court and by their politicians, to articulate their complaints, establishing “a ritualized, boisterous political presence.” The urban masses were coming to “know their own strength, rights and minds equal to the Few.”⁵⁷ The bawdyhouse riots of 1793 allowed the working-class citizens of New York to show that “they were far more than simple subjects of power.”⁵⁸

Ultimately, the events of October 1793 did not bring about any immediate change. Henry Bedlow went on to prosper after taking over his father’s properties. After the trial, no record exists of Lanah Sawyer, but one can assume that she lived out her life as a seamstress in lower Manhattan, continuing to play her role in the New York class system. The rise of democracy did not overthrow the social order overnight, and the actions of the rioters soon faded from the collective memory of the city. Six years later, however, slightly different circumstances

53 Newman, 25.

54 Paul A. Gilje, *Rioting in America* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press 1996), 52-53.

55 Newman, 7.

56 Pauline Maier, “Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America.” *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser., 27 (January 1970), 3-8; Gilje, *Rioting*, 54.

57 Manning, 143.

58 Newman, 187; *Ibid.*, 7.

would lead to a second set of bawdyhouse riots in Manhattan, and the following year, in 1800, the Levi Weeks murder trial would captivate national attention. Once again, the issue of the gentleman and the working-class girl would come before the court, only this time Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr would argue on Weeks's behalf. The two legal greats modeled parts of their own case on the masterful defense Bedlow's attorneys had assembled seven years earlier.⁵⁹ The issues brought to the foreground in the Lanah Sawyer affair—morality, women's rights, the power of the mob—would come up again and again as America moved through the early nineteenth century. In his closing argument, Mr. Hoffman, one of the prosecutors, summed up the case with praise of Lanah Sawyer's courage: "She was going to disclose an unfortunate occurrence to the world; poor and unknown, she was going to oppose a man of rich family and connections."⁶⁰ And so, for a few brief days in October, Lanah Sawyer, and her fellow neighbors did oppose those of wealth and power by striking out against the injustices that they had failed to prevent. The riots ended, the bawdyhouses continued to flourish, and the class divide in New York continued to be a source of tension. But something had changed. Several large scale riots, the bawdyhouse riots of 1793 included, took place in New York City in the last decade of the eighteenth century. The growing working class was making it clear that it would no longer tolerate a government that did not protect its interests and promote its progress. Little coincidence, then, that twenty years later, New York State would become the birthplace of the populist Van Burenite Democrats, the party that would shape the new course of American politics for decades to come. Perhaps Lanah Sawyer's date with Henry Bedlow was in fact America's date with its own destiny. The bawdyhouse riots represent the new world order, one in which decisions of an elitist, biased system could be contested in popular forums, and one in which the crimes of the Henry Bedlows would not go unnoticed and the plights of the Lanah Sawyers would not remain unvoiced.

59 James Hardy, *An Impartial Account of the Trial of Levi Weeks for the Supposed Murder of Miss Juliana Elmore Sands* (New York: M. M'Farlane 1800), ff.

60 Wyche, 59.

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SOURCE WARS: THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF ARCHIVAL RE- SEARCH ON THE STUDY OF THE SOVIET PRESS

AN ANALYSIS OF WORKS BY JEFFREY BROOKS AND MATTHEW LENOE

NICHOLAS SWISHER

For decades, the Soviet newspaper system has drawn the interest of American observers, since perhaps no other institution in Soviet society better represented the state's ideological rigidity and homogenous Party culture. There existed obvious contrasts in the political ideologies in each country, which manifested in their respective newspaper corps. In general terms, the press in the Soviet Union served as an official apparatus of the Communist Party, as opposed to America, where freedom of the press is codified by the U. S. Constitution. Though Soviet citizens were technically guaranteed freedom of the press by Article 125 of the 1936 Constitution of the U.S.S.R., the two states certainly perceived 'freedom of the press' in very different ways.¹ This was easily apparent to American observers.

This comparison defined most Cold War-era studies of the Soviet newspaper system. Mark W. Hopkins, a journalist for Voice of America who served as a foreign correspondent in Yugoslavia, Belgrade, China and the USSR, commented on the nature of Soviet journalism in his 1970 book, "Mass Media in the Soviet Union." He wrote:

As regards to the Soviet press specifically, my judgments are influenced by American values. It seems to me that the press should voice the fullest range of thought. When the press is managed by special interests, the inevitable consequence is the suppression of "dangerous" ideas, and therefore the denial of individual liberty At various points throughout the book, I have referred to the American mass media ... to draw parallels or note contrasts where they seemed to me helpful in understanding the Soviet press system."²

Evaluations of the Soviet media in America were colored with Cold War rhetoric, focusing on "freedom" as a primary criterion of judgment and emphasizing the Soviet press's propagandistic nature.

Though to American ears Hopkins's evaluation probably sounded like a reproach of the

1 "PoliticsForum.Org - U.S.S.R. Constitution 1936." (*PoliticsForum.Org*. 22 Nov. 2006) <http://www.politicsforum.org/documents/constitution_ussr_1936.php>.

2 Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*. (New York: Western Company, Inc., 1970), vii-viii.

Soviet press, Soviet officials actually agreed with the tenor of his assessment. A 1939 English-language pamphlet released by the Soviet Teacher's Journal, ostensibly for purposes of international propaganda, claims:

In the U.S.S.R. the press must be a propagandist, an agitator and an organizer—that is how Lenin formulated its tasks. ... It is the aim of the Soviet press to have every issue help to popularize advanced ideas, to encourage the public-spirited workers in all spheres of labor, science and culture, reveal any shortcomings there may be on one or another sector of construction of the new, Socialist life, flail and ridicule all bureaucracy and red-tape and expose the spies and saboteurs sent into the U.S.S.R. by the fascist countries. (Pamphlet 23, 41)³

It should also be noted that in the first sentence of this pamphlet the author claims that the “USSR enjoys freedom of the press.” This statement undoubtedly came off as ironic to many American readers, but there seemed to be no inherent contradiction for members of the Soviet bureaucracy. For Americans, comparing the Soviet press system to U.S. media outlets was the simplest way to evaluate the Soviet press. As such, studies in early Sovietology focused largely on the differences between the two systems, “measuring Soviet Russia against a Western yardstick.”⁴ American political scientists and journalists considered Soviet Russia to be a ‘totalitarian’ state and, as such, their press was deemed as a monolithic and oppressive appendage. The antagonistic climate of the Cold War and a lack of access to documents likely prevented more thorough studies.

However, in recent decades, most scholars of Soviet history have rejected this comparative tendency, focusing new attention on previously-neglected facets of Soviet society. In 1986, noted Soviet historian Sheila Fitzpatrick wrote in the *Russian Review* about recent trends in the Soviet historical research:

... there have been other developments affecting the direction of Western Soviet scholarship in recent years. The most relevant ... is the entry of historians into a field long dominated by political scientists, the study of the Soviet Union from the Revolution of 1917 to the end of the Stalin period. ... [T]he new cohort ... is distinguishing itself from the older generation of Sovietologists, dominated by political scientists' main interpretative framework, the totalitarian model.⁵

In this climate, American scholars of Soviet history reasserted themselves in the task of detailing and analyzing the “real dynamics of post-revolutionary Soviet development,” which political scientists traditionally neglected.⁶

This shift was apparent in studies of the Soviet press. The aforementioned propaganda piece from the Soviet Teacher's Journal quotes Stalin declaring, “The press is the only instrument whereby the Party can speak daily and hourly with the workers in its own language, in the language it needs to.”⁷ With respect to this quote, traditional Kremlinologists would have considered the press as simply being the circumscribed mouthpiece of the totalitarian state. However, the “new cohort” began to consider the Soviet press from a fresh perspective. What

3 Vera Golenkina, *The Soviet Press*. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939), 23; Ibid, 41.

4 Jan Plamper, “Review of *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers*, by Matthew E. Lenoe,” *Russian Review* (2005), 152-153.

5 Sheila, Fitzpatrick, “New Perspectives on Stalinism.” *Russian Review* (1986), 358.

6 Ibid, 358.

7 Golenkina, 27.

was the Party's 'language?' From where did this press system arise? And how did newspapers change during Stalin's rise to power? During the 1990s, several historians busied themselves answering these questions; they included Julie Kay Mueller, Steven Coe, Michael Gorham, Jeffrey Brooks and Matthew Lenoe, all of whom studied and published on the early development of the Soviet press and political culture in the USSR.⁸

Until recently, these questions and others like them had to be answered through a close critical reading of newspaper sources and other published materials. The opening of the Soviet archives after the collapse of the USSR, however, provided an opportunity for historians to study these questions from a different perspective. The State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI) and the Central State Archive of Socio-Political Movements of the City of Moscow (TsGAOD) in particular proved to be valuable resources for scholars of the Soviet press, as these archives revealed information about the inner workings of the editorial offices of various newspapers, as well as until-then-concealed documents from the Central Committee Department of Agitation and Propaganda. Numerous scholars shifted their attention from traditional source-based work to taking advantage of these archives.

This shift in the use of sources is the basis of a recent dispute between two of the aforementioned scholars: Jeffrey Brooks and Matthew Lenoe. Brooks is the elder and more experienced of the two scholars. He received his PhD from Stanford University in 1972, writing a dissertation titled *Literature, Liberalism, and the Idea of Culture: Russia, 1900-1910*. His first published book, *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917* broadens themes found in his thesis, detailing the rise of a mass Russian "popular culture based on common literacy" among peasants in post-feudal Russia. Brooks currently holds a professorship at Johns Hopkins University.

Lenoe, who studied at the University of Chicago under Sheila Fitzpatrick, only recently became a professional academic, receiving his PhD in 1997. Since then, he has taught at Assumption College and currently instructs Russian history at the University of Rochester. His first book, *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers*, was published in 2004. The book drew significant portions from Lenoe's dissertation, *Agitation, Propaganda, and the 'Stalinization' of the Soviet Press, 1922-1930*.

Brooks reviewed *Closer to the Masses* in the April 2005 edition of the *American Historical Review*. Brooks was generally critical of Lenoe's scholarly contribution, commenting, "From its structure, language, and uneven coverage, the book appears to be a revised dissertation" Apart from this critique, Brooks leveled a much more serious charge against Lenoe: plagiarism. Brooks wrote, "I agree substantially with many of Lenoe's ideas, perhaps because he restates key elements of the thesis of my *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (2000) and views developed in earlier published articles"⁹

The accusations spilled outside the pages of the *AHR*. Jan Plamper of the University of Tübingen reviewed Lenoe's book in the *Russian Review*, where he made reference to Brooks's claims of plagiarism.¹⁰ Soon thereafter, Fitzpatrick, who served as Lenoe's thesis advisor, responded to Plamper's review, writing, "It is inappropriate, to choose no harsher word, for Plamper to repeat a charge that is potentially damaging to Lenoe's scholarly reputation without either attempting to substantiate it or giving an exact citation"¹¹ Plamper sardonically re-

8 Matthew E. Lenoe, "To the Editor," *American Historical Review* 110 (2005).

9 Jeffrey Brooks, "Review of *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers*, by Matthew E. Lenoe," *American Historical Review* (2005).

10 Plamper, 153.

11 Sheila Fitzpatrick and Jan Plamper, "To the Editor," *Russian Review* 65 (2006), 559.

plied, “I find it curious, to choose no harsher word, that Matthew Lenoe’s dissertation advisor, not Lenoe himself, writes to *Russian Review* in response to my review of Lenoe’s book. If all advisors start publicly throwing in their full weight after less-than-enthusiastic reviews of their advisees’ published dissertations, reviews in scholarly journals will soon become indistinguishable from the blurbs on book covers.”¹² This exchange no doubt added more venom to an already spiteful discussion.

Lenoe responded to the dispute promptly. He wrote in the October edition of the *AHR*, “In his review of my book ... Jeffrey Brooks suggests that I appropriated his work (the book *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* and earlier articles) without attribution. This suggestion is baseless, as anyone who reads through his and my published work on the Soviet press can discover for themselves.”¹³ This paper aims to do just that: consider both *Closer to the Masses* and *Thank You Comrade Stalin!* and weigh the merit of Brooks’s allegation. It also aspires to use these two books to contrast current archival studies with more traditional text-based studies in Russian historiography.

The brunt of Brooks’s allegation is that the main thesis of *Closer to the Masses*, published in 2004, rehashes ideas about a shift in Bolshevik newspaper audience. Brooks feels these ideas were appropriated from his own book, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, which was published in 2000. Brooks outlined the offending portions in his review:

... consider Lenoe’s argument below that the Bolshevik leadership at the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP) shifted from efforts to engage common readers to attempts to mobilize political activists: ‘The shift from enlightenment to mobilization was not one of rhetoric ... but one of practice. A number of changes in practices signaled the end of the NEP mass enlightenment project, among them the decline of studies of audience response ... But most important for this book’s story, the Central Committee leadership in 1929–1931 retargeted newspapers all over the USSR at rank-and-file party activists’ (p. 2). Now compare that to my own words: ‘The shift from an imagined mass public to be swayed by rational argument to a narrower and less critical audience of insiders coincided with the implementation of the great Stalinist coercive projects,’ and ‘The workers and peasants whom editors had often courted in the 1920s were supplanted in the press by officials and enthusiasts, and the large-scale studies of common readers carried out so assiduously during the NEP virtually ceased’” (pp. 15–16, and 54–55).¹⁴

Brooks concludes, “[T]he major ideas of the first part of the book—i.e. the notion that the Bolsheviks turned from enlightenment to mass mobilization, and that their target audience shifted from common readers to activists—are not new.”¹⁵ As demonstrated, Brooks previously published nearly identical claims himself four years before Lenoe.

Even so, Lenoe has provided a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy. In his response to Brooks in the *American Historical Review*, Lenoe offers several reasons why he feels that the accusations against him were misguided:

In his review, Brooks focuses on the fact that both of our books discuss a narrowing of the target audience(s) of Soviet newspapers to party activists/”insiders” during the

12 Ibid, 560.

13 Lenoe, “To the Editor.”

14 Brooks, “Review of *Closer to the Masses*.”

15 Ibid.

First Five Year Plan. Brooks appears to indicate that I took this idea from him. First, I formulated this thesis in a seminar paper written for Professor Sheila Fitzpatrick in the winter of 1992–1993, before Professor Brooks had published it anywhere, as far as I know. I expanded on the thesis in my dissertation, which was complete and available to the public as of December 1997. I presented the thesis on the retargeting of the Soviet press (as well as the other core arguments of *Closer to the Masses*) in my short 1998 monograph *Agitation, Propaganda, and the “Stalinization” of the Soviet Press, 1922–1930*, published in the University of Pittsburgh’s Carl Beck Papers series two years before Brooks’s book appeared. Yet Brooks’s book does not cite either my monograph or my dissertation.¹⁶

On one level, this entire dispute appears to be merely a misunderstanding. As Lenoe asserts, “During the 1990s, a number of North American scholars were working in parallel on the early history of the Soviet press There was both cross-fertilization and coincidence of conclusions.”¹⁷ If we accept this, Brooks’s accusations of outright intellectual misappropriation are clearly overstated. Lenoe cites all of Brooks’s most recent work in his end notes (Brooks recognizes this effort in his review), and there is sufficient overlap in the dates of their various published works to give Lenoe the benefit of the doubt.

However, even if Lenoe did not appropriate *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, there still exists a strong similarity between the two books’ theses. This forces us to question the historiographical value of *Closer to the Masses*. If *Closer to the Masses* merely presents the same thesis as *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, does the former retain any worth as an original academic work? Should students of Stalinism skip over Lenoe in favor of Brooks, merely because the latter was published first?

Though some of Brooks’s general criticisms are valid, and there is a distinct similarity between the conclusions drawn in *Closer to the Masses* and *Thank You Comrade Stalin!*, there exists an important difference in the manner by which these two books are written. *Closer to the Masses* presents extensive evidence from archival sources, while *Thank You Comrade Stalin!* employs only the content of Soviet newspapers, including *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, as its sources. Though *Closer to the Masses* does have its faults in terms of structure and coverage (as noted by Brooks), its ostensible goal—to use archival research to tackle questions about the Soviet press left unanswered by previous studies—guarantees the book’s relevance in Soviet historiography.

As noted, Brooks did not draw on archival sources when he researched *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*. He writes in the prologue of his book, “I began this book during the late Soviet era. Now, after the collapse of Communism, the quantity of primary material about the Soviet experience has multiplied manifold I have not availed myself of the opportunity to work in Russian archives on the press. The quantity of material in the press itself was more than sufficient for this project.”¹⁸ Instead, Brooks primarily analyzes the content of the newspapers, especially *Pravda*, to explain the shift taken by the Bolshevik press corps from enlightening a mass readership toward appealing to Party bureaucrats. He does this by using empirical samples of *Pravda*. Describing his data system, Brooks writes: “One sample consisted of every tenth editorial in *Pravda* from 1917 to Stalin’s death; another comprised articles published on important holidays; and a third included all reports on domestic affairs in a random sample

16 Lenoe, “To the Editor.”

17 Ibid.

18 Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), xix–xx.

of several issues of *Pravda* per year from 1917 to the end of World War II, more than twenty-five hundred articles in all.¹⁹ In an article published in the *Russian Review* in 1986, Wojciech Zalewski surveyed the sources currently available for scholars of Russian history. He wrote, “Holdings of Russian newspapers in Western libraries are scanty, but newspapers attract progressively greater attention from scholars.”²⁰ Considering this, Brooks’s *Pravda* research appears even more prodigious.

On one hand, Brooks’s approach is instructive since it allows readers to consider the actual *Pravda* text that would have been read by Soviet citizens. On the other, the book does not provide sufficient contextual evidence from the Soviet archives to explain the motivations of Bolshevik leaders or the actual responses expressed by citizens. This duality is apparent in several of Brooks’s arguments. The thesis of the second chapter in *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* reads as follows: “As the country entered an era of greater planning and administrative control over the economy, portrayals of agency took on features of the mechanical fulfillment of directives from above. Orders from institutions often replaced explanations of behavior, and tasks were described without explanations of their purpose. Class motivation, which had lost its pre-eminence in *Pravda* during the NEP, was buried by bureaucratic motivation.”²¹ To defend this position, Brooks details the shift in official vocabulary used in newspapers by the Bolsheviks that, Brooks argues, appealed more to bureaucrats than to the average citizen or peasant. In his textual evaluation, Brooks analyzes the word ‘task,’ which “connoted hierarchical authority;” the phrases ‘the path,’ ‘the line,’ and ‘the building,’ which “were all widely employed at this time to emphasize control, purpose, and leadership from above;” and an ‘authoritative *we*’ that journalists used to represent “themselves, the state, the Party, and a new inclusive public.”²² All these phrases indicate that language used in *Pravda* became more specialized and less explanatory.

However, Brooks does not sufficiently explore the effects that the use of this language may have had upon readers. Since Brooks relies so heavily on the text of *Pravda*, he leaves the question of actual popular response unexplored. He does cite numerous unpublished letters from peasants that employed this “official language,” arguing that this indicates the public’s “susceptibility to the press.”²³ Even so, these letters are not necessarily indicative of the population as a whole, and any claim Brooks makes would surely be bolstered by additional research. Historian Norman Naimark commented that Brooks had previously made “the important point that shifts in language determined changes in policy...”²⁴ This is true, but historians cannot be sure if this change in policy was intended by Party leaders, or how citizens responded to changes, without corroborating research.

Similarly, other sections of *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* focus exhaustively on newspaper sources, but neglect to consider individual actors. In the third chapter, Brooks continues to argue that newspapers shifted away from engaging common readers to coveting party activists; as evidence, he details the decline in surveys conducted by *Pravda* that gauged reader opinion:

The Bolsheviks’ sponsorship of thousands of such studies indicates that they had not given up on a mass audience. That they were willing to ask open questions was a measure of their optimism about what they offered. As the NEP progressed, however, their interest in open inquiries waned. As the government turned from common readers, it

19 Ibid, xix.

20 Wojciech Zalewski, “Reference Materials, 1984/1985,” *Russian Review* (1986), 212.

21 Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, 51.

22 Ibid, 48-52.

23 Ibid, 52.

24 Norman M. Naimark, “Cold War Studies and New Archival Materials on Stalin,” *Russian Review* 61 (2002).

ceased to study them. ... The official study of the reader began soon after the revolution with open-ended queries about what people wanted to read. In the late 1920s and early 1930s the enterprise concluded with demonstrative reports on model citizens' reactions to model texts.²⁵

Brooks's evidence on the decline of reader surveys is exhaustive (he previously wrote an entire book on the subject of reader response in Soviet Russia), but again Brooks is unable to evaluate the actual intent of party leaders, which could only be indicated in archival documents outside of *Pravda*. This troubles particular arguments Brooks proffers; for instance, Brooks, explaining the decision to phase out reader surveys, argues that "under a monopoly, the investigation of taste is unnecessary."²⁶ But Laura Roselle of Elon University, in her 2001 review of *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* writes, "If media messages were meant to legitimize Soviet rule, taste and believability *do* matter. It also matters whether or not citizens understand what they are reading. Legitimation, according to most definitions, implies the normative belief that the system of policies is right, good, and/or proper."²⁷ Based on the limits of his text-based research, Brooks cannot study the opinions of readers or writers of newspapers. While this was not the stated goal of *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, archival research would have likely provided some of this neglected information and enriched his argument.

Perhaps the most compelling discussion in *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* involves Brooks's application of sociologist Erving Goffman's theories on public performance. As newspapers narrowed their audience, Brooks theorizes that Stalin's charisma and the mythic dimension of the Great Teacher's public persona contributed to an all-encompassing political theater, which was "the only show in town."²⁸ Newspapers served as the stage for Stalin's grand performance. But once again, these theories are confined only to the content of Soviet published materials, and do not consider individual perceptions. Historian Amir Weiner of Stanford University comments:

On the other side of the axis, the confinement of "performance" to the regime precludes a thorough analysis of the efficacy of the official discourse—that is, the degree to which the regime's claims were accepted by the readers.... Most of these questions could have been answered even by a *limited use of the archives*, which now offer researchers the intimate genres of diaries and correspondence.²⁹

In other words, Brooks exhaustively studies the performance's script. It would have been instructive had he studied the directors and the audience members as well.

Though response to *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* was mostly positive in academic journals, many reviewers questioned Brooks's deliberate choice not to use the archives in his research. Julie Kay Mueller of Harvard University, reviewing *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* in the *Journal of Social History*, noted:

Brooks did not conduct research in the previously closed Party archives that became accessible to Western scholars after the collapse of Soviet communism, and thus his

25 Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, 16.

26 Ibid.

27 Laura Roselle, "Review of *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture From Revolution to Cold War*, by Jeffrey Brooks," *Political Psychology* (2001), 635.

28 Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, 82.

29 Amir Weiner, "Review of *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture From Revolution to Cold War*, by Jeffrey Brooks. *Journal of Modern History*," (2001), 1.

book has not benefited from new archival evidence that might have more fully illuminated the intentions of those who created the newspapers or the reactions of those who read them—topics that are both of some consequence to Brooks's analysis.³⁰

In a similar vein, Laura Engelstein of Princeton University wrote in a review, "In seeking to grasp how the journalistic field produced its effects, Brooks largely avoids speculating on how people understood what they read but concentrates instead on the character of the message."³¹ However, some lauded Brooks's decision not to use archival sources. Weiner, writing in the *Journal of Modern History*, stated:

At a time when Soviet historiography revels in thematically and chronologically narrow studies and archival fetishism, the scope and sources of this study are truly refreshing. Brooks's tale is nothing less than the entire course of Soviet history and politics as narrated by the regime's mouthpieces to its audience, and one that no "smoking guns" in the archives that might or might not have influenced the official story could convey.³²

In summation, we are left with a book that, although informative and extensive, leaves some questions necessarily unanswerable by the self-imposed limits of its research. This approach received both acclaim and criticism. Ultimately, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* demonstrates that archival research is not necessary to create an empirically excellent study, though traditional textual-based evidence inherently leaves some issues unresolved.

Closer to the Masses takes a decidedly different tack than *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*. In his response to Brooks that appeared in the *AHR*, Lenoe argues that the books have markedly different focuses. He writes:

[*Closer to the Masses*] demonstrates that by 1930 the formerly "highbrow" *Pravda* and *Izvestiia* had come to resemble closely the "mass newspapers" *Peasant Gazette* and *Worker Gazette*, not just in language and layout, but in distribution methods and journalistic work procedures. I link this change to specific decisions of party leaders, to chronic production problems faced by early Soviet journalists, and to difficulties in distributing the newspapers. Professor Brooks does not do any of this, which is fine. His is a different book, focused more on newspaper content than on newspaper production.³³

Brooks presents *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* primarily drawing on newspaper content and an already-established historiography. *Closer to the Masses*, on the other hand, benefits principally from the inclusion of new archival sources. "Distribution methods" and "journalistic work procedures" could only have been studied effectively by using these sources. Even Plamper, who was "less than enthusiastic" about Lenoe's book, acknowledges Lenoe's "prodigious archival research" on "the economics of newspaper production and distribution," "reader response research," and "conflicts between two generations of journalists."³⁴ While these topics have been previously acknowledged and studied by Brooks, the depth of archival research in

30 Julie Kay Mueller, "Review of *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture From Revolution to Cold War*, by Jeffrey Brooks," *Journal of Social History* (2001), 750.

31 Laura Engelstein, "Review of *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture From Revolution to Cold War*, by Jeffrey Brooks," *American Historical Review*, (2001).

32 Weiner, 1001.

33 Lenoe, "To the Editor."

34 *Ibid.*

Closer to the Masses breaks new ground in Soviet historiography.

Compare, for instance, Lenoe's treatment of reader response to that of Brooks. Lenoe uses previously unreleased documents to explain some of the press decisions made by the Bolsheviks, instead of interpreting their intentions from newspaper content. For example, using the archives, Lenoe details how "M. Erlikh, the secretary for *The Worker Gazette* editorial staff and member of the paper's party cell bureau" would often send worrisome articles and letters directly to Stalin. During a 1926 Bolshevik campaign to cut production costs (including worker salaries), newspaper editorial boards forwarded numerous unpublished letters, which then informed media policy in the coming years. One letter written by a 40-year-old cleaning woman compared the "nice big salaries" of Soviet bureaucrats to her own squalor. Another unpublished letter questioned the cost of building monuments to Lenin during a period of cutting costs. Yet another asked why specialists received raises, but wages for workers remained the same—only 20 rubles. Based on these letters, "Workers were not convinced that the sacrifices demanded of them were necessary, nor were they sure that the party and factory administrators were handling the economy competently."³⁵ Agitprop officials reacted accordingly, crafting a policy focusing on denunciations, which seemed to generate the best response from readers. Detailing the impetus behind Bolshevik newspaper policies, this archival evidence forces scholars to question the ability of the press to engender 'true belief' among Soviet citizens, an issue that Brooks leaves unresolved.

Lenoe also uses archival evidence to describe newspaper distribution policies, which present a different perspective on the push to narrow newspaper audience during the late 1920s. In 1923, the Central Committee began to publish a new national peasant newspaper, *The Peasant Gazette*, in order to reach "the wild peasants." Internal correspondence details large budget deficits experienced by *The Peasant Gazette*, as well as the CC's willingness to subsidize the venture.³⁶ Later in the decade, however, the CC experienced newsprint shortages; it instituted a "system of centralized rationing of newspapers to control newsprint supplies and direct information to preferred audiences."³⁷ Lenoe argues that the narrowing of audience was largely due to economic reasons, and ideology came second. As Lenoe puts it, "... the Central Committee insisted on rationing information to its cadres, at the expense of other social groups."³⁸

Most reviewers of *Closer to the Masses* acknowledged the relative unoriginality of Lenoe's thesis, yet lauded his extensive archival research. Brooks, despite his negativity, agreed that the book contains "interesting new material."³⁹ Louise McReynolds of the University of Hawaii wrote that "Extensive work in Soviet archives has permitted Lenoe to detail his story with authority."⁴⁰ Even Plamper approved of Lenoe's archival "microstudies," writing, "It is here, and in the archival research it is grounded in, that the strength of Lenoe's study lies, and it is here where it adds to and complicates the Pravda findings of Jeffrey Brooks."⁴¹

The comparative study of *Closer to the Masses* and *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!* provides an excellent opportunity to contrast the relative merits of archival research versus traditional sources and studies. Much has been written on the topic of new archival sources, as their introduction has shaped a debate that involves every subfield of Soviet historical research. In 1993, soon after the opening of the archives, historian Mark von Hagen, now at Columbia

35 Ibid, 86-87.

36 Ibid, 51.

37 Ibid, 57.

38 Ibid, 69.

39 Brooks, "Review of *Closer to the Masses*," 152.

40 Louise McReynolds, "Review of *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers*, by Matthew E. Lenoe," *Journal of Modern History* (2006).

41 Plamper, "Review of *Closer to the Masses*," 153.

University, wrote an article for the *Slavic Review* titled “The Archival Gold Rush and Historical Agendas in the Post-Soviet Era.” Von Hagen warns of the “double-edged” nature of archival research; though the archives doubtlessly hold much valuable data, their promise in other words, “... archival access is presumed [by new scholars] to have replaced imagination.”⁴² Von Hagen details issues that apply to all new Soviet studies, but they seem especially appropriate in this discussion of Brooks and Lenoë. He writes:

... in our rush to get to the archives as soon as possible, we seem to have forgotten the available historiography, especially some of the still classic works that cover the revolutions, civil war and interwar periods. We return from the archives thinking we have discovered America and in fact are often repeating—albeit with more detail—the findings of earlier scholars that were based on a very sensitive reading of the press or published materials. ... historical scholarship is little advanced by researching and writing in ignorance of earlier achievements.⁴³

Though Brooks never states it explicitly, his critical review of Lenoë likely is a response to the trend of “historiographical amnesia” von Hagen describes. Even Fitzpatrick empathized; responding to Plamper, she wrote, “... intellectual property rights in historical scholarship seem to be more like patents, that is, they expire after a certain period ... by which time the ideas in question have presumably either been forgotten or become conventional wisdom. Scholars of a new generation of scholars, not knowing whose ideas they originally were, often unwittingly add insult to injury by citing only the latest work that cites the original—without, of course, including the footnote.”⁴⁴ This trend has likely been exacerbated by an influx of new students drawn to Soviet studies by the prospect of archival research.

Others have viewed archival research in a more positive light. One of the most significant academic subfields affected by the archives is the study of the Cold War. This was recently commented upon by Norman Naimark. Naimark references “Melvyn Leffler’s magisterial history of the origins of the Cold War, *A Preponderance of Power*, which was published shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and before the opening of the Russian archives.”⁴⁵ He portrays Leffler’s book as complimentary to studies that followed, including *We Now Know* by John Gaddis, whose work attempted “to fit the new ‘discoveries’ from the Russian and East European archives into the broader historiography of the Cold War.”⁴⁶ At this point, despite early expectations, archival sources seem best used to corroborate and elaborate on past theses, providing additional specificity and evidence. There are exceptions, however; historians J. Arch Getty, Gabor T. Rittersporn and Viktor N. Zemskov used archival evidence to present a completely new depiction of the ‘Great Purge’ that significantly disputed several past studies.⁴⁷ Even so, old theses have not become obsolete in the era of the Soviet archives; rather, they become increasingly relevant as new evidence either confirms or challenge the old theories.

Many scholars expected studies of the Soviet press in particular to benefit from additional archival research. Laura Roselle, reviewing *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, commented, “Others will be able to build on [Brooks’s] work to assess the implications of such information control. The availability of Russian archives on the press now affords scholars the opportunity

42 Mark von Hagen, “The Archival Gold Rush and Historical Agendas in the Post-Soviet Era,” *Slavic Review* 52 (1993), 98.

43 Ibid.

44 Fitzpatrick and Plamper, “To the Editor,” 559.

45 Naimark, 2.

46 Ibid.

47 J. Arch Getty, Gabor T. Rittersporn, and Viktor N. Zemskov, “Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Pre-War Years: A First Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence,” *American Historical Review* 98 (1993).

to ask questions about the creation of the performance and its effects.”⁴⁸ Even Brooks, in the introduction of his book, commented that archival research would benefit the field, writing, “... archival material will undoubtedly offer new perspectives as a new generation of scholars attempts to understand the cultural and intellectual dimensions of Russia’s experience under communist rule.”⁴⁹ Perhaps Brooks forgot that he wrote this line when he reviewed *Closer to the Masses*. Nevertheless, there continues to be archival materials on the Soviet press. Lenoe commented on a wealth of unexplored documents remain in various archives he could not access.⁵⁰

Currently, Lenoe is working on a book about the murder of Sergey Kirov that relies on new archival sources. He recently wrote an article on the subject, where he acknowledges that some questions will always remain unanswered with respect to Stalin’s role in Kirov’s assassination.⁵¹ However, the title of the article—“Key to the Kirov Murder on the Shelves of Hokkaido University Library”—reinforces an idea that von Hagen presents in his 1993 article; namely, that scholars “are approaching the archives with the attitude that the truth is lying there and only needs to be translated ...”⁵² Looking for a “smoking gun” in the archives that will magically answer historiographical questions not only will likely prove fruitless, but it also insults the extensive historiography that already analyzes Kirov’s assassination. It would behoove younger scholars to recognize the wedge that archival research may be driving between two generations of historians.

Ultimately, *Closer to the Masses* should not be judged only by the originality of its thesis; rather, critics should also consider the innovative evidence Lenoe uses to present his argument. This characterizes many new works in Soviet historiography, which is increasingly based in archival research. In the future, students of Russian media would be advised to read Brooks and Lenoe in tandem (as loathe as the authors might be to this proposition). Not only does *Closer to the Masses* begin to answer some questions left unaddressed by Brooks, but the books also stand as an example of the distinction between traditional text-based research and archival scholarship in Sovietology. Instead of pushing previous studies into obsolescence, archival research should continue to interact with past scholarship. Indeed, the works of Brooks and Lenoe complement each other by providing both traditional and archival sources on the same period of the development of the Soviet press. Framing this relationship as conflict rather than alliance is a disservice to Soviet scholars.

48 Roselle, 636.

49 Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!*, xix-xx.

50 Lenoe, *Closer to the Masses*, 248.

51 Matthew E. Lenoe, “Key to the Kirov Murder on the Shelves of Hokkaido University Library.” (Hokkaido University. 20 Nov. 2006) <<http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/eng/news/no13/eneews13-essay3.html>>.

52 von Hagen, 98.

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EARLY SCHOLARSHIP AWARDS AT BROWN UNIVERSITY

ZACHARY TOWNSEND

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The Hon. Isaac Davis, when in England, remarked to one who for thirty years had been entrusted with the care of the Register of Cambridge University.

“I suppose you have many sons of Dukes, Earls, and Lords among the graduates who have distinguished themselves.”

“No, sir,” says the Registrar, “if you want to consult the record of our distinguished scholars and great men, look to the scholarships, sir, look to the scholarships.”

Reuben A. Guild
History of Brown University, 1867

Education and economic opportunity have always been linked in American society, with education serving as a means of social mobility. Aware of this relationship, many colleges in the mid-nineteenth century began to offer scholarship aid to students. Scholarship aid is a peculiar mixture of charity and reward, of outright gift and well-earned wages, the nature of which reveals a school's philosophy toward wealth, as well as its financial goals and needs. At the heart of any scholarship program is the question of who should receive aid and why they should receive it; the answers selected reveal the educational and social values of the program's administrators.

A scholarship can be useful both to its recipients and to those who provide it. The history of charity has often been a tale of mixed motives; rarely, however, have organized charities approached the level of enlightened self-interest revealed in the administration of scholarship aid by our nation's colleges and universities. Within a broad context of charitable concern, college officers have attempted, through a careful application of financial aid, to define and stimulate their student bodies in order to meet institutional needs.

The following essay is an exploration of social values and institutional purpose in the creation and administration of a program of endowed scholarship at Brown University during the

second half of the nineteenth century. The narrative is complicated because responses to student needs at Brown were always closely related to institutional needs and goals. The scholarship program that evolved at Brown after 1859 reflected economic problems that had plagued the Brown administration, as well as the social values held by particular administrators. It also reflected the Brown administration's previous attempts to solve the school's economic and social problems. The history of financial aid at Brown University offers an illuminating glimpse into the university's history.

The first question worth considering is why Brown created a scholarship program in the first place, and why in 1859. Brown University had been established for almost one hundred years without offering an endowed scholarship to a student. Students had received aid in one form or another from locally-supported Baptist education societies and subscription funds, but no attempt had ever been made by the university itself to establish a program of scholarships. Yet in 1859, Brown converted a series of academic prizes into 11 full scholarships and engaged in a unique contract with Waterville College to jointly hire an agent to solicit funds with the aim of creating more scholarships. This agent received a salary greater than that of any member of the Brown faculty at a time when every expense of the university was subject to close scrutiny. Within eight years, Brown's subscription drive had led to the creation of 36 new scholarships. By 1867, fully one quarter of Brown's student body was supported by the new scholarships.¹

What led to such a bold experiment? And why was the program so ambitiously pursued and so eagerly embraced by the Brown administration? Part of the answer lies in the increasing commercial and industrial affluence of American society, affluence that created America's first millionaires and opened the coffers of philanthropy to many fields, college endowments included. Money was there for the asking, as Brown's administration suspected.² Certainly, Brown was aware of similar scholarship programs being established at nearby colleges: Yale announced a new scholarship in 1846, Harvard in 1852 and Amherst in 1858.³

The initial bequest used to fund Brown's first scholarships had been made expressly for that purpose in 1841. In fact, the bequest specifically requested that its funds be used for need-based scholarship aid for students. For 18 years, however, Brown's administration disregarded these stipulations, instead using the funds to offer academic prizes based purely on achievement instead of financial need. This ambivalence towards financial aid was not new; Brown administrators were never quite sure on what criteria scholarship aid should be awarded, whether as prizes offered for academic achievement, or for financial need.

Scholarship aid was not unknown in the early years of American higher education. Both Harvard and Yale offered endowed scholarships in the early eighteenth century, patterned upon the well-known funds established at Oxford and Cambridge. But these early scholarships suffered from difficult investment conditions in colonial America, and little was added to them until the middle of the nineteenth century. The other provincial colleges, Brown included, had no endowments for scholarship aid at all.⁴

This lack of scholarship aid did not necessarily preclude poor students from applying during these years; on the contrary, as David Allmendinger documents in *Paupers and Scholars*, New England colleges in the early nineteenth century were inundated with needy would-be ministers, teachers and lawyers from overcrowded farms. New England was in the grip of a

1 47 full scholarships had been established by 1867; five more students received aid from the Carpenter Aid Fund, according to the Record Book of the Scholarship Committee. Enrollment in 1867, according to the Brown University Catalogue, was 185.

2 Report of Committee to Examine Expenditure of the University, September 1, 1862.

3 David F. Allmendinger, Jr., *Paupers and Scholars* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), 51.

4 *Ibid.*, 46-52.

major demographic upheaval, and among the streams of younger sons heading west or into the cities was a sizeable number knocking on the doors of colleges.⁵

In the absence of institutional support from the colleges themselves, new forms of charity emerged. Ministerial education societies grew rapidly, providing support for indigent and pious young men preparing for the ministry. These societies fixed tuition costs at a low price, and professors' salaries suffered as a result. Historian Frederick Rudolph asserts: "The choice was a simple one: the college could either pay their professors to teach or they could pay their students to enroll. They chose the latter course because it was the only way they could achieve the enrollment that justified their existence."⁶

Colleges had sprung up like wild flowers across the country before the Civil War. One scholar has estimated that as many as 700 colleges were founded but failed before 1861. There existed nine colleges during the colonial years; this number had risen to 250 by the Civil War.⁷ Surprisingly, many of these colleges struggled to fill their classes with students. Though the number of colleges rose rapidly during the antebellum years, the nation's youth showed little interest in attending. Brown President Francis Wayland observed in 1842: "We cannot induce men to pursue a collegiate course unless we offer it vastly below its cost, if we do not give it away altogether... Can (a liberal education) not be made to recommend itself; so that he who wished to obtain it shall also be willing to pay for it?"⁸ American colleges were unable to find a stable constituency of students in a rapidly expanding and socially mobile nation.

Colleges struggled especially because they rigidly adhered to a classical curriculum. Opportunities in business and land speculation grew more attractive to America's expanding middle class than studying Latin, Greek and moral philosophy. Consequently, colleges were forced to seek new groups of students, eventually attracting the indigent sons of New England's dwindling farm population. These young men could clearly see the benefits of achieving professional status, even as poor ministers in frontier parishes.

Like other New England colleges, Brown willingly rearranged its schedule, allowed student bills to go unpaid, provided its students flexible living accommodations and offered them more time to earn their degrees. These measures allowed poor students to support themselves. A historical account of this period written by an 1843 graduate estimated that one half of the student body was able to attend the university by the cost-cutting provisions.⁹

Some students at Brown also received sizeable tuition aid from the Northern Baptist Education Society (NBES) in Massachusetts and its Providence chapter, the Warren Education Society. These societies worked closely with university officers, reflecting Brown's institutional purpose of preparing a learned Baptist ministry. Such aid was based strongly upon demonstrated piety, and required written quarterly affirmations of the candidates' dedication to the ministry. Scholarly achievements were not emphasized; all that was asked was that the beneficiary "also sustain his character as a scholar."¹⁰

Throughout its early history, Brown achieved its enrollment and met its instructional goals of preparing candidates for the ministry by encouraging indigent young men to get an education. Brown's views on educating poor students changed dramatically, however, under the presidency of Francis Wayland, which spanned 1827 to 1855. Wayland was not convinced that the answer to Brown's still continuing enrollment problems lay in encouraging needy

5 Ibid, 8-22.

6 Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University* (New York: 1962), 197-8.

7 Donald G. Tewksbury, *The Founding of American Colleges and Universities Before the Civil War* (New York: 1932), 28 as quoted in Rudolph, 47.

8 Rudolph, 198.

9 P. A. Crane, *Brown University Under the Presidency of Asa Messer* (Boston: Crosby and Ainsworth, 1867), 17.

10 Northern Baptist Education Society, *Records of Annual Meetings*, 1826-1872.

young men to attend. In 1829, he condemned the long winter vacation as disruptive to the academic schedule and asked the Brown Corporation:

Ought we to construct our college arrangements to meet the wishes of those parents who are desirous of giving their sons a thorough education or of those who from pecuniary misfortune are able only to hope for one in a very considerable degree imperfect?¹¹

Early in his career, Wayland was sympathetic to the needs of impoverished students struggling to complete their education at Brown. He sought aid from the Rhode Island General Assembly and raised subscriptions among local Baptist congregations to defray students' costs. He became increasingly suspicious, however, of the Baptist education societies and considered them harmful both to the character of the ministry and to the effectiveness of the university. Wayland objected to scholarship aid because it allowed for social mobility. Theodore Crane describes the president's views in *Francis Wayland and Brown University*:

Piety was a more essential qualification for a minister than culture; the education society beneficiary who had been attracted to his future calling by the desire to enter a genteel and respectable profession would be a corrupt influence in the church...¹²

In other words, Wayland believed that only the congenitally well-off should become ministers and that poor students would pursue that path for personal gain or need. In later years, Wayland opposed a movement to increase the number of students aided by the NBES and viewed the financial problems of the Baptist scholarship organization with fatalistic detachment.¹³

Wayland hoped to solve the problem of a lagging enrollment by reforming Brown's curriculum and improving academic standards; he believed that these reforms would increase the number of students who would consider attending the university. Wayland's now famous New System entailed radical changes in curriculum and degree requirements, aimed at attracting the sons of middle class merchants and manufacturers. He introduced elective courses, expanded the curriculum in natural philosophy and mechanics and altered degree requirements. A graduate of the traditional classical course received a Master of Arts, while a student enrolled in a new three-year program, which substituted modern languages and science for a large part of the Latin and Greek, received a new degree, the Bachelor of Philosophy.¹⁴ Wayland articulated a sincere concern for making education in the United States more representative of the needs of its people, but revising degree and entrance requirements also served to directly increase paid enrollment. In effect, Brown now offered a four-year Master's degree and an alternative track with less rigorous entrance requirements to appeal to a more pragmatic, urban, industrial America.

Wayland wished to raise intellectual standards at Brown, so he devised systems of incentives, based on the example of European universities, to stimulate academic achievement.¹⁵ Wayland articulated his philosophy in *Thoughts on the Present Collegiate System in the United States*:

11 Francis Wayland, Annual Report to the Corporation, September 2, 1829.

12 Theodore Crane, *Francis Wayland and Brown University 1796-1841* (unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, March 1959), 493.

13 Ibid, 491-4.

14 Walter C. Bronson, *The History of Brown University 1764-1914* (Providence: Brown University, 1914), 253-4.

15 Crane, 399.

The love of pleasure is commonly, in young persons, too strong to be controlled by the love of knowledge, or by the remote prospect of professional success... As a pupil can rarely appreciate the ultimate consequences of his present actions, let us place before him immediate consequences, as far as possible, analogues to those which must afterwards inevitably ensue.¹⁶

Upon first assuming the presidency of Brown, Wayland introduced a grading system, complete with a public merit roll and reports to parents. In an attempt to reinforce college discipline, students were graded on class attendance and conduct as well as achievement.¹⁷ Following a visit to English universities in 1840-41, Wayland introduced a system of prizes for undergraduates. He donated \$1,000 towards the establishment of the President's Premiums for excellence in preparatory studies. The Reverend Henry Jackson, a member of the corporation, offered two other premiums to seniors for essays in philosophy and political economy. Most of the premium system, however, was funded by a generous bequest in the will of the University's foremost patron, Nicholas Brown.¹⁸ Upon his death in 1841, Brown had bequeathed half of the income of his various estates to the Corporation of Brown University to be appropriated "to the charitable purpose of aiding deserving young men in obtaining their education while members of said University." A codicil added that the administration must accept the advice and recommendation of the Warren Education Society with regard to potential beneficiaries (if such advice was given).¹⁹

Wayland, seemingly ignoring the explicit language of the will, appropriated this funding for his system of prizes and premiums. Instead of charitably "aiding young men in obtaining their education," Nicholas Brown's bequest became the University Premiums, awarded by competitive essay or examination in Greek, Latin, mathematics, English composition, mechanics, physical science, astronomy and history.²⁰ Wayland's attitude toward financial incentives for students was clear: he believed that scholarly achievement would enhance Brown's academic reputation, rather than charitable support for a class of students whose motives he suspected. Need-based scholarship ran counter to Wayland's plans for the University.

Wayland's reforms and his incentives for academic achievement and increased enrollment were not successful. The prizes attracted few applicants and the work submitted was disappointing. Reverend Jackson withdrew his premiums in disgust after 1850, but the remainder continued to be offered, although occasionally unclaimed, throughout Wayland's presidency.²¹

Far worse, Wayland's system failed to attract the new constituency he had anticipated. Enrollment increased for a time, but began to fall again in 1855 amid complaints of weakened academic standards. More painful for the reputation of Brown University, the number of students who earned degrees fell sharply under the new academic system. Brown's historian, Walter Bronson, observed: "It was evident that, instead of drawing many persons who under the former system would not have come to college at all, the New System was acting chiefly to lessen the number of those taking the full course."²²

16 Francis Wayland, *Thoughts on the Present Collegiate System in the United States* (Boston: 1842), 37; *Ibid.*, 92 as quoted in Theodore Crane, 399.

17 *Ibid.*, 400.

18 Bronson, 218.

19 Reuben A. Guild, *History of Brown University with Illustrative Documents* (Providence: 1867), 308.

20 Bronson, 218.

21 *Ibid.*, 219.

22 *Ibid.*, 323.

Something was clearly wrong, and Wayland's resignation in 1855 was accepted without argument. His successor, Barnas Sears, reported frankly on the failure of the New System to the Executive Board:

It is well known that the best students of preparatory schools, which would naturally direct their pupils to this college, now go elsewhere This results chiefly from the interpretation which is generally given to our peculiar and lowered standard of degrees as an open act of underbidding other colleges, and as scramble for an increased number of students. Even the personal relations of our professors are humiliating, so that their intercourse with the officers of other colleges is a source of mortification rather than of pleasure It cannot be concealed that, while, by such a public sentiment against our system of degrees, the better class of students are often turned away from us, we are flooded by a class of young men of little solidity or earnestness of character, who resort to this college not so much for the sake of sound learning as for the sake of cheap honors. We are now literally receiving the refuse of other colleges We are in danger of becoming an institution rather for conferring degrees upon the unfortunate than for educating a sterling class of men.²³

The Corporation immediately upgraded requirements for the Master's and Bachelor's degrees, reverting to the standards of other colleges. The three-year program leading to the Bachelor of Philosophy was retained but fell into disfavor.²⁴

Brown University's experiment in curriculum reform—softening degree requirements to attract a larger constituency—had failed. Its academic reputation was tarnished, its enrollment had fallen and its financial security stood in jeopardy. Brown needed a new direction, and it was perhaps inevitable, following a period of such vigorous change, that the search for answers led to a conservative reassessment of Brown's past.

In 1858, Brown University rediscovered, almost by accident, the Nicholas Brown bequest for scholarships given in 1841. At the time, Brown's administration had hoped to support the private boarding clubs (akin to early fraternities) that had formed as a cheaper living option than dorms. Following a request for aid, the Corporation appointed a committee to examine Brown's existing funds to determine their applicability. The committee, chaired by President Sears, concluded that restrictions in the terms of the original bequests forbade their use for aiding the boarding clubs. However, in examining the University Premiums, the committee read the original wording of Nicholas Brown's will. They concluded the grounds for aid were financial need and character rather than scholarly achievements:

It is not necessary, probably not material, that it should be applied as the reward of excellence in scholarship; the intention of the donor will perhaps be more completely fulfilled by giving the preponderance, in the awards, to moral merit, struggling for an education, against straightened pecuniary means and a moderate intellectual capacity.²⁵

Accordingly, the Executive Board, agreeing with the committee that the prize funds were of "doubtful propriety" and "questionable" utility as currently allocated, recommended that scholarships be formed from the bequest and added, significantly: "...the reception of which

23 Barnas Sears, Report to the Executive Board, July 5, 1856.

24 Bronson, 322.

25 Report of Committee to Examine Prize Funds, July 9, 1858.

would be an honor rather than a humiliation.”²⁶ A Scholarship Committee, headed by the president, was established, and instructed to give aid to “such undergraduates as are in all respects most meritorious, and at the same time stand most in need of assistance.”²⁷ That committee promptly adopted statutes setting forth grounds for granting aid:

2. Candidates for scholarship must give satisfactory evidence of being meritorious young men, that is, men of good moral character, or industrious and economical habits, and of respectable scholarship.
3. In the disposition of scholarships, preference shall be given, other things being equal, to members of the more advanced classes [in age].
4. No person who shall cease to maintain the character specified in the second statute, shall continue to receive appropriations.²⁸

The record of these early deliberations reveals considerable confusion over the basis for awarding financial aid, which likely arose from the ambiguity over the concept of the scholarship. The committee which re-examined Nicholas Brown’s will concluded that it was his intent to aid young men in securing an education, not to reward them for their achievement. Yet that very committee immediately turned from need to “moral merit” as grounds for aid, and the Executive Board in its turn envisioned the scholarship as an honor, not a “humiliation.” Charity had connotations that disquieted these men, and the concept of reward continually allied itself with that of aid. They were to discover that both faces of scholarship could be useful in meeting their institutional needs.

In fact, the Nicholas Brown scholarships were awarded in 1858 and in future years on the grounds of academic excellence as well as character and need. The President’s Annual Reports to the Corporation regularly listed the grades of the scholarship holders, which were consistently at or near the top of the class.²⁹ President Sears provocatively concluded of the lists of grades in 1860: “Thus it is made evident that aid has been given to the deserving as well as the needy.”³⁰

But the Brown administration soon recognized the value of their new scholarships as a means to attract students by subsidizing tuition. Inspired in part by the example of newly founded scholarships at other colleges, by 1859, the Corporation resolved to seek out private donors for additional scholarships. President Sears, aware that Massachusetts Baptists were considering enacting scholarships for the sons of Baptist clergymen, addressed the Massachusetts Baptist State Convention in Worcester in October 1858 and was greatly encouraged by the warm reception of his ideas. In 1859, Sears was authorized to hire the Reverend Horace Love as an agent for the college to solicit funds, largely because Love was associated with the Massachusetts Baptists so receptive to the scholarship plan. Discovering, with considerable surprise, that Love had also contracted with Waterville College for exactly the same purpose, Brown hastened to make a gentleman’s agreement with its sister Baptist college. The proceeds of Love’s subscription drive were divided according to the wishes of the donor, or else equally, and Love’s sizeable salary was paid according to the proportion of the funds each college received.³¹

26 Annual Report of the Executive Board to the Corporation, September 1, 1858.

27 Bronson, 333.

28 Record Book of the Scholarship Committee of Brown University.

29 Grades of Nicholas Brown scholars in 1862, for example, ranged from 19.75 to 18.65, and averaged 19.30, on a scale of 20. Sears, Annual Report to the Corporation, 1862.

30 Sears, Annual Report to the Corporation, 1860.

31 Sears, Annual Report to the Corporation, 1859.

With Love's subscriptions arriving as capital or interest upon pledges, the Brown Corporation's appreciation of scholarship aid increased dramatically. Scholarships were increasingly recognized as the answer to the most pressing of the university's problems: enrollment and financial stability. In 1862 the Corporation appointed a special committee to report upon income and expenditures of the university. This committee found no difficulty justifying the unusual expense of Horace Love's salary:

In a country like ours, where entailed estates are unknown, the great majority of the young men of the land, those who will hereafter make their mark in the world, are possessed of small means, and are obliged to rely on their individual exertions and the practice of a strict economy, to enable them to get an education. In a multitude of cases, the question of what College they shall go, will be decided by the greater or lesser account of expenses at the different Colleges, or more strictly, by the greater or lesser amount of pecuniary aid rendered at the different Colleges to those in need of such aid.³²

Another committee was appointed the following year to find a means of paying a \$30,000 debt from previous years. Fearing that higher costs would halve the student body, the committee rejected a proposal to double tuition and even considered the painful remedy of increasing duties, thereby lessening the number of faculty members. The committee—faculty members themselves—finally only half-heartedly recommended the elimination of Civil Engineering from the curriculum to cut costs.³³

They gave enthusiastic support, however, to increasing enrollment through scholarship aid:

The income from the term bills of the students are the only legitimate sources from which the salaries of the officers and the incidental expenses can be paid ... if there were one hundred more students, it would add to the income of the University \$6100 annually. The Corporation have all the means and facilities for giving them instruction without much further outlay ... the most efficient means, as well as the most legitimate, of increasing the number of students, after making the best provision for instruction, is the founding of scholarships. This is made the more necessary by the course adopted by other New England colleges which have much larger scholarships³⁴

Brown's major interest lay in increasing enrollment: if a private donor was willing to endow a scholarship, Brown's regulations allowed the donor freedom to name the fund, establish the grounds for choosing beneficiaries, and even to name beneficiaries himself or to assign that responsibility to whomever he pleased. Horace Love's new scholarships included stipulations reserving the benefits for the donor's children and other relatives, if they should apply; forbidding the beneficiary's use of tobacco or wine; and holding the privilege of naming recipients until the donor's death or transferring the privilege to the rectors of local churches. But the great majority of the endowments placed the actual choice of beneficiaries, within the grounds of these stipulations, upon the Scholarship Committee headed by President Sears, and there

32 Report of the Special Committee on Income and Expenditure of Brown University, September 1, 1862.

33 Report of Committee Appointed to Ascertain in What Way the Income of the University May be Increased, 1863.

34 *Ibid.*

are few indications that donors submitted names to the committee.³⁵

Moreover, while the nomination to a scholarship was held to be an honor, President Sears wrote in 1860 in answer to an inquiry about the program:

We do not intend that any shall leave for want of a scholarship. I think there will be provision for all such cases. As you are the member of another college, I ought not, perhaps, to say any more, as it might be interpreted as an attempt to draw a student away from another college to enter ours Our scholarships are \$60 a year, The requirements are, good character, industry, economy, and good scholarship. There will not be much risk for persons of this description.³⁶

Lyman Partridge (the recipient of the above letter) was suitably encouraged to apply, and received a scholarship for the two remaining years of his college study.

The administration of scholarship aid in the years 1859 to 1867 was clearly intended to attract enrollment. Despite the provision in the Scholarship Committee regulations that it would favor upperclassmen, 66 percent of all recipients of aid from Brown during this period first received scholarships in their freshman year; another 23 percent were sophomores.³⁷ Rather than being reserved as an honor for upperclassmen, it appears that scholarship aid was given to students attracted by catalogue announcements and advertisements.

Once a student had been admitted with aid, he tended to keep it for the remainder of his time as a student. Only nine freshmen, or 11 percent of those entering with aid, had their scholarships rescinded, and some of them had left the college before the year ended. 42 percent of the scholarship-holders received aid for four years; another 27 percent for three years, and many of these recipients completed their course in that time.³⁸

The success of Brown's program in attracting enrollment is difficult to judge, since the program operated during the Civil War, when higher education had been severely disrupted. In his history of Brown, Walter Bronson concludes: "... although these [scholarships] were not directly productive, they at least helped to prevent the number of students from falling off greatly during the Civil War."³⁹ Brown's enrollment remained close to two hundred throughout the war, despite the military service of many students. By 1865, Brown offered scholarships to forty-five young men and gave additional financial assistance from the Aid Fund to as many as five more.⁴⁰ The Northern Baptist Education Society was still supporting four or five candidates for the ministry each year. Some were also on ministerial scholarships from Brown.⁴¹

Brown turned to an aggressive program of fund raising to endow scholarships largely because its officers believed scholarships were the answer to pressing problems of enrollment and finance. Another institutional purpose was met in the endowment of scholarships to support candidates for the ministry. By 1867, 24 scholarships out of 47 had been endowed for "pious young men, having the Baptist ministry in view," two more were restricted to Episcopalians.⁴²

These ministerial scholarships overlapped to a great degree with the function of the North-ern Baptist Education Society (NBES), and their foundation may well have sapped the finan-

35 Record Book of the Scholarship Committee.

36 Barnas Sears to Lyman Partridge, July 11, 1860.

37 Analysis by author from the Brown University Catalogues, the Brown University Registrar 1856-1867 and the Record Book of the Scholarship Committee.

38 Ibid.

39 Bronson, 333.

40 Record Book of the Scholarship Committee.

41 Receipt Book of Students in Account with the Northern Baptist Education Society in Brown University 1860-1888.

42 Record Book of the Scholarship Committee.

cial base of the older education society. Between 1841 and 1867, the NBES supported only 28 students at Brown, and 20 others were receiving scholarships from the university. Although ties between Brown and the Baptists were still strong, there is no evidence that the NBES ever contributed to the deliberations of the Scholarship Committee in selecting recipients.⁴³

The ministerial scholarships seem to have been effective as incentives for encouraging the professional preparation of clergymen. Brown had always sent a large proportion of its graduates to Newton Theological Seminary or directly to the pulpit; financial assistance was always available for needy candidates for the pulpit. The degree to which this financial incentive was effective in maintaining this mission is suggested by an examination of the later careers of scholarship recipients. Of the 59 recipients of ministerial scholarships whose careers can be traced, 39, or 66 percent became clergymen, the vast majority Baptist. From Brown's graduating class of 1862, only four of 29 members whose careers can be determined became clergymen; all four were scholarship holders. Similarly, in the class of 1865, 13 of 32 became ministers, eight of whom were scholarship holders.⁴⁴

Despite the concern of the Brown administration with enrollment and ministerial preparation, the scholarship was still valuable in stimulating academic achievement. The majority of university scholarships were awarded to incoming freshman, and a large number of the beneficiaries were chosen at least partly on grounds of piety and the intention to preach. The original Nicholas Brown scholarships, however, continued to be awarded largely on academic merit. Sears' Annual Reports listed the grades of those beneficiaries through 1865, and made no attempt to justify the other scholarship on that basis.⁴⁵ Furthermore, as other scholarship funds were established and helped attract enrollment, the Nicholas Brown scholarships were increasingly reserved for upperclassmen who had had time to prove their academic ability. In the first three years of the scholarship program, from 1859 to 1861, when Brown had little else to offer interested applicants, 16 of 23 Nicholas Brown scholars were incoming freshmen. After that point, only two of 27 recipients named up to 1867 were freshmen. They tended to be awarded one of the other privately endowed scholarships, and transferred to the Nicholas Brown fund as upperclassmen. The standards of scholarship were very high: 60 percent of the Nicholas Brown scholars received Phi Beta Kappa upon graduation, compared with only 21 percent of Brown's entire body during this period, and 33 percent for the holders of ministerial scholarships.⁴⁶

Two special scholarships, added in 1864 and 1867, explicitly recognized the value of financial incentive in stimulating academic achievement. The Romeo Elton scholarship, founded by a retired Brown professor of classical languages, was actually a premium awarded for excellence in Latin and Greek, as was the Howell Scholarship, which was awarded to the senior, already on a scholarship, with the highest rank in mathematics and science.⁴⁷ In later years Brown inaugurated a major program of academic prizes and premiums once again and raised the standards of academic achievement necessary to receive or retain a scholarship. The Brown University catalogue for 1879-80, describing over 100 available scholarship funds, stated: "... a scholarship is forfeited if the candidate incurs college censure, or fails to secure at least 75 percent of the maximum mark." Premiums were listed in most academic fields and the Howell Scholarship was renamed the Howell Premium.

Scholarships served the Brown administration by attracting students, supporting insti-

43 Receipt Book of NBES; Record Book of the Scholarship Committee.

44 Compiled by author from Louise Bauer and William T. Hastings, comps., *The Historical Catalogue of Brown University, 1764-1934* (Providence: Brown University, 1936).

45 Sears, Annual Reports to the Corporation 1859-1865.

46 Compiled by author from the Brown University Catalogues 1861-71 and the *The Historical Catalogue*.

47 Record Book of the Scholarship Committee

tutional goals of ministerial preparation, stimulating academic achievement, and addressing university financial needs. As the program developed, university officers grew aware of other benefits to the program and the students it attracted. The enrollment of Brown University, though barely growing in number, had been changing dramatically, as had the society around Brown. Scholarships seemed to offer the university a means of halting the changing character of Brown's student body, which the administration viewed as a disturbing trend. Brown had traditionally drawn upon the young men of farming communities in southeastern Massachusetts, eastern Connecticut and Rhode Island. Massachusetts furnished 69 percent of the enrollment in 1800, Rhode Island 20 percent. The school maintained this balance throughout the early nineteenth century. By the 1850s, however, Rhode Island had become increasingly commercial, industrial and urban and was furnishing almost as many students as rural southeastern Massachusetts.⁴⁸

Doubts about the overwhelming change in the character of Brown's student body surfaced in discussions of scholarship aid, and scholarships came to represent a conservative hope of slowing change, or at least alleviating the pernicious effects of students who hailed from cities. President Sears, in his Annual Report to the Corporation in 1860, expressed his concern at length:

The college needs the influence of that class of students who are mainly dependent on themselves for success, and who know more of poverty than of affluence. Its chief peril is that of verging, by force of circumstances, towards the condition of a local school, and ultimately losing both its free scope and its vigor. Such has been the case with some of the universities in our larger cities.⁴⁹

Sears continued:

But let a university be constantly invigorated with fresh blood, by young men from the country of earnest, industrious, and economical habits, to which these scholarships tends, it will send out men into the world, whose power will be felt, and will itself thereby acquire a character and reputation that will ensure its prosperity. If our college should not retain its old established character in this respect, even those who live within the precincts of a city might come to regard it safer and better to send their sons to a college in the country for their education, where they would find associates who have not been spoiled by the luxuries and indulgences of a city life.⁵⁰

Men such as Sears, whose own educational experience had come from a different time and a different society, associated with the values of hard work, self-denial and struggle with rural life; their own memories colored their appreciation of the poor young men applying for financial assistance. In a retrospective account of Brown's early history published in 1867, P. A. Crane revealed how older Brown alumni experienced difficulty adjusting to the new breed of students that Wayland had tried to recruit:

Until recently, most of those who had entered our colleges were young men. They came of their own choice, and had worked hard to get there. They had no time and no money to waste in idleness and folly. They came with an earnest purpose to prepare

48 Bronson, 289.

49 Sears, Annual Report to the Corporation, 1860.

50 Ibid.

themselves for the places of honor and responsibility which they had in view, and hoped some day to occupy. Such young men need little stimulus and less restraint. But now boys were sent to college. Many of them had no definite object in view. They did not look to their education as the means of future support, or usefulness, or distinction in life. They had thus far been provided for, and they left the future to take care of itself. They had plenty of money to spend; and the warm blood and heedless impulses of youth disposed them to think more of pleasure than knowledge, of amusement than study. Of necessity, this state of things called for a stronger and more vigilant college government.⁵¹

Crane had been a tutor following his graduation in 1824; his elegiac reminiscences of Brown under President Messer linked poverty, self-reliance and economic hardship with the virtue of “earnest purpose.”

The vision of the hard-working, self-disciplined young man from the country was highly attractive to Brown’s administration and was supported by their reports. Faced with recurrent discipline crises involving stolen buckets from the college well, drinking and-card playing in student rooms and property damage, to say nothing of the disruption of the peace resulting from the undergraduate disposition to roll cannon balls down dormitory halls, they welcomed these idealized rural students.⁵² President Sears’s Annual Report of 1860 concludes its defense of scholarships by noting their advantage to college officers:

It is believed that students from the country, urged on by an irrepressible love of knowledge on the one hand, and somewhat repressed by poverty on the other, and having, consequently, the strongest motives for effort, are the life blood of the college; that by the influence of their example an earnest spirit of study is kept alive, and discipline maintained, and that the good name of the University is more dependent on this than on any other class of young man.

The Annual Report of 1862 continued by attributing the peaceful conditions on campus directly to the presence of scholarship students. But Sears was not alone in recognizing the virtues of the scholarship students and their openness to administrative control. The 1862 committee appointed to examine expenditures of the university stressed discipline and academic standards among the recipients.⁵³ Initially the scholarships were a tool that allowed the administration to ensure its desired enrollment. In time, however, the scholarships led to incidental benefits, including “peaceful” conditions and high academic achievement.

Ultimately, the Brown administration discovered in their scholarship program a flexible and effective means for meeting a wide variety of institutional needs and goals. First seized upon as a quick method of increasing enrollment, both to meet financial needs and to enhance Brown’s academic reputation, the scholarships came to express the mores of the university officers: their concern to provide for the education of the Baptist ministry, their desire to stimulate academic achievement, their conservative rejection of the city and its encroachment upon their school and their need to maintain social control over a community of unruly adolescents.

The scholarship, with its simple promise of social mobility, provided powerful incentive for students to conform, to obey the rules and to behave as expected. The Brown administration never decided whether they would perceive their scholarships as a reward or charity. The

51 Crane, 14-15.

52 Bronson, 319-321; *Ibid.*, 350.

53 Report of Committee to Examine Expenditures of the University, September 1, 1862.

scholarship beneficiaries, on the other hand, may well have appreciated the honors, but most simply needed the money. The Brown University officers held the future of these young men in their hands, and neither group was likely to forget it.

Overall, it was an admirable bargain. Brown received a generation of young men eager to please academically, willing to enter the ministry during its gradual decline in social prominence, and cooperative in all matters of discipline. The poor men received a near free education and all reports suggest that many entered upon professional careers. A Horatio Alger story, perhaps, but one founded upon self-interest as well as generosity, hard work and moral virtue.

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THE WING LUKE ASIAN MUSEUM EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066, FIFTY YEARS BEFORE AND FIFTY YEARS AFTER

REBECCA SILVERMAN

Engaging the Asian Pacific American community and the public in exploring issues related to the culture, art and history of the Asian Pacific American community, the Wing Luke Asian Museum in Seattle, Washington has undergone stages of growth and reinvention with the hiring of each of its new directors. Shortly after appointing Ron Chew as executive director in 1992, the museum initiated an ambitious and experimental exhibition that would become the model for all displays thereafter. Pivotal both in the evolution of the museum and in the experience of Japanese Pacific Americans, “Executive Order 9066: Fifty Years Before and Fifty Years After” debuted on February 19, 1992 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the infamous federal order which authorized the removal and internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans. With a budget of \$130,000 and three full-time staff members, the museum recruited an inter-generational committee of 100 community volunteers spanning four generations to embark on a collective mission over a nine-month period. In chronicling the full story of the Japanese American community in the state and uniting an increasingly diffuse community, the committee confronted the legacies of the gross injustice and traumatic history of internment through a project of retrospective justice. The journey of conceiving, developing, and installing “Executive Order 9066” validated the committee and empowered the community.¹ From pioneering a unique, collaborative, community-response exhibit amidst doubt to spawning a traveling display and the publishing of the museum catalogue in book form, “Executive Order 9066” reoriented the public humanities and reaffirmed the stories of Japanese Americans.

The Wing Luke Asian Museum was named for and extended the legacy of the Chinese American Wing Luke, a civil rights, historic preservation and urban renewal activist. The institution opened in the 1960s with a handful of news clippings, a volunteer staff, and the hope of expanding beyond a small Seattle storefront. The inaugural exhibition honored the region’s pioneer Chinese families in a shop in Seattle’s International District, extending the traditional museum model of collecting, curating and communicating.² Under the leadership of white directors, items from the permanent collection depicted both historic and artistic expressions of the community through a conventional approach to the public humanities. The birthing stage in 1967-1983 during which volunteers operated on a \$20,000 budget progressed to the professionalization phase from 1983-1991 during which the museum built its budget and

1 David Takami, *Executive Order 9066: Fifty Years Before and Fifty Years After* (1992), 4-5.

2 Tom Borrup, “Wing Luke Asian Museum: A Place for Voices Not Otherwise Listened To,” *Community Arts Network* (2003).

collections. Chew was responsible for amassing financial and human resources, inaugurating the subsequent growth phase.³ Recounting his own initial inexperience and the immaturity of the museum, Chew admits, “When I came to the Museum, I hardly knew what a docent or curator was. The previous two directors were white and from outside the community. The previous focus of the museum was on educating the general public.”⁴ Ron Chew’s appointment as the first Asian-American director of the museum ushered in a shift from financial deficit and dwindling public support to financial stability and growing acclaim.

Transferring his journalism background and passion for oral history to his new role in the museum, Chew merged cultural identity and civic participation with museum initiatives to foster community bonds.⁵ Chew describes his approach as “journalistic”: Museums, he believes, should cast aside their traditional pseudo-academic model to address topics of relevance and interest to the public. According to Chew, his belief that “oral histories can and should embrace stories of all stages of life” is manifested in the melding of his grass-roots community organizing and journalistic experience to redefine the role of the museum. Chew carried his reputation for combining cutting-edge presentations with a locally oriented emphasis on social justice to the Pan-Asian American community. The museum as a vehicle for conveying personal and collective stories of Asian immigrants, from toiling in canneries to sewing factories to hotels to internment camps, became the building block of Chew’s leadership style and “Executive Order 9066.”⁶ A commitment to exploration combined with a flair for teasing anecdotes out of interviewees would underlie the ultimate mission of the museum to stimulate social change through interethnic and intergenerational dialogue.⁷

“Executive Order 9066” represented the convergence of the museum as mouthpiece for articulating the stories of the Asian Pacific American community with the positioning of the museum as anchor of preserving its cultural tradition and heritage. Reviewing his strategy in a 2000 journal article, Chew explained that the exhibit would serve as an experiment in applying his audience-centered, collaborative, and educational approach to the core ingredients of attractive design, cohesive presentation, sound research, compelling stories, and evocative artifacts. The exhibit would also serve as an experiment for the museum and community.⁸ Shifting the focus of the museum from public education to community empowerment, Chew would bring the community’s cultural, economic, and political position to the forefront of his first project that would represent the merging of museum, community and neighborhood.⁹

Searching to apply this approach to a tangible project, Chew began meeting with a half dozen Japanese Americans in the back of the converted auto-garage cum museum to sketch the blueprint for what would eventually become the hallmark exhibit. Inspired by Chew’s proclivity for community-based projects, their mission outlined the creation of the exhibit. It would open on the exact 50-year anniversary of the signing of Executive Order 9066, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s federal mandate that forced hundreds of thousands of West Coast Japanese Americans to abandon their homes for concentration camps following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II. With the Asian American population in Seattle increasing at a ten-fold rate since 1970 and the former Japanese American internee population gradually decreasing at a similar rate, the committee envisioned the museum as medium to tell their often silenced story. According to Chew, they would seek to tell, from their community’s point of

3 Ron Chew, “Displaying Race and Ethnicity: Communities and Their Museums,” Lecture: 10/2006.

4 Borrup.

5 Richard Louv, “A People’s Curator,” *The Ford Foundation Report* (2005).

6 Ibid.

7 Ron Chew, “Toward a More Agile Model of Exhibition-Making,” *Museum News* (2000): 47.

8 Ibid., 47.

9 Chew. Lecture.

view, “the painful story of this injustice—the loss of property, rights and precious freedom, the struggles to resist the internment and survive camp conditions, the diligent efforts to rebuild lives and heal profound emotional wounds, and the attempts to seek justice from a government that had coldly breached their trust.”¹⁰ To have people tell their own stories would give voice to a history otherwise left unheard. The process and product of the project would therefore serve as retrospective justice, socially rebuilding the political community that had been shattered through the atrocity of internment. What began as a committee exercise would become a community effort to confront the legacies of bitterness, silence, and sorrow that had continued to divide and debilitate the community long after internment.¹¹

Pioneering new ways for the museum to grow in community engagement encouraged a collaborative approach that would not, however, progress unchallenged by controversy. With barely enough funds to cover the salary of three staff members, rent, heat, and electricity, “Executive Order 9066” was fraught with initial doubts about its ability to extend Chew’s unconventional philosophy. Nay-sayers among Seattle’s Asian Americans and the professional art world cast doubts upon the community-response model. In his first days at Wing Luke, a volunteer suspicious of Chew’s roots in community organizing warned him, “Remember, we’re a museum, not a community center.” Chew recalls challenges to his method: “You can’t create a quality exhibit if you put the work in the hands of a committee. You’ll have too much in-fighting, too many egos, no artistic control.”¹²

The reconstruction of an internment camp barrack, for example, was fraught with perils caused by the difficulty of appeasing multiple shareholders with conflicting visions. Individuals and groups brought with them a long history of distrust and hostility targeted at public institutions and at each other. For example, the exhibit presented the challenge of securing the participation of both Nisei veterans, who fought with American armed forces overseas during World War II to prove their loyalty to the country, and the “no-no boys,” who resisted serving for the American military on the grounds of conscientious resistance. Despite remaining bitterly distrustful of each other, the Nisei veterans and “no-no boys” united in the development phase to balance the representations portrayed in the exhibit with their personal narratives.¹³ Confronting traumatic histories to promote dialogue and healing allowed the repair of social divisions within the community left by internment. The process of retrospective justice in turn allowed the invitation to “wallow in the past” to open new avenues of awareness to come to terms with painful histories and move forward.¹⁴

The exhibit would come to design but not without its detractors. While Chew was prepared to make quick decisions in response to community needs, he was reluctant to choose hierarchy over discussion and debate. Debate did indeed erupt early both within and outside the committee and community. Instead of being viewed as a hindrance, debate was encouraged to build support for eventual decisions. In response to early opposition, Chew reminded critics that the museum, in its unique approach and methodology, “is not about pieces of the frozen past. We can be controversial. We can be scary to people who want a museum that is safe and unchallenging.”¹⁵ Others worried that stories and oral histories would replace objects and facts. According to Chew, they were right to worry, since, “that’s just what [the committee] did.”¹⁶

10 Takami, 4.

11 Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice, “Report on Slavery and Justice” (Providence: Brown University, 2006), 5.

12 Takami, 4.

13 William Cleveland, “Making Exact Change,” *Community Arts Network* (2005).

14 Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice, 44.

15 Ibid.

16 Ron Chew, “Five Keys to Growing a Healthy Community-connected Museum,” 48th Annual British Columbia Museums Association Conference, Canada (2004).

Chew and the committee adopted a dogma of patience, resourcefulness, and sensitivity as necessary to pursue their model of community-based exhibition. The committee re-appropriated as encouragement warnings that the quality and credence of the exhibit would be sacrificed in the absence of proper involvement and oversight of traditional academic scholars. Establishing itself from the start as an institution deeply rooted in the community, as more than a place to see and experience historic or cultural expression, the museum lent itself to honoring neglected voices. It would not bend to critics propagating an uncontroversial, conventional museum model.

The committee decided that the only way to effectively convey the expansive community history would be by reaching into the community to garner support from other volunteers to search for photographs, personal papers, artwork, signs, tools, and other artifacts.¹⁷ Many voices, drawing from vivid memories, reconstructed the stories and facts to discuss in a public forum the history that in previous generations would have been forgotten or suppressed. Exhibition coordinator Michelle Kumata recalls a chain-like reaction in one volunteer leading to the next, sometimes in the same family. A committee member might say, for example, “You know, Ike has lots of boxes of things from Camp” or “Auntie Yuki has a Hagiya painting from Minidoka. She also has negatives from the old Takano Studio,” or “Nioro has film footage from the Alaska canneries and from Camp,” or “Go see Fred, he’s got old pictures of the bowling alleys and the dances at Spanish Castle.” Leads that “Ryo’s got quite a collection of photos and negatives” or of a “trunk of stuff left in storage in the basement of the Panama Hotel” would lead to a series of new contacts, suggesting, for instance, that “Bob may help build the reconstruction of the Camp barrack” or “Suki can develop curriculum kits.”¹⁸ Painstakingly nurtured by the committee, the exhibit would pass through many hands that would bring forth, from family albums, closets, and attics, evocative images and artifacts into the display.

Outsiders suspected that this undertaking, punctuated by many tasks and an unforgiving deadline, would cause rifts. Instead, the committee relied on the community to help guide, and eventually join, the endeavor. Articles in the local press and newsletters, from “The Seattle Times” to the “Wing Luke Asian Museum Monthly,” quickly spread word of the exhibit and Chew’s unprecedented leadership style through a grapevine of community historians, artists and activists who became the project’s strongest advocates. Individuals, churches and organizations, such as the Nisei Veterans Committee and the Japanese American Citizens League, forgave their often conflicting political leanings to unite in the effort. Of the many who were asked to pitch in, each stepped forth eagerly.¹⁹

The committee realized that the snapshot of the Japanese American community’s internment experience must fit into a broader historical narrative, extending back to the arrival of Japanese settlers at the end of the nineteenth century and reaching forward to the youngest generation of Japanese Americans at the turn of the twenty-first century. Locating the internment in the one hundred year history of the Japanese in Seattle therefore gave way to documenting and recounting the full story of the community from beginning to end, captured in the title of the exhibit, “Executive Order 9066: 50 Years Before and 50 Years After.”²⁰ The title referenced the broad historical context of the Japanese Pacific American experience, as well as the larger story of community formation, fracturing, and rebuilding. The committee agreed that three sections of the exhibit, pre-war, war and post-war, would be sufficient to retrace the history of Japanese Pacific Americans. Two centerpieces, they agreed, would recreate a pre-war

17 Ibid.

18 Takami, 5.

19 Borrup.

20 Cleveland.

Japanese American owned drugstore and a barrack from the Minidoka, Idaho internment camp. Each display would be replicated using old photographs, cherished mementoes and, as Chew adds, “the most ubiquitous resource available, the memories of community elders.”²¹

Fusing both exactness and exploration, art and artifacts, the first stage of the exhibit chronicled the “Embarkation” of Japanese Americans fifty years prior to internment through sections highlighting “Coming to America,” “On the Job,” “Pioneer Families,” “Roots of Racism,” “Main Street USA,” and “Growth of Community Life.” The goal of the exhibit, however, would not be to create a comprehensive chronology, but rather to be attuned to audience engagement by offering basic facts, shared perspectives and mood. Retracing the trajectory of early Japanese immigration from arrival in Seattle to work in railroads, sawmills, logging camps and canneries, the first section juxtaposed facts with photos. Stories of community elder, Frank Natsuhara, picking berries and selling produce at the Pike Place Market, as well as that of Kimiko Ono, wife of a Renton truck farmer who retold her busy days of laboring, told the history of the settlers in a human context. Quotes interspersed with statistics illustrative of the growing Japanese population and economic competition made tangible the origins of early racism. For example, the story of farmer Sashiro Rin Hasabe’s fear of removal of her 15 acres of land contextualized the anti-Japanese agitation that led to racialized legislation. Exhibition coordinator Michelle Kumata found her role not unlike a community artist, bringing people together, listening, and interpreting their stories in an art form.²²

The committee’s tactful decision to combine legal and political with cultural and communal stories from the early immigration and early community extended the redefinition of their museum approach to tailor the exhibit to the experiences of the audience. From a wall featuring images of “picture brides” to the ghetto Japantown, the personal examples of Japanese American discrimination were made to resonate with the viewer. Montages of photos, music clips, quotes, and costumes brought to life the movie halls, judo and kendo competitions, and senbei and kintoki meals imprinted in the committee and community members’ memories. Litanies of numbers indicating the strong Japanese foothold in Seattle’s economy mirrored the litanies of stories of the thriving culture it spawned, manifested in Oshogatsu celebrations, the stellar Nihongo Gakko School, and jenjinkari social organizations. Excerpts from the “Japanese American Courier” juxtaposed with personal memoirs of community leaders, such as Shousuke Sasaki’s voicing concern over the Issei abandonment of Japanese culture.²³ In delving into the personal memories of Nisei and Issei volunteers, the committee reawakened the historical memory of the community. According to director of exhibitions and collections, Cassie Chin, “[The committee] worked closely with community members in spurring a broad-based dialogue, then creating a format for accurately and sensitively representing the community’s vision.”²⁴

The rekindling of generational differences in reaction to the start of World War II evoked strong reactions in the intergenerational committee, priming them for the subsequent section that would bring internment to the forefront of their consciousness. The subdivision prominently sandwiched between the fifty years before and fifty years sections, aptly entitled, “The Turning Point,” took the viewer on a journey from “December 7 and the Days of Infamy” to “Evacuation” to “Camp Harmony” onto “Minidoka” to “The Question of Loyalty” then “Distinguished Military Service” and finally to “Court Challenges, Continued Hostility.” In placing the text of the Executive Order 9066 at the entrance to the section, the committee and

21 Ibid.

22 Takami, 9-16.

23 Takami, 16-25.

24 Borrup.

community confronted the painful past to gain a deeper understanding of their heritage and a renewed recognition of their place in American history. Stories woven into the tapestry of the state's history were repackaged against a backdrop of the tragedy of internment and strength of the people. The committee collected relics of discarded Japanese flags, swords, language books and toys to spur reflection on the fear following the December 7 bombing of Pearl Harbor. Auditory tapes of FDR were played in tandem with transcribed reactions of Japanese Americans, such as Nobue Shimuzu's diary, an 18-year-old Nisei's letter, and Jim Akutsu's arrest papers. Displays carefully retraced the unfolding events, from the signing of Executive Order 9066 to evacuees' selling of their businesses and belongings, from the perspective of the community. Varied media, such as political cartoons in "The Seattle Times" and photos freezing in time the chaos and confusion of evacuation, allowed the committee to communicate the emotions unleashed by a few strokes of a pen that set in motion the 1942 expulsion and internment.²⁵

In pairing memoirs, poems, art work, photography and objects with the historical narrative running through the exhibit, the committee fostered both community and a shared rediscovery of history. The recreation of the surreal backdrop of "Camp Harmony" incorporated visual and sound dramatizations of the desperation of Japanese Americans residing in livestock barracks and parking lots between April and August 1942. The installation served the primary goal of empowering the community through reliving the massive scale of the experience. Sounds of crying babies, sights of tossed luggage and reminders of the extreme weather and lack of privacy recaptured the transport to the Minidoka Internment Camp in Idaho. The committee conducted oral histories with former internees, such as carpenter and Seattle native George Nakashima, who fashioned furniture out of stolen scrap wood in the Camp, and painter Kenjiro Nomura whose paintings had previously been shown in New York. In so doing, the committee garnered stories expressing the full spectrum of internee emotion and experience.

Carefully negotiating the divisive issues in the Japanese American community in its task of retrospective justice, the committee encouraged public discussion in its inclusive approach to presenting the viewpoints of the "no-no boys," Heart Mountain draft resisters and service men. Explorations of the deterioration of family and community led to explorations of the question of loyalty surrounding the controversial 1943 government questionnaires to internees. Rather than further fueling the divisive debate, the committee avoided triggering further resentment among the Nisei volunteers by presenting the viewpoints of both the "no-no boys," who were labeled "disloyal," and those who served in the American armed forces, labeled "loyal." Stories describing both the principled stand of those who refused military induction and the 33,000 who served in World War II were told through excerpts from John Okada's book, *No No Boy* as well as photos of memorial services for Nisei soldiers killed in action. To address the legal challenges against internment that mounted outside the camps, the committee examined the *Mitsuye Endo v. the United States* case that took place amidst a sociopolitical climate of racist elected officials and Americans ignorant of internment.²⁶

Effectively linking cultural expression to community responsibility, the museum positioned the 1970s Japanese American community in Seattle at the nexus of the third section, "Starting Over," a journey encompassing the "Rejection, Resettlement," "Breaking Barriers," "Quest for Redress," "What the Future Holds," and "Return to Minidoka" phases. Retracing the final days in the internment camps and the bitter reception upon return to their communities, the committee collected images of discriminatory graffiti and stories of betrayal.

25 Takami, 25-34.

26 Ibid., 35-42.

The exhibit echoed the post-war ascendancy of the Nisei and the great economic, social and political strides of Japanese American Nisei and Sansei, which culminated in their campaign for financial reparations. Just as the civil rights movement provided an impetus for demands of federal and state redress to former internees, the process of assembling testimony from Japanese Americans provided the committee an impetus to extend the process of community healing. Chronicling the lobbying of the JACL, the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 and the overturning of individual internee convictions allowed the committee to act as an open forum for historical and personal expression. Although the federal government combined three modes of reparative justice in addressing the internment—through a national commission, modest monetary reparations and formal apologies—it was the work of the committee’s pursuit of retrospective justice to inscribe the historical record in the collective memory of the relevant institution.²⁷ The committee closed the exhibit by asking about the possibility of recurrence of internment of American citizens, racism, and stereotyping. Inviting open-ended response and reaction, the committee intended the exhibit to encourage visitors to apply lessons learned from internment and redress to combat contemporary injustices and promote civil and human rights. Replete with hardship and hard work, the process of developing the exhibit, like the history of Japanese Americans, resounded with resilience and triumph.²⁸

The exhibit met with success on many levels. Transforming a deteriorating old hotel in the heart of the Pan-Asian neighborhood with insufficient resources, widespread crime and large capital projects paid dividends to the strength required to erect the exhibit. Months of planning and conferring among staff and volunteers succeeded in validating the 100-year history of Japanese Americans in Seattle. In the end, over 100 individuals catalogued over 1,000 artifacts and photographs. Defying skeptics, the committee and community succeeded in creating an ambitious display more credible than if they had been professional curators. Beginning at the crossroads of a community in transition and becoming the cornerstone of a people and culture in its geographic community, the exhibit drew an unprecedented 50,000 visitors to the 7,200 square foot converted garage and fostered a spirit of equal collaboration that maximized all resources. The exhibit was reassembled into a traveling display to tour across other sites in Washington upon completion on August 31, 1992. The Minidoka barrack recreation has stayed on view as a permanent installation. The republishing of the catalogue in book form, made possible by a 2001 Ford Foundation grant, reflects both the exhibit’s recognition and continued legacy.²⁹ The impact of the exhibit imprinted itself just as much in the consciousness of the Asian Pacific American community as it did in the local and national press. Ranging from “The Seattle Times” to the “Ford Foundation Report,” the media and academia have continuously profiled the museum’s cutting-edge style, the exhibit, Chew and the community through acclaim, grants and awards.³⁰

According to Chew, of equal importance to the committee and community were “the process of working on the exhibit and the final product.” As a community-response exhibit, “Executive Order 9066” employed a street-level approach of recruiting neighborhood residents for their input. This set a precedent for the museum to stretch its boundaries, make programming relevant to contemporary issues, diversify, foster leadership in young people, and invest in long-term relationships.³¹ Releasing itself from the rigor of academic training permeating the public humanities and granting authority to community elders and students afforded the ex-

27 Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice, 81.

28 Takami, 42-60.

29 Charlene Mano, “The Wing Luke Asian Museum” *The Brown Quarterly* 1 (1997).

30 Florangela Davila, “Museum Executive an Insider to History,” *The Seattle Times*, October 11, 2004.

31 Chew. 48th Annual British Columbia Museums Association Conference.

hibit a greater degree of authenticity. Their involvement allowed the documents and objects to pass through the very hands of those people whose stories the exhibit sought to communicate. Its clear mission to engage 13 million Asian Pacific Americans of 30–40 distinct ethnic groups, however, required increased diversity in programming, staff, board, trustees and volunteers. The exhibit enabled the museum to first recognize and begin to address the establishment of linkages between institution and community in representing those it serves. As a multi-disciplinary institution, according to Chew, the collaborative relationships cultivated by the exhibit have allowed diverse pan-Asian individuals and organizations to bring to the fore issues relevant to its constituency. In creating a living laboratory for the collective talents of ordinary people, Chew noted that the exhibit “gave sanction, in a museum setting, to the notion of students, non-professionals and elders as scholars and lead decision-makers, rather than token advisors.”³² As a portal for reflection of the community, the Community Advisory Committee has orchestrated the recent “Adoptee Exhibit,” which reflects the community’s specific interest and personal experiences in foreign adoption, and “One Song Many Voices,” which captures the cohesive story of a 200-year story of Asian immigration and settlement in Washington.³³

Since pioneering its trademark community-driven and program-development process in “Executive Order 9066,” the Wing Luke Museum has expanded from three staff members, 20 regular volunteers and \$130,000 to 17 full-time staff, four part-time staff, 75 regular volunteers and a budget of \$1 million in 2006. Embarking on a \$27 million capital building and endowment campaign to buy and renovate a larger museum facility in the historic East Kong Yick building will ensure continued program success and organizational maturation amidst a climbing Asian Pacific American population.³⁴ Meaningful educational and cultural displays across a broad constituency, reaching 10,000 visitors annually, require greater resources for greater diplomacy and dialogue. As the museum continues to mature, it must grow its capacity to challenge visitors to think about preserving civil liberties and freedoms during times of war and national crises. “Executive Order 9066” prepared the museum and community to embrace the same issues with Arab and South Asian Americans post-September 11.³⁵ From the first community-response exhibit, the museum realized the power of its authority to shape public opinion, promote tolerance, advocate for social justice and improve community life.³⁶

Just as the Wing Luke Asian Museum’s “Executive Order 9066” embarked upon a quest to empower and legitimate the Japanese Pacific American community, so too did the exhibit represent a community’s quest for retrospective justice. As a model for all subsequent exhibitions and larger institutions in its method of participatory engagement in community-response program development, “Executive Order 9066” tapped the opportunity and obligation to facilitate serious dialogue about bitter legacies affecting its constituency. In so doing, the museum tapped into deeply personal stories involving both visionaries and visitors alike. Combining collaboration with traditional values of historic continuity and credibility fostered a community healing process through reminiscing, mending and joining the pilgrimage to bear witness to the past. Through discussion and debate, the exhibit transformed the museum into a living site of memory revitalizing the urban neighborhood, healing old divisions with the Asian American community and bridging contemporary local issues. In the end, the exhibit opened up the power of exhibiting issues that reach and echo far beyond the confined space of the museum to link the past, present and future of Asian American communities.

32 Borrup.

33 Cleveland.

34 Ibid.

35 Chew, 48th Annual British Columbia Museums Association Conference.

36 Ibid.

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FISHY POLITICS: THE HIGH PRICE OF LABOR AND THE FEEDING OF A NATION

JEFFREY A. YOSKOWITZ

Abundant and severely underexploited fish populations off the shores of the Western Cape took on a supreme importance for South Africa in the decade and a half following World War II. The South African fishing industry was closed off to major international markets during the early period of apartheid, prompting the struggling industry to look for new domestic markets. Simultaneously, a protein shortage threatened South Africa's black migrant labor force. The South African fishing industry and the apartheid government developed a plan in the late 1940s and 1950s to include fish in the diet of black laborers, first through an extensive advertising campaign and then through the creation of a fish flour to supplement the nation's cereal grains. Though Bantu-speaking South Africans had traditionally rejected fish consumption unless confronted by famine, the white apartheid government and the fishing industry colluded in this period to break these taboos and to ensure that the black labor force would remain productive. This seemingly unique policy was surprisingly similar to the efforts of other nations to supplement the diets of their populations.

The Union government's motivations, however, were laced with racial bias and symbolic paternalism. The government and the fishing industry blatantly wished to sustain migrant labor to aid South Africa's urban industries. The stated government intentions for the program were to nourish its population, but the clandestine nature of the scheme and its objectives revealed that the fish consumption program was yet one more way in which the South African government attempted to oppress the black population. The fish scheme also demonstrated that black South African labor was indeed the fundamental base on which the Union of South Africa stood: The apartheid government and the fishing industry went to great lengths to institutionalize fish flour, a massive undertaking involving years of investigatory research and a major effort to conquer the cultural taboos of its "native" population. This paper seeks to answer how exactly fish became so important during this period, both as a sector of the South African economy and as a means of enabling other sectors to flourish. Moreover, this paper will analyze the creative and furtive ways the apartheid government invested in the domestic fish market, and the racial implications of this process.

THE CONTEXT

From the end of the Second World War well into the 1950s, an acute and devastating protein shortage plagued South Africa. Following World War II, food supplies were disorganized and meat and dairy was eliminated from the diets of Europeans and South Africans alike. It was estimated that only after several years would food supplies again be regulated.¹ Meanwhile, the mineral revolution and the unprecedented urbanization that it spurred, from the movement of people inland to the influx of capital for the diamond and gold industries, increased demands on South Africa's food resources.² By 1946, with burgeoning prospects for larger-scale gold-mining operations in the Orange Free State and increasing growth rates for most South African industries, many prophesied that "South African agriculture will fall even further behind in its task of feeding the Union's population ... [because the] immigration of our native population from the reserves into the country's industrial economy will add to a population that already cannot feed itself."³

At the same time, the South African fishing industry was in trouble itself, losing international markets in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The industry suffered a particularly painful blow when Australia placed import restrictions on products from the Union of South Africa. By Australia the restrictions alone actually cut South Africa's fish exports in 1952 to one-fifth of its total exports the previous year. The Australian import cuts "laid up" several steam and motor trawlers, resulted in the unemployment of crews and gave the industry negative publicity. The editor of the *South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review (SASFNIR)* lamented the effects of Australia's import cuts, saying that "it is unfortunate ... that the profitable operation of an important primary industry should be so dependent on an overseas market."⁴ This dependency prompted the industry to build up local markets, concentrating on public relations and American sales techniques. Leaders in the industry were surprised that "the Union ranks among the world's smallest consumer of fish per head of population."⁵

The fishing industry galvanized around the apparent failure of South African crops to feed the nation, capitalizing upon national food problems to create a market for fish. Prominent leaders of the fishing industry, such as Dr. S.H. Skaife, voiced their concern over "decreasing soil fertility and increasing population" as early as 1948.⁶ Skaife commented in particular on the nation's dearth of "self-perpetuating" food resources, with the notable exception of South Africa's untapped resource: fish. The industry review began to emphasize the effects of malnourishment on industrial laborers and consequently on their employers and the Union. The Basuto and other Bantus reportedly suffered from a grave protein deficiency resulting in "economic inefficiency and hospital expenditure."⁷ An editor of the *SASFNIR* wrote that because of shortages, meat was becoming a luxury, even in places known for meat production such as Argentina. Furthermore, the author wrote, "much of African malnutrition ... is ascribable to protein deficiency."⁸ By emphasizing these problems, the fishing industry caught the attention of the mining companies and the union government.

Pressed by the fisheries, the South African government took serious notice of the wide-reaching economic implications of the protein shortage by the mid-1950s. In 1956, the House

1 "Fish Flour for Human Consumption: Dramatic Possibilities in Cape Town Research," *SASFNIR* (February 1946) 8-10.

2 "Industrial Development in South Africa," Dept. of Mines and Industries, in collaboration with The SA railways and harbours administration (1924).

3 "Gold and Fish," *SASFNIR* (May 1946).

4 "The Market for Fish," *SASFNIR* (Oct., 1952).

5 *Ibid.*

6 "Remarkable Growth of South African Fishing Industry," *SASFNIR* (July, 1948).

7 "Basutos Eager to Get Sardines: No Taboos Against Fish and Proteins Needed," *SASFNIR* (Sep., 1946), 30.

8 "Meat—A Luxury—The Answer," *SASFNIR* (May 1949), 43.

of Assembly called together a special committee to look into the protein problem of the black population and decided on a course of action to remedy the situation. The committee noted that a sharp decrease in meat consumption had plagued black communities over the course of a decade. The committee deemed the Union diet unbalanced and unsatisfactory, reporting that “too large a percentage of the food intake [of the black population] is derived from carbohydrates; far too little from protein, particularly animal protein, and from foodstuffs rich in minerals and vitamins, particularly fruit and vegetables.”⁹ The committee projected that the decline in meat consumption would grow worse over the next few years. In the face of the “great need for national protein,” the committee recommended a campaign to significantly increase fish consumption in the Union and to do “everything possible ... to encourage wholesale fish distributors ... to extend their activities in this direction” and to develop projects for the “bulk-feeding” of the nation.¹⁰

FISH AS POTENTIAL PANACEA

The protein shortage and the fishing industry’s need to build a domestic market emerged in South Africa at the same time that public health was attracting international attention. In the wake of the Great Depression, by 1935, the League of Nations had taken groundbreaking actions to address health and nutrition problems. The League’s Health Organization concluded that nutrition “was no longer an exclusively physiological problem and that henceforward it must be a matter of concern to both public health officers and economists.”¹¹ A 1937 report by the League’s *Committee on the Relation of Nutrition to Health, Agriculture and Economic Policy* recommended that national governments create councils to tend to administrative and legislative matters affecting any aspect of health. South Africa responded to the League by creating South Africa’s Nutritional Council in 1940. The minister of public health opened the first meeting by stating that “combating malnutrition ... is a national task and one above all political considerations.”¹²

Within the context of a suddenly health conscious nation and national government, the South African fishing industry strategically posited fish as an ideal alternative source of animal protein. Fish was declared to be the cure-all. The *SASNFIR* declared that “the answer to [malnourishment] lies in the provision of cheap protein food as an integral part of Bantu diet.”¹³ Others declared the “only long term solution is for South Africans to become ‘fish-eaters.’”¹⁴ And in the late 1940s, the chairman of the fisheries development corporation announced that South Africa’s only “immediate problem is how best we can exploit and at the same time conserve our marine resources.”¹⁵

The government and the medical establishment supported increased fish consumption. According to the *South African Medical Journal*, fish was easy to digest and an “excellent enriching medium for cereal diets ... especially rich in lysine and methianine, amino acids usually deficient in the cereal problems of the staple foods of malnourished populations.”¹⁶ The *Journal*

9 “Report: *Special Committee on Fish Consumption*.” House of Assembly, Union of South Africa annexures nos. 670-687 (1956), 1-2.

10 *Ibid.*, 13-16.

11 MacVicar, Neil. “The People’s Food: Recent Discoveries and their application in South Africa.” *New Africa Pamphlet* no. 9. (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1946), 4.

12 *Ibid.*, 5-6.

13 “Basutos Eager to Get Sardines: No Taboos Against Fish and Proteins Needed.”

14 “Meat—A Luxury—The Answer.”

15 “Remarkable Growth of S. African Fishing Industry.”

16 G.M. Dreosti, “The Role of the South African Fishing Industry in Feeding the nation,” *South African Medical Journal* 38 (August 1964), 638-9.

declared fish to be the “answer” of choice for economic as well as medical reasons: fish had exactly the same nutritional value as meat for just about half the price, making it the cheapest form of animal protein in all of South Africa.¹⁷ Moreover, in the mid-1940s, the SASNFIR hypothesized that the South Africa’s seas contained stock loads of fish to be exploited.¹⁸ Both economically and nutritionally, fish harvesting seemed to be a clear course of action.

OBSTACLES FOR THE FISH INDUSTRY

While white South Africans viewed fish as the panacea for South Africa’s nutritive ills, the institutionalization of fish as a staple protein supply was impeded by the taboos surrounding the animal among many of the Bantu peoples in Southern Africa. “Natives just won’t eat fish,”¹⁹ believed many white South Africans, who were aware of an aversion to fish but remained ignorant of the reasons. In 1964, the *South African Medical Journal* recounted the Sotho prejudice towards fish to be a result of a “totemic relationship between themselves and fish” while Zulus “identified fish with snakes.”²⁰ According to W.C. Willoughby in his book *Nature-Worship and Taboo*, there existed a common belief that demons inhabited the waters of Africa’s rivers and lakes and lived in human-like dwellings. The demons remained unseen and gained their powers from living in the water. Willoughby wrote that “scores of Bantu tribes, like those of the Transkei and Bechaunaland, have an aversion to fish ... [because] legends that have gathered these real denizens are connected with past or present totems of the tribes concerned or of the trunk from which they are offshoots ...”²¹ In fact, some Bantu-speaking peoples did eat fish in times of crisis, but Willoughby’s ideas spread widely.

No matter the assumptions made about Bantu taboos made by white South Africans, the impact of the Bantu cultural taboos on the African diet was real. South Africa’s fish consumption was a mere 8.1 pounds per capita as of 1951, compared Japan’s 66 pounds and the USA’s 11 pounds per capita per annum.²² The fish consumption of the non-African peoples was generally high, suggesting that the “African” population was responsible for lower rates of consumption. Fishing industry executives felt that narrowing the gap of fish consumption in South Africa by engaging the “African” population “is not only socially desirable but, from a long-term view, socially inevitable.”²³

EXPANDING THE FISH MARKET

In order to expand domestic markets, the fishing industry needed to make “fish-eaters” out of the black population. The most immediate and practical way was through a series of mass-market campaigns. Three of the largest trawling companies in South Africa joined together in 1949 to “promote a greater appreciation of fresh deep sea trawled fish on the daily household menu.”²⁴ The “Eat More Fish” campaign, as it was dubbed, began with dieticians and demonstrators enlisted by the trawling companies to teach families about the nutritional and culinary values of fish. Sales of Hake and other refined fish were limited, the fishing industry strategists

17 Ibid, 637.

18 “Gold and Fish.”

19 F.W. Fox, “Agricultural Foundations of Nutrition – ix. Sea-foods,” *South African Medical Journal* 28, (Oct., 1954), 899.

20 Dreosti, “The Role of the South African Fishing Industry in Feeding the nation,” 634.

21 W.C. Willoughby, *Nature-Worship and Taboo: Further Studies in “The Soul of the Bantu”* (Hartford: The Hartford Seminary Press, 1932), 17–19.

22 “Report: *Special Committee on Fish Consumption*,” House of Assembly, Union of South Africa annexures nos. 670-687 1956.

23 “The Union’s Consumption of Fish,” *SASNFIR* (June 1949).

24 “Eat More Fish,” *SASNFIR* (August, 1949), 47.

believed, because most South Africans saw it “as a mediocre dish to be eaten only when tastier foods are unobtainable.”²⁵ The campaign began by targeting residents of Cape Town in the hope that the effects of new marketing techniques would spread outward from the city.²⁶

The campaign progressed with enthusiastic support from the South African government and the Minister of Health J.F.T. Naude. In 1956, the House of Assembly’s *Special Committee on Fish Consumption* released its report recommending a massive wide-scale marketing campaign. The report declared that “there would seem to be considerable scope for expanding consumption of both canned fish and fried fish.”²⁷ The committee also noted the poor sales of canned fish and the need to provide incentives to retailers and buyers.²⁸ With new governmental support, the “Eat More Fish” campaign was re-launched and closely followed the committee’s report, using the recommendations to give legitimacy to their work. The campaign attempted to demonstrate that fish was more “than something wet on a slab”²⁹ and focused on the idea that fish was not a luxury item but rather a necessity. The campaign engineers likened fish to meat, emphasizing to the South African consumer that there were choice lines of fish such as the Kingklip and Snoek that were comparable to beef fillets or mutton joints, just as there were also canned pilchards and maasbankers which corresponded to plain mutton and beef to be eaten on a daily basis. The campaign’s initial goal was to raise consumption by two or three pounds per capita.³⁰ With the backing of the Union government, this modest goal seemed easily achievable.

A media blitz ensued as the “Eat More Fish” campaign expanded its marketing strategy to include advertising, contests and new corporate images. The campaign organizers followed a similar marketing plan to that of the Mexican government, which had also recently launched a campaign to convince indigenous Mexicans and “mestizos” to increase their personal fish consumption.³¹ In 1956, the South African campaign opened The Deep Sea Fisheries information and Publicity Centre in Cape Town to provide cooking demonstrations and films to the South African consumer.³² Individual companies, spearheaded by the largest, Irvin & Johnson (I. & J.), also sought new products and corporate identities to appeal to South Africans. Fish sticks were created by I. & J. to make fish preparation easy and painless for housewives. Much of fish sticks’ success was owed to “Frikkie Fishstick,” a company mascot placed on every box of fish sticks. The image gained widespread notoriety. Painting books of Frikkie and his mermaid companion, Seabell were created and sold in grocer and fish shops nationwide.³³ Within one year, a new female spokeswoman was hired to be the new face of I. & J. to show consumers that fish was “the choice food of a lady of obvious taste and fashion.”³⁴ The campaign even sponsored radio shows like SABC’s 1956 series entitled “Our Neighbor the Sea” to acquaint South Africans with the importance of its surrounding waters and its resources.³⁵ Radio and newspaper contests, such as the national fish recipe competition which offered a £100 reward, were sponsored in the hopes of increasing domestic consumption.³⁶

The campaign also targeted the “native” population through advertising. According to *SASNFIR*’s announcement of the campaign’s launch, the Department of Nutrition invested

25 “Eat More Fish Campaign,” *SASNFIR* (Nov., 1949), 67.

26 “Eat More Fish,” 47.

27 “Report: *Special Committee on Fish Consumption*,” 6.

28 *Ibid.*, 10.

29 “Union Government Backs ‘Eat More Fish’ Campaign,” *SASNFIR* (July, 1956), 63.

30 *Ibid.*, 61.

31 “Three Fish Times Two Fish is Six Fish—One Fish Into Six Fish is ...” *SASNFIR* (Oct. 1955).

32 “Union Government Backs ‘Eat More Fish’ Campaign,” 61.

33 “Super Salesman Frikkie Sells South African Fish Sticks,” *SASNFIR* (February 1956).

34 “Lovely Blonde Joins Frikkie and Seabell in Fish Selling Campaign,” *SASNFIR* (February 1957), 50.

35 “Radio Series About the Sea,” *SASNFIR* (March 1956), 61.

36 “Motor Car is Big Prize in I. & J. Radio Show,” *SASNFIR* (July 1957).

heavily in the scheme, closely cooperating with public relations and advertising managers.³⁷ Glenryck, a leading cannery of pilchards, produced a 1959 advertisement focusing on fish as food for all generations of black Africans. “Look at the child who eats FISH!” the advertisement targeted towards children reads. “Fish is the food that makes him work better, think better ... You’ll feel better, work better and think better—when you eat more fish.”³⁸ Another advertisement shows a hard working laborer who is “still working hard, when others are tired out.” It continues: “Fish makes him extra strong and healthy!”³⁹ All three advertisements focus on the fact that a single pound of fish is equal to a single pound of the highest quality meat. Moreover, the fish needs no cooking and is certainly a “real man’s meal.” A flexing man illustrates the consistent theme of manliness running through the ads.⁴⁰ Not only did the advertisements espouse culturally accepted family values, they exhibited an obvious focus on gendered notions of strength and hard work, revealing the fish companies’ attempt to appeal to the male laborer in particular. By challenging meat on a pound-to-pound basis and emphasizing pilchards as a “strengthening meal,” Glenryck and other companies strove to appeal to urban black men of the migrant labor system, the most fruitful of potential markets for the fishing industry.

FISH FLOUR SCHEME

Fish flour was presented as a further means of aggrandizing the domestic fish market and improving the health of South Africans. Protein deficiency was a common form of malnourishment in South Africa where many penurious peoples ate monotonous diets of mealie or Boer meal with limited meat and dairy intake. The creation of a protein concentrate by processing a neutral flour made to fortify the biscuits, breads and other staples of “native” diets, offered the promise of an increase in national fish consumption. Such an idea was in no way novel nor unique to South Africa. Norwegian experiments with fish flour in the 1930s were moderately successful despite the fishy taste of the nation’s biscuits. There had also been South African attempts at cereal fortification prior to 1946: During World War II, army biscuits were fortified with wheat germ and milk powder to infuse Vitamin B and Calcium into soldiers’ diets.⁴¹ Experiments were later performed with soya-bean meal used to supplement mealie meal. A mixture with up to 20 percent soya-bean meal was found to improve the health of African children who ate fortified porridge.⁴²

This precedent set the stage for the South African fishing industry’s experiments with fish flour. Beginning in 1945, the chairman of Concentra (Pty.) Ltd. of Cape Town, F.S. Mendel, set about experimentally producing a flour made of fish which would be rich in protein, vitamins and minerals. The fishing industry hailed Mendel’s fish flour as the product that would “banish rickets, bad teeth, and rheumatism in old age.”⁴³ Mendel’s initial plan was to use the flour in biscuits, breads, mealie meal and other potential comestibles. Hampered by insufficient technology, however, Mendel could not effectively neutralize the flour until 1950, when he acquired the proper equipment from Europe.⁴⁴

The news of Mendel’s success thrilled the fishing industry and government officials. Mendel’s creation transformed the industry into a sudden forerunner in nutritional technol-

37 “Fish Publicity Campaign to be Launched Next Month,” *SASNFIR* (June 1956).

38 “Glenryck boy advertisement,” *Golden City Post*, Jan. 18, 1959, 11.

39 “Glenryck man advertisement,” *Golden City Post*, Feb. 15, 1959, 17.

40 “Glenryck boy advertisement,” *Golden City Post*, Jan. 18, 1959, 11.

41 MacVicar, 8.

42 MacVicar, 23.

43 “Fish Flour for Human Consumption: Dramatic Possibilities in Cape Town Research,” *SASNFIR* (February, 1946), 8.

44 *Ibid.*, 8.

ogy through access to the raw materials (white fish) and the scientific knowledge to make “a substance that has been so eagerly sought for by scientists all over the world to eliminate malnutrition and its consequent diseases.”⁴⁵ The industry’s enthusiasm led Dr. G.M. Dreosti, the director of the Fishing Industry Research Institute in Cape Town (F.I.R.I.), an institute financed by the fishing industry but part of the Union government, to meet with Pretoria government officials and present to them the case for fortifying mealie meal and basic foods of the “native” population. His presentation intrigued the Minister of Health, Dr. Karl Bremer, who eagerly insisted on further investigation into the matter. Bremer announced to the *Cape Argus* that fortified staples were the future of South Africa and that in the near future “food in a form so nutritious that it would prevent disease, and at a price within the earning capacity of the lowest paid, would be made available by the government to the whole population ...”⁴⁶

The flour was transferred to the control of F.I.R.I. in 1951 in order to better control and test the product. Mendel had been working with expensive white fish such as hake, which yielded a colorless but costly flour. The research institute undertook “investigational work in connection with stockfish, pilchard and maasbanker in yielding ... a white or light coloured fish flour, free from fishy flavour or odour.”⁴⁷ Under F.I.R.I., fish flour received attention from industries that wanted to benefit from the government’s interest in fortified foods. One crystallized fruit manufacturing corporation ran experiments of their own and showed F.I.R.I. that up to six percent of fish flour could be mixed in with their fruit and remain undetected.⁴⁸ While F.I.R.I. continued to pursue only its initial plan of fortifying cereals, the wider interest in the program shows the attraction of fish flour for companies looking to secure government subsidies. F.I.R.I. spent the next five years perfecting its methods, experimenting with different ingredients, and researching various modes of production, partly because it lacked the support and funding to begin large-scale production of the flour.

The result of F.I.R.I.’s research was the 1956 *Special Committee on Fish Consumption* report, which reinvigorated the fishing industry’s mass-marketing campaign and served as an engine for the fish flour scheme. The primary recommendations of the Special Committee’s report was for the Union government to proceed with fish flour production. “In these circumstances,” reported the committee to the government concerning recent health scares, “your Committee feels that the enrichment of mealie meal and bread with a neutral fish flour would constitute one of the most effective ways of inducing a material increase in the protein intake of all sections of the population.”⁴⁹ Based upon the committee’s investigations and discussions with F.I.R.I., the report claimed that an effective fish flour scheme would multiply the consumption of fish by five, thus helping the fishing industry and improving the quality of life for many South Africans. Two percent of the tasteless and odorless flour could be added to white bread and over eight percent could be added to brown bread without detection. The report then concluded with the Committee’s endorsement of the fish flour enrichment scheme, strongly recommending “that this project be proceeded with as a matter of prime national importance.”⁵⁰

Upon the committee’s overwhelming support for the fish flour scheme, F.I.R.I. was

45 “Product is Completely Neutral and will not Alter Taste, Odour or Colour of Food it fortifies.” SASNFIR (Aug., 1951), 63.

46 “Fish Flour Will Help To Conquer Malnutrition In Union: National Feeding Scheme to Use Fishing Industry in Battle Against Diet Deficiency,” *SASNFIR* (August 1951), 59.

47 “Fifth Annual Report of the Director,” Fishing Industry Research Institute, Cape Town, South Africa (1 April 1951 – 31 March 1952), 18.

48 “Sixth Annual Report of the Director,” Fishing Industry Research Institute Cape Town, South Africa (1 April 1952 – 31 March 1953), 25.

49 “Report 1: Special Committee on Fish Consumption,” 14.

50 “Report 1: Special Committee on Fish Consumption,” 14.

able to complete its research and begin pilot plant production. F.I.R.I.'s annual reports, following the committee's recommendations, placed increasing importance on fish flour. Before 1956, fish flour was but a mere investigation briefly mentioned in a few paragraphs. Yet, after 1956, F.I.R.I.'s annual reports included entire fish flour articles. Within three months of the beginning of pilot plant production in 1956, the plant was producing up to a ton of the product per day. After sending out pre-mix to producers of cereal goods to a test market, F.I.R.I. reported that the bakers lauded the premix as the best they had ever used. Members of the public called F.I.R.I. to say "that they liked the colour, flavour and texture of the present enriched bread, and have particularly commented on the good quality of the toast made from it."⁵¹ The department of nutrition also approved of the flour. By the end of 1956, over 68 tons of fish flour had been produced.⁵²

But very suddenly, the fish flour scheme came to a halt. At the beginning of production in 1956, the fish flour industry hit its peak and the enthusiasm for the program began to wane. Fish flour continued to be produced through the end of the 1950s, but by 1960, it came to a stand-still. Also by 1960, F.I.R.I.'s annual reports published recipes of Boerwors, croquettes and fish cakes to be fortified with fish flour without mentioning bread or cereal grains. The recipes were the only part of the report that dealt with fish flour. Discussion of the supplementation of the nation's food supply had ceased.⁵³ Given the national attention afforded to the fishing industry's brainchild, such a turn of events was unexpected. Yet the director of F.I.R.I., G. M. Dreosti, later revealed in a letter to the editor of *SASNFIR* that fish flour production had fallen behind that of many countries in the world because of the "failure of the bread enrichment programme . . ."⁵⁴ To hide the visible presence of fish flour, F.I.R.I. had only fortified brown bread, a staple of South Africa's newly health-conscious white population. South African blacks tended to eat white bread more often than brown bread. This cultural and dietary divide prevented the flour from enriching the cereals of the black labor force that the government had most wished to target. Fish flour was instead supplementing the diet of those "who enjoyed it with bacon and egg for breakfast."⁵⁵ The failure of the scheme led to its abandonment, and by 1967, Dreosti foresaw no real demand for this product. Thus ended the Union of South Africa's attempt to fortify their nation's food supply with a protein concentrate from fish, and so too did it end the government's involvement in the fish industry.

South Africa became entrenched in a dietary crisis as a result of post-war protein shortages, agricultural difficulties and expanding labor demands. The fishing industry capitalized on South Africa's food problems in order to expand its market, convincing the apartheid government of fish's potential importance in feeding malnourished black laborers. Government and industry colluded in order to break perceived black cultural taboos around fish through an effective marketing campaign and the development of fish flour. The initiation of the scheme speaks to the economic importance placed upon the health of the black labor force by the apartheid government. When it became apparent that fish flour would not benefit this labor force, the government quickly abandoned its development.

51 "Tenth Annual Report of the Director," Fishing Industry Research Institute, Cape Town, South Africa (1 April 1956 – 31 March 1956), 34.

52 "Tenth Annual Report," F.I.R.I., 34.

53 "Fourteenth Annual Report of the Director," Fishing Industry Research Institute, Cape Town, South Africa (1 Jan. – 31 Dec. 1960), 20.

54 "FPC: South Africa, the pioneer, now falls behind," *SASNFIR*, July, 1967, p. 118.

55 *Ibid.*, 118.

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THE PRIMACY OF THE WAR EFFORT: DOMESTIC NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION OF 1917

BENJAMIN L. MILLER

In many respects, the First World War is America's forgotten conflict. While World War II is remembered for the sweeping international changes it brought about, WWI is recalled as a failure—a catastrophic loss of human life that did not produce the finality of conflict expected at its inception. Although WWI certainly was not “the war to end all wars,” it did produce the October Revolution—arguably the most important event of the twentieth century. The Bolshevik rise to power led to the creation of the Soviet Union, which became America's arch enemy and the chief determinant of U.S. foreign policy for nearly half a century. Yet just as WWI is often lost amidst the historiographical emphasis placed on WWII, so too is there a tendency to overlook the immediate impact of the Russian Revolution, focusing instead on the tension between communism and capitalism that would dominate international politics until the 1990s. Doing so, however, overestimates the immediate impact of Bolshevik ideology, which was not a factor in the initial American response. Instead, critiques of the Russian Revolution, as seen in two of America's daily newspapers, were largely couched in terms of the impact of the war effort, rather than in a struggle between two diametrically opposed doctrines.

NEWS THAT SELLS: SENSATIONALISM, SOLIDARITY AND WAR

World War I ushered in a type of conflict that had never before been experienced. Known as Total War, this manner of struggle obliterated previous boundaries between soldier and civilian, demanding a level of domestic solidarity that linked the home with the front to a greater extent than ever before.¹ This new occurrence left little room for variety of opinion: it required a kind of hyper-patriotism that stifled dissent and demonized elements that did not fit perfectly into society's bounds. This homogeneity was especially prevalent in newspapers, whose biases often bypassed journalistic ethics or detachment.

Even in this environment, *The Providence Journal* stood out as one of the most rabidly anti-German publications in America. Consistently publishing stories of Prussian atrocities, schemes and crimes, the *Journal* gained a national reputation: other papers frequently ran its

¹ Jay Winter, “Under Cover of War: The Armenian Genocide in the Context of Total War,” in *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 194.

content along with the phrase: “*The Providence Journal* will say tomorrow ...”² This increased popularity could also be seen in the *Journal’s* circulation numbers, which skyrocketed from 21,382 for the daily edition in 1915 to 30,452 for the daily and 43,830 for the Sunday edition in 1918.³

The man largely responsible for this rise in national prominence was John Rathom, the paper’s enormous and enigmatic editor-in-chief. Weighing upwards of 250 pounds and standing over six feet tall, Rathom took over as both editor and general manager of the paper in 1912 after previously serving as the managing editor since 1906.⁴ While he initially made only mundane layout changes, Rathom’s ultimate effect on the paper could be felt with the outbreak overseas of WWI. A native Australian,⁵ Rathom betrayed no sense of subtlety in his push for U.S. intervention, vehemently attacking the Germans, while harshly criticizing President Woodrow Wilson for his inaction.⁶ The most explicit articulation of this could be found in a box on the editorial page beginning on July 6, 1917:

Every German or Austrian in the United States, unless known by years of association to be absolutely loyal, should be treated as a potential spy. Keep your eyes and ears open. Whenever any suspicious act or disloyal war comes to your notice communicate at once with the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice...

We are at war with the most merciless and inhuman nation in the world. Hundreds of thousands of its people in this country want to see America humiliated and beaten to her knees, and they are doing, and will do, everything in their power to bring this about. Take nothing for granted. Energy and alertness in this direction may save the life your son, your husband or your brother.⁷

Rathom’s vehement anti-German stance both colored the *Journal’s* views on the Russian Revolution and also produced an attitude toward the Prussians similar to the opinion of Bolsheviks in the 1919 Red Scare.

While the *Journal* was an example of a local paper gaining national attention, *The New York Times* was arguably the preeminent daily newspaper in the United States at the time. Given this position, its resources were significantly greater than the *Journal’s*, allowing the *Times* to cover more events with its own staff and to minimize the use of the Associated Press wire. At its helm was Adolph Ochs—a direct ancestor of current publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr.—who had purchased the paper in 1896 and controlled it until his death in 1935.⁸ Ochs completely rejuvenated the then-struggling paper, increasing circulation to 248,170 in 1912—a number larger than the entire population of Providence in 1915.⁹

As biased and rabid as was the *Journal*, the *Times* strove to be the opposite, even attempting to present a neutral view of the war in its early days by publishing both Allied and Ger-

2 “A hundred Years of *The Providence Journal* 1829-1929,” Special Supplement of *The Providence Journal*, 23 July 1929: 22.

3 Ibid, 23.

4 Garrett D. Byrnes and Charles H. Spilman, *The Providence Journal 150 Years*, 1st ed. (Providence: The Providence Journal Company, 1980), 261.

5 Although Rathom claimed to be Australian, no records of him exist there—an unusual fact given that Australia’s status as a penal colony meant that it had better population records than most countries. Moreover, later background searches by the *Journal* were unable to turn up any sign of Rathom at the schools he claimed to have attended.

6 Ibid, 262.

7 Ibid, 295.

8 Susan E. Tift and Alex S. Jones, *The Trust: The Private and Powerful Family Behind The New York Times*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999), XIV.

9 Ibid, 87.; Patrick T. Conley, *Rhode Island Profile*, 1st ed. (Providence: Rhode Island Publications Society, 1982), 34.

man documents. This move that drew harsh criticism from both sides.¹⁰ From the first day of the war, the *Journal* had emphatically lobbied for American intervention against the German menace. The *Times* meanwhile “supported President Wilson’s efforts to preserve peace as long as was honorably possible.”¹¹ The balanced coverage of the war was a boon to the *Times’* readership: circulation spiked, increasing from 230,000 just before WWI to 368,492 in 1918.¹²

Thus, by March of 1917, the two publications were headed in the same direction by different means. The *Journal*, relying upon sensationalism, was slowly growing and gaining national attention, while the *Times* was providing unparalleled coverage of the war and continuing to establish itself as the preeminent American daily paper. The events in Russia, however, would produce similar responses driven by very different logic.

THE FIRST REVOLUTION: A GREAT HOPE

The *Times* reveled in the news of the initial Russian uprising in March of 1917.¹³ The prospect of the Duma taking over for the Czar led to positive financial forecasts and the prediction of a swift and “vigorous prosecution of the war to a victorious end.”¹⁴ More importantly, the revolution indicated the beginning of an era of freedom for the Russian people. The *Times* called the change in power a “new birth for Russia,” one that would end not only the Czarist government but also the “Germanophile treason and conspiracy which have long been dominant in the Government.”¹⁵

Contained within the positive outpouring from the *Times* were numerous comparisons to the French Revolution. The editors likened the coming together of the masses to the gathering of the States General under Louis XVI, heralding the abundance of new ideas spreading among the people.¹⁶ Although the uprising was just a few days old, there were already strong expectations of the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Russia.¹⁷ Some experts went even further, predicting the growth of a republic that would convey a deep respect for American values: “Every Russian sees in America an ideal that should be cherished, and in his heart he realizes that this country is the model for democracy the world over.”¹⁸ No matter what government the emancipated people chose, the prospect of a strong bond between the United States and Russia tantalized policymakers.

The *Journal* also invoked images of the French Revolution, although it did so in a subtler way. Its initial editorial on March 16 labeled the ascendancy of the Duma as marking “the passing of the old and the coming of the new,” signaling an end to “the Divine Right of Kings”—the same doctrine that was attacked by the French uprising in 1789.¹⁹ The similarities continued in the following day’s paper, as the *Journal* emphatically declared that the Russian Revolution indicated the effect of America’s ideas upon the world: “Europe cannot escape the influence of the democratic leaven. The yeast, indeed, has long been stirring there.”²⁰ Therefore, the revolution showed “that the great social and political movement of the nineteenth

10 Tiff, et al., *The Trust*, 104.

11 *Ibid.*, 116.

12 *Ibid.*, 118.

13 Due to differing calendars, the revolution began in February according to the Russians, but March by the Gregorian calendar. The gap also explains why the October Revolution took place in November.

14 “London Hails Revolution,” *New York Times*, 16 March 1917, sec. A: 1.

15 “The New Birth of Russia,” *New York Times*, 16 March 1917, sec. A: 10.

16 *Ibid.*

17 *Ibid.*

18 “Expects Russia to be a Republic,” *New York Times*, 18 March 1917, sec. A: 2.

19 “Russia Awakes,” *Providence Journal*, 10 March 1917, sec: 1: 10.

20 “Democracy’s Rising Tide,” *Providence Journal*, 17 March 1917, sec. 1: 10.

century,” the spread of democracy, would continue into the twentieth.²¹

Given this view, the comparison to the French Revolution was particularly apt. Just as the events of 1789 were supposed to be the first in a series of revolutions modeled on American values, so too could the abdication of the Czar be seen in the same vein. In some respects, the promise of the Russian Revolution was even greater. While the French uprising had little immediate military implication, many felt that the entrance of the Russians on the Allied side could spell quick defeat for Germany. Thus, the initial revolution brought about a sense of ideological affirmation for the Americans and impending victory for the Allies.

THE SECOND REVOLUTION: A GERMAN MENACE AMIDST RUSSIAN FLAWS

Unfortunately, the French Revolution analogy proved too insightful, as the mighty wave of hope came crashing down less than nine months later. The rise of the Bolsheviks, and their subsequent calls for an immediate peace, threatened to throw the balance of the war back to the Germans. Because of the military impact, the new Russian leaders garnered a great deal of criticism from both the *Times* and the *Journal*. Unlike the February Revolution, however, which engendered thoughts of positive ideological and military outcomes, the October Revolution received little scrutiny from a doctrinal standpoint, the focus instead turning to what it likely meant to the Allied cause.

While reports of the Czar’s abdication were met with ecstatic outbursts on the editorial pages, both papers approached the Bolshevik uprising with caution, printing solely factual accounts and avoiding opinions. The first report of the October Revolution showed up in the *Journal* on November 8—a day after it was written due to technological constraints. Located below the fold in the center of the front page, the article ran with the headline “Maximalists seize Petrograd offices.” It then proceeded to briefly outline how the Maximalists—a misnomer for the Bolsheviks—had captured the telegraph office, State Bank and Marie Palace.²² Lacking many details, the story was relatively brief, emphasizing that “The general life of the city remains normal” and that “strict orders against outlawry” have been handed out.²³

Interestingly, the *Journal* story was nearly identical to the one in the *Times*, although neither ran with a byline or wire attribution. The *Times*, however, placed the article above the fold on the left side of the page, running it down an entire column and jumping it to the next page. The *Times* article had a slightly different construction, pushing the passage about city conditions lower down, while moving details of Premier Alexander Kerensky’s attempts to thwart the Bolsheviks from the end to the beginning.²⁴ While relatively insignificant, such changes belied a difference in priorities, with the *Journal* more focused on the current situation, while the *Times* looked more at background and history for explanations.

Both publications extended their coverage the following day with banner headlines. This time, however, a noticeable difference in tone emerged. The *Journal*’s top stories focused upon actions in Russia, starting with the rather dramatic phrase “Petrograd is again in turmoil.”²⁵ The article then proceeded to detail the shelling of the winter palace and the unknown whereabouts of Kerensky. By contrast, the *Times* also featured a factual story, but then expanded

21 Ibid.

22 According to a segment from *Ten Days that Shook the World* by John Reed, found at <http://www2.cddc.vt.edu/marxists/history/ussr/revolution/johnreed/parties.htm>, the Maximalists were “An off-shoot of the *Socialist Revolutionary Party* in the revolution of 1905,” and not an English translation for Bolshevik. Given that the *Journal* refers to Leon Trotsky as one of the leaders, it would appear that it mistakenly used the term in place of Bolshevik.

23 “Maximalists Seize Petrograd Offices,” *Providence Journal*, 8 November 1917, sec. 1: 1.

24 “Bolshevik Seize State Buildings, Defying Kerensky,” *New York Times*, 8 November 1917, sec. A: 1.

25 “Russian Rebels Arrest Cabinet Members; Shell Winter Palace,” *Providence Journal*, 9 November 1917, sec. 1: 1.

upon the situation, recapping in greater detail how the revolt developed and filling in the information gaps from the previous day.²⁶ The *Times* also ran a front page story about the United States government's hope that the conflict would not expand to the whole country.²⁷ The *Journal* included a similar article from the AP wire, but relegated it to the second page. The differences again highlight the *Journal's* sensationalist focus as opposed to the drier and contextualized approach of the *Times*.

The editorial that day was especially indicative of both the differences between the two papers and the outlook on latent causes of the revolution. The *Times* again employed a historical view, holding Kerensky accountable for failing to act when the situation first manifested itself: "If he had accepted the challenge the moment the glove was thrown down, order would have had a better chance."²⁸ The *Journal*, on the other hand, blamed the entire uprising on Germany: "It is clear that Berlin knew, a fortnight ago, what was going to happen at the Russian capital."²⁹ The editorial proved this claim by pointing to German troops being shifted away from the Russian front and backed it up with an unnamed dispatch that referred to Nikolai Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, as "in the pay of Germany."³⁰

This perceived German connection colored all of the *Journal's* commentary about Russia. Even in that initial editorial it was established that the Bolsheviks should be considered dangerous only because they were "the friends and abettors of Germany," and not because of their ideology.³¹ With this outlook, the editorial on the Petrograd revolt quickly turned into an anti-German rant, saying that the Bolshevik takeover "only goes to show once more the insidious menace of the German propaganda. It is a menace to which this country as well as Russia is exposed."³² The piece then proposed a solution to this perceived threat: interning every alien enemy.³³

By focusing more on the Kaiser and German menace than the Bolsheviks, the *Journal* displayed greater interest in the Russian Revolution's impact upon the war effort than in its ideological implications. A November 10 editorial confirmed this stance, highlighting the "unabashed and unbuked (sic)" German intrigue in Petrograd and used it to justify hurrying American war preparations.³⁴ The German role was graphically explored the following day with an editorial cartoon on the front page (Appendix I). Depicting Russia as a gagged woman being attacked by three men labeled "Lenine, Trotsky and Bolsheviki," the image explicitly showed the force behind the leaders of the coup—a sinister German lurking in the shadows with a bag of gold in his hand and a dagger behind his back.³⁵ The meaning was unmistakable: German money spurred on the Bolshevik attack, while the Prussians waited in the wings to take control of Russia.

The *Journal's* attitude about the Bolsheviks extended to the domestic realm as well. While the editors certainly did not approve of Lenin or Trotsky, they again critiqued the domestic threat in the context of Germany. Thus, the ideology of Bolshevism was not the issue, but rather its role as "malevolent servants of Prussian autocracy."³⁶ The split between the ideology and the menace in relation to the war continued in a special feature in the November 11

26 "Ministers Under Arrest," *New York Times*, 9 November 1917, sec. A: 1.

27 "Awaits Light From Russia," *New York Times*, 9 November 1917, sec. A: 1.

28 "The Russian Overturn," *New York Times*, 9 November 1917, sec. A: 12.

29 "The Revolt at Petrograd," *Providence Journal*, 9 November 1917, sec. 1: 8.

30 *Ibid.*

31 *Ibid.*

32 *Ibid.*

33 *Ibid.*

34 "Russia and America," *Providence Journal*, 10 November 1917, sec. 1: 8.

35 "Delivering the Goods," *Providence Journal*, 11 November 1917, sec. 1: 1.

36 "American Maximalists," *Providence Sunday Journal*, 11 November 1917 sec. 3: 2.

Sunday Journal. Titled “Socialism has Grievance Against Prussianism,” it laid out how “Prussianism had corrupted socialism,” and “built a camouflage behind which it robbed labor of political rights and choked rebellion with the poison gas of subserviency (sic).”³⁷ Again, there was a sense of a gap between the ideology of socialism and the Bolsheviks.

The *Times*, meanwhile, was more critical of the Bolshevik government, calling its reign “a mad rush to ruin,” and putting Russia “outside the pale of civilized, recognizable governments.”³⁸ Interestingly, while the *Journal* portrayed German socialism as innocent in the face of the Kaiser, the *Times* deemphasized the German government’s role. The editors first made this point in a November 25 editorial, divulging how the State Department had “no evidence of a convincing nature . . . that Nikolai Lenine . . . is in Germany’s pay or is in direct contact with German agents.” This did not, however, absolve the Prussians of all guilt, as three days earlier the *Times* had blamed a different German envoy, writing that “it is socialism that has brought Russia to ruin, German socialism.”³⁹

Thus, after just a few weeks, a clear divide emerged between the entities each publication blamed for the revolution. On the one hand, the *Journal*, led by Rathom’s venomous hatred of the Germans, saw the Kaiser as a lurking menace behind both the turmoil in Russia and any domestic threats. On the other hand, the *Times* focused its blame more solidly upon Kerensky, the Bolsheviks and the ideology of socialism, seeing the latter two as “foul contagions [that] have spread to other nations, free and well-governed nations, where they have become a pest and a menace.”⁴⁰ Both newspapers also attached some sort of culpability to the Germans, either in the form of its government or its arm of the socialist party.

ABRITISHAGENTINPROVIDENCE

Rathom’s perception of WWI played a large role in the *Journal’s* obsession with the Germans. Especially indicative of this zealous dislike is a story that ran below the fold of the front page of the November 9 issue. Titled “Hamburg-American Line Offices at New York Seized by Marshal,” the article recounted how federal agents raided a nest of German spies, taking books and records. More interesting, however, was the way the *Journal*, in an obvious breach of journalistic ethics, boasted about its role in the seizure:

Ever since the beginning of the European War the Providence Journal has been in the possession of information, most of which it has put into the hands of the United States government . . . the Journal has persistently sought to point out to the Federal authorities the almost criminal negligence of permitting the Hamburg-American organization to remain in existence in New York city.⁴¹

Not only was such a claim unusual for a newspaper, it was also false. Later research into Rathom and some of his stories revealed that in fact many of the more radically anti-German pieces were not even penned by *Journal* writers. According to reporters writing a 150-year history of the paper in 1980, Rathom was part of an information triangle with the British naval attaché in Washington and a wealthy Bohemian who ran a spy network against the Germans.⁴² The two men fed Rathom both British propaganda and reports of German and Austrian activi-

37 A. M. Simons, “Socialism has Grievance Against Prussianism,” *Providence Sunday Journal* 11 November 1917, sec. 5: 4.

38 “Outside the Pale,” *New York Times*, 25 November 1917, sec. E: 2.

39 Ibid.; “Keep Russia in Turmoil,” *New York Times*, 22 November 1917, sec. A: 2.

40 “Outside the Pale,” *New York Times*, 25 November 1917, sec. E: 2.

41 “Hamburg American Line Offices at New York Seized by Marshal,” *Providence Journal*, 9 November 1917, sec. 1: 1.

42 Byrnes, et al., *The Providence Journal 150 Years*, 276.

ties, making it appear that the *Journal* drew from a wide-ranging network of counter espionage sources.⁴³ If there was such a network, it existed only within Rathom's office, for many of the stories reportedly came straight from the editor-in-chief, "already edited and complete with headlines," and were ordered to go in without any changes.⁴⁴

While the triangular trade of information was unknown, the bias of the *Journal* was easily recognizable. James Carr Garrison, the vice president of *The Providence News*, a competing publication, lambasted Rathom, writing in a December 1918 editorial: "Nowhere in England is the 'undercurrent' [of anti-Wilson opinion] half so strong as it is under that extra-territorial part of the British Empire which arrogantly sits at the corner of Westminster and Eddy Streets [the location of the *Journal* building]."⁴⁵ The Department of Justice was also less than thrilled with Rathom's flair for the dramatic—in 1918 it summoned him before a federal grand jury in New York to testify about some of his sources.⁴⁶ Rather than appearing, Rathom sent a letter of apology, acknowledging that the *Journal* did not have any information and that "Government officials are alone responsible for the Hamburg-American Line arrests."⁴⁷ The confession remained hidden for two years, but was released after Rathom attacked Franklin D. Roosevelt, then navy secretary, in print.⁴⁸ The letter was picked up by *The Nation* magazine, which ran it in full.

While the outcome of all the proceedings slightly tarnished the mysterious Rathom's image, knowledge of the *Journal's* full background taints current considerations of its WWI coverage. There was little indication that Rathom's connections were feeding him stories about anything besides Germany, but the lack of attribution in most articles makes it difficult to differentiate actual reporting from British propaganda. That being said, the intensity of the coverage of the Central Powers represents a good foil for seeing how the Bolsheviks were viewed after the armistice. The transfer of hostility from the Prussians to the Russians also helps underscore how circumstances had a greater role than ideology in the response to the revolution and the development of anti-Bolshevik sentiment.

PROBLEMATIC PEACE AND THE BEGINNING OF THE DOMESTIC THREAT

One of the biggest problems with forging a stance on the Russian Revolution was the lack of concrete information available. This was apparent especially in the early days, when Bolshevik control of telegraph offices meant they controlled almost all reports coming out of Russia. Because of this, "a majority of newspapers in all the Allied countries featured rumor and second- or third-hand reports ... no matter how fantastic."⁴⁹ Both the *Journal* and *Times* fell into this description, publishing a series of contradictory dispatches. On consecutive days the *Journal* reported complete victories for both Kerensky and the Bolsheviks.⁵⁰ The *Times* was not able to get any closer to the truth, publishing a story on November 13 that reported victories for both sides.⁵¹ The *Times* was especially likely to produce whatever information it received, and

43 Ibid. 277.

44 Ibid.

45 Wilbur L. Doctor "On the Pan" *Side-Ways*, no. 27 (1992), http://www.uri.edu/library/special_collections/exhibits/doctor/cover.html (accessed December 4, 2005), 4-5.

46 "Fiction Writer." *Providence Journal*, 21 July 2004 http://www.projo.com/extra/2004/1910_1919/ (accessed December 4, 2005).

47 "The Confession of John R. Rathom," *The Nation* 2889, no. III (1920): 558.

48 "Fiction Writer," *Providence Journal*.

49 Robert D. Warth, *The Allies and the Russian Revolution*, 1st ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1954), 166.

50 "Bolshevik Report Complete Victory," *Providence Journal*, 14 November 1917, sec. 1: 5; "Kerensky said to hold nearly all of Petrograd," *Providence Journal* 15 November 1917, sec. 1: 5.

51 "Petrograd Battle Still in Doubt," *New York Times*, 13 November 1917, sec. A: 1.

predicted the demise of the Bolsheviks roughly 91 times over a two-year period.⁵²

Similar problems arose with calls for peace. Although Lenin had been pushing for a universal treaty from the first day of the revolution, the results of such a desire were unclear. Trotsky issued the first declaration on November 20, making a “formal offer of an armistice to all the belligerents, enemy and ally.”⁵³ That move was unpopular with the American government, which saw it as amounting to “an act that would place Russia almost in the list of unfriendly nations.”⁵⁴ The claims of universality also garnered skepticism, as the only country that would seemingly benefit from a universal peace would be Germany, leading to the belief that the Central Powers forces would sign an independent treaty.

Again, the two publications differed over the source of the Russian drive for peace. The *Times* continued its analytical tone and attributed the move to “the impatience of the masses who demand the immediate execution of the Bolshevik promises.”⁵⁵ Such a position noticeably excluded the role of ideology in the decision, separating the article from later scholarship on the Russian withdrawal. For example, H. William Brands trumps external condition with doctrine, arguing that Lenin probably would have pulled out of the war “even *if* ideology had not pointed him in that direction [emphasis added].”⁵⁶ The heightened stress upon principles over circumstances in the secondary source indicates a shift over time in prioritizing the role of Bolshevism’s tenets.

The *Journal*, meanwhile, returned to its editorial cartoons to explain its view of the Russian peace attempts (Appendix I). Running predominantly in the middle of the front page, their image depicted a bearded man with a turban dressed up as an angel walking toward the Russian front, carrying a white flag in his hand. To avoid any doubts about this “peace angel’s” motivation, his tunic is stamped “Made in Germany,” while behind him two men labeled “Kerensky” and “Lenine” are busy fighting.⁵⁷ Thus, the root of the Russian move for peace was not depicted as ideological or circumstantial, but as the product of German propaganda designed to break Russia away from the Allies.

After taking strong stances against the Russian peace, the slow progression of treaty negotiations and speculation gave way to repeated predictions about the fall of the Bolshevik regime, coupled with pleas and plans for the U.S. to “save” Russia. The *Times* printed an opinion piece by Senator William Borah who emphasized the humanitarian angle and the need of the United States to aid the “noble people struggling in blindness and madness to be free.”⁵⁸ Borah claimed that the United States had to act to save Russia, because failing to do so could lead to it entering into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

As the likelihood of a Russian-German treaty increased, reports of U.S. domestic Bolshevik agitation started appearing. On December 3 the *Journal* printed a brief detailing a claim by Arkansas Governor Charles Brough that “the United States is ‘honeycombed’ with a Bolshevik composed of [Industrial Workers of the World] leaders, German spies, stealthy Lenines in diplomacy and weak Trotzkys of American pacifism.”⁵⁹ The same issue also contained an article about the inaugural meeting of the Bolsheviks of New York. That short piece provided the first hint of the potential role of ideology, describing how the club “declared that the Rus-

52 Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 1st ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 116.

53 Leon Trotsky, “Announcement of Bolshevik Foreign Policy 20 November 1917,” First World War.com, http://www.first-worldwar.com/source/russia_trotskypeace1.htm (accessed December 5, 2005).

54 “Peace Scheme May Make America Treat Russia as Unfriendly Nation,” *Providence Journal*, 24 November 1917, sec. 1: 1.

55 Harold Williams, “Bolshevik’s Hand Forced by Masses Who Demand Execution of Promises,” *New York Times*, 24 November 1917, sec. A: 1.

56 H. William Brands, *The United States in the World: Volume II*, 1st ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 66.

57 Milton Hallady, “The Latest Peace Angel,” *Providence Journal*, 25 November 1917, sec. 1: 1.

58 William Borah, “Shall we Abandon Russia?,” *New York Times*, 2 December 1917, sec. M: 2.

59 “Arkansas Governor Warns Against Bolsheviks Here,” *Providence Journal*, 3 December 1917, sec. 1: 2.

sian Revolution is an international affair and that it is probable its ideals will spread all over the world.⁶⁰ Neither item, however, seemed to be very noteworthy; both stories were buried inside the paper.

As the New Year approached, neither publication altered its stance. A piece that ran the day after Christmas, however, provided a perfect snapshot of where the two publications differed. The article related discoveries of a potential worldwide plot to overthrow multiple governments. The texts were nearly identical except for one subtle change in the lede. The *Times* story began with the following sentence:

Evidence has been uncovered by Government agents indicating that American Industrial Workers of the World, Russian Bolsheviki, Irish agitators and revolutionists in various countries at war with Germany *may be* seeking to lay the foundation of an elaborate world-wide plan to overthrow existing social orders [emphasis added].⁶¹

The *Journal* ran a nearly identical lede, but changed one word, providing a very different picture of the situation:

Evidence has been uncovered by Government agents indicating that American Industrial Workers of the World, Russian Bolsheviki, Irish agitators and revolutionists in various countries at war with Germany *are* seeking to lay the foundation of an elaborate world-wide plan to overthrow existing social orders (emphasis added).⁶²

Although the change appears minor, by substituting “are” for “may be,” the *Journal’s* version reads more dramatically and has a sense of definitiveness that the *Times’* report does not. Moreover, the *Journal’s* headline, which reads “Government Sees Plot to Spread Bolshevism in Allied Countries,” changes the direction of the story, singling out the Russian element, while ignoring the anarchist role that dominates most of the article’s message.⁶³ Thus, the *Times’* headline, “Sees Worldwide Anarchist Plot,” is far more indicative of the actual tone, and does not relate the plot back to a specific country.⁶⁴ The difference between the two portrayals again underscores the *Journal’s* usage of sensationalism and also foreshadows the role Bolshevism would occupy after the war ended.

The first months of 1918 brought about a similar pattern within both publications of hope for Russia, coupled with more bad news about the Bolsheviks. The government, meanwhile, took a softer stance. This was true of Wilson especially, who on January 8 delivered a long speech praising the virtue of the Russian people: “They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany ... And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield in either principle or action.”⁶⁵ Wilson’s wording is particularly illuminating — the decision to portray the Russian people under the grip of Germany rather than the Bolsheviks indicated that the U.S. government still saw the Kaiser, and not communist ideology, behind the chaos in Russia.

Part of the reason for Russian support may have been derived from the government’s reassessment of the military situation. While both the *Journal* and the *Times* bemoaned the effect of a Russo-German peace treaty on the Western Front, military advisors downplayed the

60 “Bolsheviki of New York Hold First Gathering,” *Providence Journal*, 3 December 1917, sec. 1: 11.

61 “Sees Worldwide Anarchist Plot,” *New York Times*, 26 December 1917, sec. A: 1.

62 “Government Sees Plot to Spread Bolshevism in Allied Countries,” *Providence Journal*, 26 December 1917, sec. 1: 1.

63 Ibid.

64 “Sees Worldwide Anarchist Plot,” *New York Times*.

65 “Text of President Wilson’s Speech,” *New York Times*, 9 January 1918, sec. A: 1.

issue, stating in mid-February that most of the prisoners of war to be released were “civilians or camp followers.”⁶⁶ Furthermore, the experts predicted that getting supplies from Russia to the Western Front would be a difficult undertaking, meaning Germany would be unlikely to capitalize too much on a Bolshevik surrender.

The status of peace negotiations at that point also buoyed such optimism. After well over a month of arguing, the Bolsheviks were still unable to convince Germany to back down from its strong demands, which included giving up the sizeable portion of Russia that was currently in the Kaiser’s control. This stubbornness led to a frustrated outburst from Lenin to the effect that the principles guiding Germany were quite different from what was originally discussed in December of 1917.⁶⁷ Trotsky was also incensed, declaring on February 10: “We are not signing a peace of landlords and capitalists,” and pulled the Russians from the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.⁶⁸ At the same time, the Bolsheviks declared their part of the war at an end, leaving themselves vulnerable to any further territorial encroachments. The apparent failure of negotiations raised American expectations.

After Germany continued to capture whole swaths of Russia, Lenin retracted previous rejections of the pact. This renewed emphasis on the acceptance of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, however, dashed some elements of American sympathy. Two days after Lenin’s declaration, Senator Porter James McCumber delivered a fiery speech in the Capitol building—saying that Bolsheviks in labor unions “menaced America’s hope of winning the war,” while the leaders of the Russian government committed the “most damnable treachery to the faithful and bleeding Allies.”⁶⁹ It is, however, unclear how much of an impact McCumber’s speech produced—the *Journal* ran it below the fold on page one, while the *Times* buried it on page seven. Neither publication bothered to produce an editorial on its content.

McCumber’s attack notwithstanding, the final signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3 did not provoke fiery language from either newspaper. The *Journal* only ran a standard news story describing the terms of the pact and the manner in which it was assembled.⁷⁰ The *Times* featured a similarly dry story, although it played up the significance of the pact more than the *Journal*, using a three column headline in capital letters on half of the page.⁷¹ The reason for the lack of outrage, though, can be found in the *Times*’ editorial, which acknowledged that the treaty was really a sham and that the Russians were powerless in the face of German aggression: “And yet [the Bolsheviks]’ surrender does not change the situation in the least, or make it better ... if they held out Germany would only go on taking additional territory as might suit her. And that she will continue to do.”⁷²

Such a defeated tone was not adopted by all publications. *The Boston Evening Transcript* vehemently denounced the treaty, writing “Never, we repeat, has there been such a betrayal in the history of the world.”⁷³ *The London Times* also blamed the Bolsheviks, saying they had “broken up the Russian armies and their own country defenseless before implacable invaders.”⁷⁴ Clearly there was a diversity of opinion on who to blame for Russia’s exit from the war.

66 “Collapse in East Fails to Alarm Military Experts at Washington,” *Providence Journal*, 13 February 1918, sec. 1: 1.

67 “Official Russian Announcement on Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, 23 January 1918,” First World War.com, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/brestlitovsk_bolshannounce.htm (accessed December 10, 2005).

68 “Official Russian Announcement of Withdrawal from Brest-Litovsk Peace Talks, 10 February 1918,” First World War.com, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/brestlitovsk_trotskywithdrawal.htm (accessed December 10, 2005).

69 “McCumber Assails ‘Bolsheviks’ Here,” *New York Times*, 26 February 1918, sec. A: 7.; “Bolshevism Threatens Country, McCumber Declares in Senate,” *Providence Journal*, 26 February 1918, sec. 1: 1.

70 “Bolsheviks Grant Further German Demands and Sign Peace Treaty,” *Providence Journal*, 4 March 1918, sec. 1: 1.

71 “Peace Signed, German Advance Ends; Russia Forced by New Terms to Cede Lands Taken from Turkey in 3 Wars,” *New York Times*, 4 March 1918, sec. A: 1.

72 “Russia Signs a Peace Treaty,” *New York Times*, 4 March 1918, sec. A: 10.

73 Warth, *The Allies and the Russian Revolution*, 234.

74 *Ibid.*, 234-235.

The same day the *Evening Transcript* was skewering the Russian government, the *Journal* again demonstrated the disconnect between socialism and Bolshevism, showing that its greatest concern was patriotism. In an editorial titled “On the Right Track,” the editors detailed a meeting of New York socialists, in which they all pledged to support the war, while condemning other groups that were against it. Saying that these “radicals” were “on the right track” was a sign that, from the *Journal’s* perspective at least, the only criteria that really mattered was support for the war.⁷⁵ The stance taken by the socialists, meanwhile, is an example of what Regin Schmidt described as national groups subverting their own interest to the national cause, a move that the *Journal* certainly agreed with.⁷⁶

PATERNALISM TRIUMPHS

While neither the *Times* nor the *Journal* approved of the Bolsheviks, the newspapers changed their tactics as the war entered its final months. Instead of lambasting the government leaders and complaining about the damage they were doing to Russia, both editorial boards discussed how to “save” the ordinary people. A *Journal* editorial on March 15 recapped the events in the year since the February Revolution and spoke very highly of the non-Bolshevik citizens saying, “we may pause a moment ... to recognize the existence of something noble, something potentially fruitful, in the minds and hearts of the inexperienced, untrained Russian people today.”⁷⁷ Such a message indicated the growth of a paternalistic ethos toward the normal citizens that emphasized their primitiveness to explain both the rise to prominence of the Bolsheviks and the way for America to effect a change in power.

While the German defeat became increasingly likely, the *Journal* continued to paint the Russians as an immature youth that needed to be saved by the wizened America. This is most explicit in three editorial cartoons that ran on March 16 and June 30. The first, titled “This Way to the Front,” shows a bearded and elderly Uncle Sam adopting a fatherly stance, placing his hand on the shoulder of a confused young man labeled Russia.⁷⁸ Uncle Sam’s other arm points emphatically back to the battle, showing that he can help the bewildered and uneducated Russians back into the fray. Moreover, in conveying the Russians as a younger man, the cartoon highlights the belief that they are still capable of fighting and defending themselves, provided they received American aid.

The second cartoon from the same day depicts a similar message in a very different way. Labeled “One Way to Save Russia,” the image shows Uncle Sam, Lady Liberty and another man using a battering ram to break through a door labeled “The West Front.”⁷⁹ There is no Russian character in the drawing but it still conveys the message that if the U.S. could use its strength, liberty and values to break down the German menace they could then plow on through to save Russia. The U.S. needed to take a proactive role in stopping the Bolsheviks.

The wizened Uncle Sam character appeared again on June 30, this time carrying two bags containing “Advice” and “Industrial and Business Commission” and tagged with the label “to Russia.”⁸⁰ Behind him and standing at attention are two U.S. soldiers, again sending the message that America needed to intervene because it possessed greater knowledge and capabilities. Two *Journal* editorials went even further with this reasoning, blaming Russia’s current situation

75 “On the Right Track,” *Providence Journal*, 4 March 1918, sec. 1: 6.

76 Regin Schmidt, *Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States*, 1st ed. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2000), 25.

77 “A Year of Russian Revolution,” *Providence Journal*, 15 March 1918, sec. 1: 8.

78 “This way to the Front,” *Providence Journal*, 16 March 1918, sec. 1: 1.

79 “One Way to Save Russia,” *Providence Journal*, 16 March 1918, sec. 1: 5.

80 “Let THEM Carry Your Bags,” *Providence Journal*, 30 June 1918, sec. 1: 1.

on a lack of U.S. military action: “our failure to intervene has been followed by exactly the result that these pacifists argued should be avoided. Russia is more than ever in Germany’s control.”⁸¹ The editors supported this statement in a separate piece, arguing that the U.S. needed a harsher and more forceful stance: “It is no time to use weak and halfhearted measures in our treatment of the Russian problem.”⁸²

This shift to the paternalistic stance was not only an attempt to show Americans finally coming to terms with the revolution, but also to explain why the March revolution had failed. The acknowledgement of the need for a U.S. military presence indicated a new approach to the Russian situation, one that saw the Bolsheviks as a firmly established entity that would have to be rooted out, rather than allowed to collapse under its own weight. Employing a paternalistic tone helped to justify such an action, depicting the Russian citizens as noble and redeemable souls who were trapped beneath a German and Bolshevik menace. Thinking of Russia in such a way also helped to explain why the initial revolution had failed. As Hunt explains: “In their efforts to explain what seemed to be the almost invariable tendency of revolutions to self-destruct, Americans looked to the personal failings of foreign leaders and the unfortunate traits of foreign peoples.”⁸³ The *Journal’s* cartoons accomplished just this. By separating the Russian people from the Bolsheviks, the editors were able to depict government leaders as evil and corrupt, while the citizens were “uninformed, superstitious, [and] primitive” and were not yet ready to take on the burden of independence.⁸⁴

The *Times* also differentiated between the government and the people, writing in an editorial on March 14: “It is well not to talk always about Russia and the Bolsheviks as if they were convertible terms.”⁸⁵ Using this distinction allowed the editors to look back with nostalgia upon the February Revolution and still berate the Bolsheviks for the current status of Russia. This could be seen in a May editorial, which recounted how the March uprising had brought the hope that liberty had come to the Russians, but contrasted that with the Bolshevik rule that had brought nothing but tyranny upon the general population.⁸⁶ Such sentiment aroused a lot of popular interest from the *Times* readers; the paper published numerous letters throughout the summer that advocated ways for the U.S. to aid the Russian people.

One reader’s response summarized the rationale behind the renewed sympathy for the Russian people. Bearing the title “How Can we Help Russia?” the letter advocated using Theodore Roosevelt in a role similar to that of General Marquis de La Fayette, the French soldier who helped lead colonial troops in the American Revolution. The prospect of the Rough Riders providing “inspiration and joy and strength to Russia” in the hopes of a “restoration of peace and prosperity,” while also helping to secure a positive revolution, would certainly have been an appealing image for those attempting to spread liberal democracy throughout the world.⁸⁷ In addition to stopping the Germans, the Allies had reasons to hope that an invasion of Russia could possibly free the “noble” citizens from the Bolsheviks.

THE BOLSHEVIK MENACE

The collapse of the German war machine changed the dynamics of the situation, especially in the *Journal*. Whereas the Prussian threat had largely shielded the Bolsheviks from more impas-

81 “We Should Help Russia,” *Providence Journal*, 29 May 1918, sec. 1: 10.

82 “Military Help for Russia,” *Providence Journal*, 28 June 1918, sec. 1: 12.

83 Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 116.

84 “Lessons for us From Russia,” *Providence Journal*, 22 February 1918, sec. 1: 8.

85 “Our Friends in Siberia,” *New York Times*, 14 March 1918, sec. A: 12.

86 “The Russian People Need Help,” *Providence Journal*, 4 May 1918, sec. 1: 14.

87 John McGahie, “How Can We Help Russia?,” *New York Times*, May 13 1918, sec. 1: 12.

sioned attacks in the past, the fall of the Kaiser and subsequent failed revolution in Germany cast the spotlight of hatred firmly upon Russia. Once begun, this process moved quickly, as evidenced by the tone of the *Journal's* editorial cartoons. As of November 8, 1918, there was still a tendency to demonize the Germans. A drawing to this effect depicted the Germans as a brute with a large club labeled "Prussianism" in one hand and a series of other countries, including Russia, soaked with blood in the other.⁸⁸ The image followed the narrative that the *Journal* had begun back in the initial days of the October Revolution—showing the Germans as the real menace behind the Bolsheviks. One month later, the message was completely different. This time, the cartoon showed the Bolsheviks as a hairy and evil-looking little man who was being booted off of U.S. soil, with a caption that read "No Place Here for Either."⁸⁹ Thus, in the space of one month, Lenin and his compatriots had gone from Prussian pawn to domestic threat. They were quickly assuming the role formerly occupied by the Germans.

Such a stance brought the *Journal* closer to the *Times* in respect to the Bolsheviks. Because it largely denied the German-Russian tie, the *Times* had consistently been more critical of the revolutionaries, meaning its stance did not change as much as the *Journal's* with the ending of the war. But the *Times* certainly did not lose its vehemence, calling the Bolsheviks a "murderous government" and a "pirate crew" on September 6.⁹⁰ The editors of the *Times* not only critiqued Lenin and his followers, they also began to question the Bolshevik ideology, criticizing them not for what was done to Russia, but because "they explicitly disdain democracy; to your honest Bolshevik that word expresses the most distasteful of all political theories."⁹¹ This marked the end of any sense of good or bad Bolshevik, for even the non-tyrannical ones could not be contained within America's value system.

This complete rejection of communism could be seen especially in the return to metaphors about the French Revolution. Whereas the March Revolution had led to favorable images of the States General, by the fall of 1918, the Bolsheviks were drawing comparisons to the Jacobins. A September editorial explicitly dealt with this issue, using the metaphor of Saturn devouring his own children—a famous comment about France's Reign of Terror—to explain an attempt to assassinate Lenin.⁹² Thus, while the initial verdict was slow to come, by the one-year anniversary of the October Revolution, the *Times* had come to the conclusion that the Bolshevik coup was unlikely to produce any sort of "ordered liberty," placing it outside the bounds of legitimate revolution.

This new consideration of Bolsheviks combined with external circumstances to create an explosive situation. With the close of the war it suddenly seemed as if all of Lenin's predictions about the worldwide spread of communism were coming true. This was an especially troubling occurrence because the war was supposed to make the world "safe for democracy," not open the door for the spread of Bolshevism.⁹³ Revolution threatened to overthrow the governments of Hungary and Germany, while liberal democracy was not making any inroads. The rapid success of such a new ideology was disheartening, as it appeared to be succeeding in multiple locations, while a century of revolutions attempting to mimic America's had resulted in little more than dashed hopes.

While the international threat was worrisome, domestic concerns coming out of demobilization quickly trumped debate about Europe. A certain letdown was inevitable after the

88 "The Offer of Peace," *Providence Journal*, 8 November 1918, sec. 1: 1.

89 "No Place Here for Either," *Providence Journal*, 8 December 1918, sec. 1: 1.

90 "A Government of Murder," *Providence Journal*, 6 September 1918, sec. 1: 12.

91 "Russia and the Peace," *New York Times*, 24 November 1918, sec. A: 37.

92 "Shooting of Lenine," *New York Times*, 3 September 1918, sec. 1: 10.

93 Woodrow Wilson, *War Messages*, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate Doc. No. 5, Serial No. 7264, Washington, D.C., 1917; pp. 3-8, *passim*. <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/swwi/1917/wilsonarm.html> (accessed December 8, 2005)

hyper-patriotism and prosperity of the war years, but the return of hundreds of thousands of soldiers created widespread unemployment and high inflation, leading to a “national crisis of self-confidence.”⁹⁴ In addition, demands of domestic solidarity were no longer necessary, causing an outburst of self-interested claims that had been stifled during the war.⁹⁵ One of the more assertive of these groups was organized labor, which demanded higher wages, better conditions and collective bargaining.⁹⁶ These ill-timed claims further exacerbated tensions and created an atmosphere of unrest amidst the poor condition of the job market.

Thus, the stance on Bolshevism took a stricter tone nearly immediately after the German armistice. By the start of 1919, the mere mention of the word Bolshevism was linked by the *Journal* to anarchism and terrorism. A January 2 editorial referred to communists as “reckless enemies of property and life,” while stories of horrific mutilation of Allied soldiers at the hands of the Bolsheviks were featured on the front page of both publications.⁹⁷ At the same time, such coverage was nearly identical to what had been published earlier about the Germans, especially with respect to propaganda. A *Journal* editorial on February 18 reported that a New York teacher had discovered Bolshevik teachings in school textbooks, leading the editors to proclaim, “The Bolshevik agents are closely paralleling the work of the German propagandists in attempting to poison the mind of youthful Americans.”⁹⁸ The *Journal* expounded on this three days later, declaring the communist propaganda to be “national in scope,” and “not the haphazard local propaganda of the individual theorists.”⁹⁹ The timing of such a finding is interesting, given that nearly one year earlier the *Journal* had turned up “insidious German propaganda” in Providence high school textbooks.¹⁰⁰ The evidence uncovered was also similar. The German propaganda consisted of a series of passages that exalted Germany’s strength and were designed to inculcate pro-Prussian sentiment among young children, while the Bolshevik threat came in the form of revolutionary pamphlets about how wonderful Lenin was.¹⁰¹

Such coverage highlighted an interesting trend within the two newspapers. By April 1919, the *Journal* seemed as if it had simply switched the word Bolshevik with German, demonizing the Russians the same way as they had demonized the Prussians during the war. There was not even much change in the rhetoric: saying the Bolsheviks were a menace and a group of agitators was no different from wartime pronouncements of Teuton spies operating within Boston or New York.¹⁰² This similarity marginalized the role of ideology, at least from the *Journal’s* standpoint. Although it did publish editorials on the anti-democratic nature of Bolshevism, such a position was similar to earlier proclamations that democracy could not be reconciled with the Kaiser and autocracy.¹⁰³ Even the bombings blamed on the IWW, one of the most memorable components of the Red Scare, had counterparts in past stories about the Prussians: On November 23, 1917, the *Journal* ran a plot by Germans to bomb a Chicago theatre.¹⁰⁴

The overwhelming similarities between the *Journal’s* treatment of the Bolsheviks after the war and the Prussians during it made the Red Scare a transfer of existing sentiments and

94 Hunt, *Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy*, 115 ; Schmidt, *Red Scare*, 25.

95 *Ibid.*

96 *Ibid.*

97 “Americans Struggle Victoriously Against Bolsheviki in Deep Snow,” *Providence Journal*, 6 January 1919, sec. 1: 1 ; “Reds Mutilate Our Soldiers,” *New York Times*, 6 January 1919, sec. A: 1.

98 “Sowing Bolshevism in America,” *New York Times*, 18 February 1919, sec. A: 10.

99 “Insidious Propaganda,” *Providence Journal*, 21 February 1919, sec. 1: 10.

100 “Insidious German Propaganda Found in City’s School Books,” *Providence Journal*, 15 February 1918, sec. 1: 1.

101 *Ibid.*; “Boys Read Lenin Book,” *New York Times*, 17 February 1919, sec. A: 4.

102 “Menace of Bolshevism Suggests Changes in Immigration Policy,” *Providence Journal*, 1 April 1919, sec. 1: 1 ; “Boston Menaced by Teuton Spies,” *Providence Journal*, 22 November 1917, sec. 1: 3.

103 “Bolshevism is anti-democratic,” *Providence Journal*, 4 April 1919, sec. 1: 12 ; “Autocracy against Democracy,” *Providence Journal*, 2 December 1917, sec. 3: 2.

104 “German Confesses to Bomb Outrage,” *Providence Journal*, 23 November 1917, sec. 1: 6.

prejudice from one enemy group to another, rather than detailing the appearance of a new and dangerous faction. This process negated the role of ideology, as the coverage was nearly identical for two groups that did not share the same tenets. Thus, from the perspective of the *Journal*, Bolshevism was not a unique threat. It certainly presented a challenge to U.S. sentiment, but not in any original form. In other words, rather than creating a new precedent of fear and xenophobia, the Red Scare and general feelings about communism were merely the continuation of a national trend.

While the *Journal* simply shifted its sensationalism, the *Times* kept a more consistent tone, building upon its previous critiques of Bolshevism, but doing so in a factual manner. Thus, while it was more critical of the ideological tenets of communism, the *Times* did not appear as vehement as the *Journal* did. That the more doctrinally opposed paper was less vicious in its sentiments reflects the unimportance of beliefs in consideration of the Bolsheviks.

Entering the Red Scare of 1919, the two papers had followed similar arcs with different results. Both expressed enthusiasm at the initial revolution in March 1917, praising its ideological and militaristic implications. Those same hopes came crashing down less than nine months later with the Bolshevik coup. But both publications expressed their disappointment in relation to the war effort, largely leaving out doctrinal considerations. Moreover, the two newspapers differed in their source of blame for the uprising. While the *Times* took a more critical look of Russia's past, blaming Kerensky for failing to act more quickly, the *Journal* extended its rabid hatred of the Germans to explain Lenin's ascendance to power. As the war progressed, these positions held rather constant, developing an air of paternalism toward the Russian people, but not revising their beliefs about the leaders until after the German armistice. The Kaiser's surrender, however, brought about significant change, especially within the content of the *Journal*. With the German threat theoretically neutralized, the editors kept their rhetoric constant, shifting the hatred and suspicion from the Prussians to the Bolsheviks. The *Times*, meanwhile, maintained a more constant position, continuing to hold harsher words for the Russians than the Germans. The *Times*, therefore, had consistently held a harsher position on the Bolsheviks and their ideology, yet the *Journal*—which did not deal with ideological considerations—was the fierier of the two during the Red Scare of 1919. This indicated that xenophobia and fear were more a result of general outlook than any specific doctrine.


Since 1896, the front page of every copy of the *Times* has run with a little box in the top right corner that proclaims "All the News That's Fit to Print." Nowadays, such a slogan epitomizes the standards of fair and balanced coverage that are expected of all print media. Looking over issues from less than 100 years ago, however, one can see that the standards of what was considered "fit to print" have evolved significantly over time. In a sense, the period of the Russian Revolution was the middle stage in the evolution of American newspapers. Some publications, such as the *Journal*, were still led by editors who, like Horace Greeley in the nineteenth century, were using their editorial role as a political platform. These partisan goals produced sensationalized reporting that would even put some of the worst of contemporary television news channels to shame. Meanwhile, other newspapers such as the *Times* were moving toward a more balanced coverage, though this was somewhat tempered by the lack of technology for long-distance reporting. Thus, the *Journal* and the *Times* respectively represented the past and the future of the newspaper business. The era of singular leaders using their publications to voice their own beliefs was fading: it was slowly replaced by a more factual approach to reporting. But this moment was still a transitory period, in which both the sensationalist tactics of John Rathom and the more restrained approach of Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr. were drawing record numbers of readers—regardless of how accurately their information was presented.

APPENDIX: THE CARTOONS OF MILTON HALLADAY

The Providence Journal's political cartoonist, Milton Halladay, often conveyed the staunch position of Rathom and the other editors in a clear and easily discernible manner. Below are some examples of his work.




"The Latest Peace Angel," Providence Journal, 25 November 1917



"Delivering the Goods," Providence Journal, 11 November 1917

LET THEM CARRY YOUR BAGS



"Let THEM Carry Your Bags," Providence Journal, 30 June 1918

THIS WAY TO THE FRONT!



"This way to the Front," Providence Journal, 16 March 1918



"News from Below Decks," Providence Journal, 6 October 1918



"The Offer of Peace," Providence Journal, 8 November 1918



"No Place Here for Either," *Providence Journal*, 8 December 1918

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THESES ABSTRACTS

2005–2006

SELECTED FOR PUBLICATION BY THE DEAN OF THE COLLEGE

THE COMPANY MAN: JOHN T. MCNAUGHTON AND ESCALATION IN VIETNAM BY CHRISTOPHER ELIAS

ADVISOR: PROFESSOR ROBERT O. SELF

This thesis examines a series of critical crossroads in America's escalating involvement in Vietnam through the eyes of John Theodore McNaughton, an important but forgotten official who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs from 1964 until 1967. A quiet official who preferred to stay behind the scenes, McNaughton rarely made public statements or spoke to the press and has been largely overlooked by historians writing about the Vietnam era.

Yet McNaughton's career at the Pentagon warrants extensive study. He possessed a unique blend of power, access, idealism, intellect, cynicism, self-doubt and analytic capability that combined to make him the perfect representative of the unfulfilled promise of the Vietnam generation of bureaucrats. In using that unique pool of skills to create Vietnam policy and analyze the outcome of those decisions, McNaughton developed a unique perspective on the era, one that allowed him to recognize the shortcomings of America's involvement in Vietnam as early as the fall of 1964. For nearly two years, however, he refused to voice those doubts to any significant audience, not even one composed of his most trusted peers within the government. He even privately argued for a dovish approach, then changed his opinion in more open settings and argued in favor of escalation. Recognizing the problem without using all of his energy to extricate America from the quagmire was McNaughton's great failing. That his early death perhaps prevented him from taking action—however belated, it would have made a difference – only adds to the tragedy of his story. This critical friction was perhaps best described by David Halberstam, who wrote that upon his elevation to Assistant Secretary, McNaughton “became at once the man in the government where two powerful currents crossed: great and forceful doubts about the wisdom of American policy in Vietnam, and an equally powerful desire to stay in government, to be a player, to influence policies for the good of the country, for the right ideas, and for the good of John McNaughton.”¹

While engaging in historical counterfactuals is dangerous, we must wonder what would have happened if significant pressure to slow or stop the buildup of American forces in the region had been placed on top officials by their colleagues during the early years of 1964–65.

1 Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*, 365.

If this exchange of doubts had occurred before the commitment of hundreds of thousands of American troops, one must ask if the entire course of American involvement could have changed. Indeed, could thousands of lives – both American and Vietnamese – have been saved? Though this thesis never directly engages these questions, it is my hope that it may allow the reader to better understand the course and causes of escalation in Vietnam and perhaps even shed some light on the decision-making process that determines American foreign policy.

REMEMBERING THE FLÂNEUR: THE WOMEN OF FRENCH PANORAMA, 1830–1848 BY DANA GOLDSTEIN

ADVISOR: PROFESSOR MARY GLUCK

As first articulated by cultural historian Walter Benjamin, the *flâneur*—loosely translated as the “stroller”—was the hero of nineteenth-century Paris. A dapper character who silently strolled the city streets, making wry observations about the mass of humanity he encountered while effortlessly disappearing into its fold, the *flâneur* has been read by historians, art historians, and literary theorists as an explicitly male type. Nineteenth-century women, scholars have argued, were generally excluded from the most exciting and liberating experiences of the emerging modern city, largely through a “separate sphere” gender ideology that confined women to the domestic space while their husbands, fathers and brothers were free to explore the rising capitalist marketplace, the democratization of politics and spectacular new entertainment opportunities in the modern city.

This thesis uses a genre of nineteenth-century popular literature called *panorama* to argue for a more nuanced view of the gender ideologies and gender roles of the July Monarchy. Nineteenth-century womanhood was not, in fact, a choice between being a whore or a housewife, a feminist activist or a nun. Rather, nineteenth-century observers—both male and female—constructed the femininity of their age as encompassing a diverse lot of available identities, from shop girl to salon leader, adulteress to seamstress, old maid to intellectual. And women writers, far from being excluded from nineteenth-century literary discourse, were active, if somewhat less visible participants in the panoramic genre, which encompassed travel guides, coffee table books and pamphlets. Panorama used human typologies to map Parisian society both high and low, serving as an important precursor to the realist novel. The female “types” represented in the pages of popular literature provide historians with powerful evidence that unlike some contemporary scholars, nineteenth-century observers considered women not only to be active players in the economic, social and political life of the modern city, but also to be symbolic of modernity itself. But men and women writers often had very different social and political agendas within the pages of panorama. Women writers in particular were adept at using this popular genre to advance feminist ideologies, forcing us to reconsider historians’ traditional reading of popular literature as devoid of true social and political critique.

CONTRIBUTORS

GRAINNE O'HARA BELLUOMO '07 is concentrating in Latin and Comparative Literature. When not writing about brothels and riots, she devotes most of her time to her thesis—an in-depth study of poop jokes in literature. This paper, written for Gordon Wood's course, "The Rise of the Early Republic," reflects her interests in micro-history and the development of the sensationalist press in the United States. After graduation, Grainne plans to return to her native New York City. She is still trying to figure out how to put her knowledge of Medieval Latin scat jokes to good use.

BENJAMIN L. MILLER '07 is concentrating in History and Economics. A native of Baltimore, Ben has an interest in the ways people respond to monumental events and how historical facts and narratives become twisted to suit personal motives. These interests inspired the research for this paper, which was written in Professor Naoko Shibusawa's course on U.S. foreign relations in the twentieth century. While at Brown, Ben has been involved with the Brown Daily Herald, serving as an executive editor on the 116th editorial board. Upon graduation, Ben hopes to pursue either a graduate degree in history or attend law school.

REBECCA SILVERMAN '08 is concentrating in American Civilization and Ethnic Studies. Her interest in the intersections between twentieth-century American history and the public humanities motivated the research for this paper, written in Professor Robert Lee's seminar on Asian American History. In addition to leading an after-school cooking program for underprivileged children and serving as an undergraduate teaching assistant, Rebecca has been active in the Student Activities Office, Office of the Chaplains and Religious Life, Hillel and the Sarah Doyle Women's Center while at Brown. Upon graduation, Rebecca hopes to pursue her interests in the creative arts and design, lifestyle, and business.

NICHOLAS SWISHER '08 is concentrating in History and Political Science. He wrote this essay for a seminar on Stalinism taught by Professor Ethan Pollock; the topic reflects Nicholas's interest in mid-twentieth century journalism. Outside of class, he writes opinions columns for the Brown Daily Herald and is a member of the Writing Fellows program. He is currently researching his thesis, a historical analysis of Mad Magazine. Upon graduation, he hopes to work in politics, and then attend law school.

ZACHARY TOWNSEND '09 is a 5-year AB/ScB candidate concentrating in Public Policy, Education Studies and Applied Mathematics-Economics. Zac is interested in twentieth-century political and economic history, historiography and the history of education. He wrote this paper for Luther Spoehr's course, "American Higher Education in Historical Context." Zac has been awarded the Royce and Liman Fellowships, and served as Vice President of the student body and on several university committees. He has been a regular columnist for the Brown Daily Herald and is a Fellow of the Center for the Study of the Presidency.

JEFFREY A. YOSKOWITZ '07 is concentrating in History. His interest in food cultures and commodity history motivated his research for this paper written for Professor Lance van Sittert in an African environmental history course while abroad at the University of Cape Town.> While at Brown, Jeffrey has been an active writer for student publications and has focused on many environmental issues, including sustainable agriculture and mass consumption.>

NATAN ZEICHNER '07 is concentrating in History and Latin American Studies. He developed an interest in contemporary Brazilian history after spending 10 months in São Paulo as an intern and research assistant. This paper is an adaptation of chapter four of his senior history thesis, which explores the social history of a segment of left-wing student activists who in the 1970s left school to become industrial workers in the Greater São Paulo area. Next year, Natan will be in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro as a Fulbright scholar, after which he will enter the PhD history program at New York University.

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